


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OF ACCIDENT REPORT

Accident Investigation Report

Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality

June 26, 1990
Southwestern Region
Tonto National Forest




Accident Investigation Report

Dude Fire Incident

Multiple Firefighter Fatality

June 26, 1990
Southwestern Region
Tonto National Forest



ELDON W. ROSS
Chief Investigator
JUL 20 1990

Team Members:

Jerry Monesmith, Fire Operations, Safety and Training
Washington Office

Hank Walters, Regional Safety and Health Manager
Intermountain Region

Frank Quintana, Regional Safety and Health Manager
Southwestern Region

Arvin White, Director, Fiscal and Public Safety
Southwestern Region

Dick Mangan, Program Leader, Fire, Aviation and Safety
Missoula Technology Development Center

Ted Putnam, Equipment Specialist
Missoula Technology Development Center

Patrica Andrews, Fire Behavior Specialist
Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station

Lee Redding, Staff Officer, Recreation and Wilderness
Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest

David Goens, Fire Weather Program Manager
National Weather Service

I. INVESTIGATION

A. Narrative

B. Findings

C. Causal Factors

A. Narrative

At approximately 1845 hours MST, Tuesday, June 26, 1990, the Washington Office Safety and Health Manager advised the Chief Investigator that a Chief's Office Accident Investigation Team was being formed to investigate a multiple fatality accident that had occurred on the Dude Fire, Tonto National Forest, Payson Ranger District.

Frank Quintana and Arvin White, Team Members from the Southwestern Regional Office, arrived at the Payson Ranger District late Tuesday evening for initial briefings, to secure the site and collect initial information. Ross, Monesmith, Quintana, White, Redding, and Walters met for the initial team meeting in the Payson Ranger District Office at 1230 hours, June 27 and received a briefing on the fire and events surrounding the accident from Bob Wagenfehr, Fire Staff Officer, Tonto NF, and Forrest Carpenter, Deputy Regional Forester.

It was determined immediately that fire behavior expertise would be required and Patricia Andrews, Fire Behavior expert was ordered for the team. Later, permission was requested and granted for David Goens, Meteorologist to join the team. Ron Zuniga, Assistant Director, Inspections and Investigations, Arizona Department of Corrections was granted permission to accompany the team during their investigation. Cliff Pearlberg, Arizona Natural Resources Manager, was also granted permission to observe the team functions.

The initial accident site visit was made on Wednesday, June 27, from 1730-2000 hours by all the team members except Mangan, Putnam, Andrews, and Goens who joined the team later. The second team meeting was held from 2030 to 2300 hours to organize and make team assignments for development of the necessary supporting data. Data responsibilities were as follows: Monesmith, Sequence of Events; Walters, Site Investigation; Quintana, Witness Statements; White, Records; and Andrews, Fire Behavior. Interview assignments were made to various team members.

The decision was made to use the Payson Ranger District Office as the Team Headquarters for June 28-29, then move to the Tonto Supervisor's Office in Phoenix for the remainder of the investigation. On Thursday, June 28, 0700 hours the team reassembled to review assignments, then separated to accomplish their individually assigned tasks. The entire team did not reassemble until June 30, however telephone contact was maintained to share important information or make additional assignments.

Bodies of the accident victims were photographed and removed by the County Sheriff's Department. Collection of equipment, materials and information related to the accident victims was coordinated through the Arizona Department of Corrections. Ron Zuniga provided excellent support and assistance throughout the investigation. Activities at the accident scene and in the fire camp were coordinated with the Incident Commander. Support needs at Payson were coordinated with the District Ranger or his Staff Officers. The decision to relocate the investigation team headquarters to the Tonto Supervisor's Office was made in order to minimize the impact on already strained resources at the Payson Ranger District.

Interviews were conducted with key members of the overhead teams and all surviving members of the Perryville Crew. Statements or records were obtained from several other key persons knowledgeable of the incident, including representatives of the Gila County Sheriff's Department and the Gila County Medical examiner.

The accident scene was released to the Incident Commander at approximately 1700 hours, June 30, 1990.

The close out for the Regional Forester, Forest Supervisor and their invited staffs was held July 5, 0830 to 1030 hours in Phoenix. Also attending was M. Jean Hassell, Arizona State Land Commissioner, Robert Richey, Chief Meteorological Services Division, National Weather Service (NWS) Western Region, and Walt Shaw, Type I Incident Management Team, Incident Commander.

Equipment and personal belongings of some of the Crew members collected at the accident site or other items belonging to the State were returned to the Department of Corrections.

The Chief Investigator released all the team members to their normal duties at 1000 hours, July 5, 1990, except Frank Quintana who was retained to come to the Washington Office to assist the National Safety and Health Manager in organizing the Chief's Board of Review.

B. Findings

The findings listed in this report are supported by Interviews, Witness Statements, Physical Evidence, Standard Forest Service Forms and other information which are held in our system of records.

Section

(a) Incident Management

(b) Personnel

(c) Equipment

(d) Weather

(e) Fire Behavior

(a) Incident Management

- (1) The fire was lightning caused at approximately 1230 hours June 25 and it was reported at 1315 hours.
- (2) A Type II Incident Management Team was ordered at 1500 hours on June 25.
- (3) A National Type I Incident Management Team was ordered at 2105 hours on June 25.
- (4) Records show the qualifications of the Type I and II Overhead Teams were appropriate for assigned duties.
- (5) The Tonto Fire Net used by the Type II Team had heavy use, making communication difficult.
- (6) The use of multiple undesignated frequencies resulted in the lack of communication between line personnel and overhead.
- (7) The Shift plan safety message and fire behavior forecast accurately predicted the potential for extreme fire behavior and thunderstorm buildup.
- (8) The Type I Team planned to "shadow" the Type II from 0600 to 1300 hours, and take over the incident at 1300 hours.
- (9) Type I Operations Section Chief Cooke met with Type II Team Operations Chief VanTilborg at approximately 1200 hours on June 26 to discuss transition.
- (10) Operations Chief Cooke assigned Division Supervisor Whitney responsibility for Bonita Creek subdivision protection and Division Supervisor Gatewood responsibility for Division "E" (Control Road to Road 144) at approximately 1250 hours on June 26.
- (11) Division Supervisor Gatewood did not understand he had responsibility for the segment of Division "E" where Navajo Crew No. 2 and Perryville crews were working.
- (12) The strategy was to construct and hold a line down the bottom of Walk Moore Canyon.
- (13) Escape routes were discussed and understood; however, safety zones were not designated or developed prior to the entrapment.
- (14) The Perryville Crew posted lookouts intermittently; none were out immediately prior to the entrapment.
- (15) Burnout operations were conducted during the heat of the day and during predicted thunderstorm activity.

(b) Personnel

- (1) Of the nineteen (19) Perryville Crew members, in 1990 Step testing, four scored 45 or above, six did not score 45 or above, and nine did not take the test. Two of the fatalities had passed the step test in 1989 or 1990.
- (2) The Perryville Crew Representative was a qualified Strike Team Leader/Task Force Leader and is in training for Division Supervisor.

(3) The Perryville Crew personnel and Type II Overhead were in working or duty status in excess of 30 hours prior to the entrapment.

(4) The Perryville Crew had received training in shelter deployment.

(5) Eleven members of the Perryville Crew were entrapped. Six fatalities occurred: 5 males, 1 female. Of the five who survived the entrapment, one received critical burns, one serious burns, and three minor burns.

(6) Blood gas carbon monoxide levels of the fatalities ranged from less than 3% to a maximum of 28.5%.

(c) Equipment

(1) The Perryville Crew was properly equipped for fire line duty with personal protective equipment.

(2) The fire shelters were produced under contract to the General Services Administration using Forest Service specifications.

(3) Personal Protective Equipment functioned within design limits.

(4) Not all personnel had sufficient time to use Personal Protective Equipment in the recommended manner.

(5) Equipment near the victims indicate temperatures close to the ground were within survivable limits.

(6) Clothing degradation of four of the deceased indicates they were caught in a flame front prior to fully deploying fire shelters.

(7) Fire shelters of the deceased were opened, but were not held down in the recommended position throughout the hazardous period.

(d) Weather, June 26, 1990

(1) Record high temperatures in the mid 90's, with 10%-15% humidities, were forecast and observed in the Dude Fire area.

(2) A convective cell occurred over the fire before 1000 hours.

(3) An updated fire weather forecast indicating building thunderstorm activity was obtained from the National Weather Service at 1100 hours. This information was not transmitted to fireline personnel.

(4) A National Weather Service Fire Weather Forecaster was requested and arrived at the Incident Base Camp at 1200 hours.

(5) A few sprinkles of rain occurred in the fire area around 1310-1315 hours.

(6) Designated weather observers were not assigned.

(7) A definite calm occurred a few minutes before the blow-up.

(8) The sky darkened a few minutes before the blow-up.

(9) A strong blast of wind preceded the fire front.

(10) A thunderstorm gust front moved over the entrapment site at 1410-1420 hours.

(11) A transcription error resulted in the Spot Weather Report in the day shift plan not accurately reflecting the National Weather Service spot weather forecast.

(e) Fire Behavior

(1) Torching, spotting, and short runs through the crowns occurred periodically from ignition through 1400 hours on June 26.

(2) Fuels were dry. Moisture contents of one-quarter inch sticks (10 hour) were 4%; large dead logs (1000 hour) 8%; live fuel (manzanita, scrub oak, and silver tassel leaves) 76%.

(3) The fire burned through ponderosa pine, manzanita, scrub oak, needle and leaf litter, and large dead and down fuel.

(4) Heavy dead and down fuels (logs) were completely consumed by the fire because of the dry conditions, contributing to development of the convection column.

(5) Short range spotting resulted from the burnout operations (1100-1315 hours).

(6) The weather (wind) totally dominated the fire environment at the time of the blow-up.

(7) The fire flashed from the west to the east side of Walk Moore Canyon. This was followed immediately by the burning of the surface fuels.

(8) The fire spread approximately 1.5 miles during the first one-half hour of the strong wind event. The fire crossed Walk Moore Canyon during this time.

(9) The fire spread and intensity were within the range of control by handcrews from 0500 until 1400 hours.

C. Causal Factors

- (a) Critical weather and fire behavior conditions were predicted and observed by some, but not acted upon by Incident personnel.
- (b) The fire enhanced the convection column to the point that the column collapsed causing the down rush of winds in a radial manner. This resulted in rapid fire spread on nearly all sides of the fire.
- (c) Poor radio communications and differences in frequencies caused a break down in communications between overhead and crews, and between ground personnel and air operations.
- (d) Transition of the overhead teams during mid-shift resulted in an uncertainty as to Division Supervisory responsibility for the Navajo Crew No. II and Perryville crews in Walk Moore Canyon.
- (e) Eight of the eighteen "Situations that Shout Watch Out" (Nos. 3 6 7 8 11 12 14 16) were not recognized, and actions consistent with seven of the ten "Standard Fire Orders" (Nos. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8) were not taken.
- (f) The fire spread so fast that the victims, without warning, did not have sufficient time to escape.

II. SUPPORTING DATA

- A. Sequence of Events
- B. Site Investigation
- C. Witness Statements
- D. Records

A. Sequence of Events

At approximately 1230 hours, June 25, 1990, a dry lightning storm started a fire under the Mogollon Rim on the Payson Ranger District, Tonto National Forest, Southwestern Region. It was sighted 1315 hours and when observed from the air at 1330 hours, the Dude Fire was estimated at 5 acres and located just below the Mogollon Rim.

An hour later, the size had grown to 50 acres and at 1615 hours, it was reported at over 100 acres with a spot fire about one mile east of the main fire.

By 1800 hours, 18 crews (360 firefighters) had been ordered in addition to the initial attack resources. A Type II Incident Management Team had been ordered earlier and was on the fire.

A Type I Incident Management Team was ordered at 2105 hours, on the 25th. The Team received a Line Officers briefing at 0430 hours, June 26.

Brisk down canyon winds pushed the fire to approximately 1900 acres by 0500 hours, on June 26, when winds subsided and the fire laid down.

The Perryville Crew arrived at the Payson Ranger District at approximately 1930 hours., Monday, June 25th. They were given instructions to eat and go to the Base Camp. While enroute to the Camp, following dinner, they were redirected to the Bonita Creek Subdivision on the fireline, arriving there about 0100 hours. Shortly after, they were moved again to the junction of Walk Moore Canyon and Control Road, arriving there at about 0230 hours.

The Crew began clearing a fireline up the jeep trail in Walk Moore Canyon. Part way up the Canyon, they were directed to continue the line along a power line right-of-way up to the Bonita Creek Subdivision. They arrived at the Subdivision at about 0500 hours, and worked there until 0900-1000 hours,

Following lunch they were directed to improve the dozer line, working down Walk Moore Canyon toward the Control Road where they had begun. By this time the jeep trail had been bladed by a dozer as a part of the fire control effort.

Type I Incident Management Team Operations Section Chief Derrick Cooke met with Type II Operations Section Chief Butch VanTilborg at about 1200 hours in the Bonita Creek Subdivision to discuss Overhead transition. Cooke made assignments to Type I Team Division Supervisors Bead, Bernal Gatewood and Jeffrey Whitney who also were in the area. Cooke then walked the fireline down Walk Moore Canyon from Bonita Creek, arriving at the Control Road at about 1415 hours.

A spot was reported below the Control Road on the west side at 1345 hours. Also, at approximately 1330 hours members of the Type II and Type I teams, when attempting to leave the Bonita Creek area found that it was surrounded by fire. Two dozers were directed to build a safety zone within the burned area.

The Perryville Crew was located approximately one-third of the way down the Canyon, at about 1300 hours, when they ran out of water. Crew Boss Larry Terra took Crew Member Fred Hill and left to get water at the Control Road leaving Assistant Crew Boss Sandra Bachman in charge with Crew Representative Dave LaTour. Terra sent the water up the line on an all-terrain-vehicle and began walking back with Hill.

The Crew gathered around the water supply, 3,300 feet from the Control Road, to fill their canteens. Just minutes after returning to work at about 1415-1420 hours, a Navajo crew member yelled "Get Out". All of the Navajo and Perryville Crew members, realizing the fire was blowing up, immediately began running down Walk Moore Canyon toward the Control Road. Part way down, 11 members of the Perryville Crew

were cut off when the fire crossed the dozer line. They turned around and began running back up the Canyon with orders to deploy their shelters.

Crew Representative LaTour radioed that the Perryville Crew was deploying their shelters. Strike Team Leader Scopa forwarded the message to Operations Section Chief Cooke at 1423 hours.

Crew member Donald Love deployed the furthest up the dozer line. Curtis Springfield was to his left, William Davenport to his right and just below. LaTour was just below Davenport. Geoffrey Hatch was below this group, then Alex Conteras, James Denney and Bachman. James Ellis probably deployed somewhere nearby. Joseph Chacon deployed 60 feet below Bachman and Gregory Hoke approximately 400 feet below Chacon.

At the time of the deployment, Denney was assisting Bachman with getting her shelter out. He then went down the dozer line. He was later found lying under Chacon. Springfield yelled "I can't take it anymore", got up, stumbled into Love's shelter, then went down the dozer line to where he expired about 150 feet below Love.

The front of Hatch's shelter was either blown or kicked off. Since he had lost part of his protection, he got up and ran up the dozer line. He continued up the dozer line about 200 yards where he was seen by Zigzag Hotshot Crew Superintendent Paul Gleason. Gleason call for Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) assistance and reported to Cooke, at 1434 hours, that he had found an injured firefighter.


Sometime during the entrapment, Ellis got up and walked down the creek bed and dozer line and spoke to Hoke who was still under his shelter.


After the deployment site had cooled down, Davenport, Love, and La Tour got out of their shelters and proceeded down the dozer line toward the Control Road. They came to Hoke still in his shelter. The four continued down the Canyon and met Ellis coming up. The five then proceeded down Walk Moore Canyon where Ellis expired 900 feet from the Control Road. The remainder then continued on and met an Engine Crew on the Control Road at about 1505 hours.


B. Site Investigation


1. Maps
 - (a.) State: Arizona
 - (b.) Forest: Tonto NF
 - (c.) Area: District
 - (d.) Fire: Dude Incident
 - (e.) Site: Walk Moore Canyon
2. Perryville Crew Member List
3. Crew Deployment Positions
4. Crew Equipment Location


1. Maps











2. Perryville Crew Member List

Perryville Crew Member List


Name	Age	Title	Injured	Doc. No. ¹	Pack No. ²	Entrapped ³
LARRY TERRA	30	CSO	NO			
SANDRA J. BACHMAN	43	CSO	DOA		27	YES
JOSEPH L. CHACON	25	FF	DOA	59979	13	YES
ALEX S. CONTRERAS	33	FF	DOA	39347	6	YES
JAMES L. DENNEY	39	FF	DOA	32912	1	YES
JAMES E. ELLIS	34	FF	DOA	40578	4	YES
CURTIS E. SPRINGFIELD	24	FF	DOA	57718	19	YES
GEOFFREY HATCH	27	FF	CRITICAL	50438	11	YES
WILLIAM H. DAVENPORT	23	FF	INJURED	75897	5	YES
GREGORY HOKE	29	FF	INJURED	41497	16	YES
DONALD R. LOVE	30	FF	INJURED	45301	12	YES
ROBERT M. CARRILLO	32	FF	NO	39380	7	NO
NORMAN ENRIQUEZ	23	FF	NO	46541	18	NO
PATRICK A. FLIPPEN	27	FF	NO	71515	9	NO
DERRICK E. GUY	25	FF	NO	36257	15	NO
GLEN A. HARDER	28	FF	NO	46793	14	NO
FRED HILL	37	FF	NO	37610	2	NO
TIM SMITH	31	FF	NO	63479	3	NO
STEVEN PENDER	22	FF	NO	57518	10	NO

¹ Department of Correction's Personnel Number


² Fire Pack Number

³ "No" means the person escaped; "Yes" means the shelter was deployed in some manner or not used.

3. Crew Deployment Positions



4. Crew Equipment Location



DUDE INCIDENT 6/26/90
 Walk Moore Canyon - Tonto National Forest
CREW EQUIPMENT LOCATION
 Perryville Crew

NOTE: GRAPHIC SKETCH AND FIELD
 DISTANCES NOT TO SCALE
 1 CHAIN = 66 FEET



C. Witness List

An asterisk (*) indicates that the statement provide by the individual is in this report (See Section D). All other statements are a part of the supporting documents to this report and kept as part of our system of records.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title/Position</i>	<i>Home Unit</i>	<i>Telephone</i>
 <i>Class I</i>			
Walt Shaw	Incident Commander	BIA	
Steve Healy	Safety Officer	Gila NF	505-388-8241
Jim Paxon	Public Info Officer	Gila NF	505-894-6677
Ron Melcher*	FBA	Coconino NF	602-526-8223
Derrick Cooke*	Ops Section Chief	Rgnl Office	505-842-3266
Mark Spann*	Communications Tech	Tonto NF	602-225-5200
Ronald Regan*	Communications Tech	Coconino NF	602-527-7400
George Leech	Ops Section Chief		
 <i>Class II</i>			
Ed Hollenshed*	Incident Commander	Prescott NF	602-445-1762
Randy Cherington	Safety Officer	Tonto NF	602-488-3441
Pete Libby	Public Info Officer	Tonto NF	602-835-1161
Dale Ashby	Group F Supervisor	Tonto NF	602-474-2269
Bob Ortlund	Air Attack	Tonto NF	602-467-2236
Phil Gil*	Division Supervisor	BLM	
Butch Van Tilborg*	Ops Section Chief	Prescott NF	602-445-7253
Hall Ashcroft*	Safety Officer	Tonto NF	602-488-3441
Glen Dundas*	OPS Section Chief	Prescott NF	
 <i>Perryville Fire Crew</i>			
Larry Terra*	Corrections Serv. Off.	Perryville Detention Center	
Don Love*	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Fred Hill	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Robert Carrillo	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Patrick Flippen	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Norman Enriquez	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Derek Guy	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Gregory Hoke*	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Bill Davenport*	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Steve Pender	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Glenn Harder*	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Tim Smith	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Jeff Hatch	Crew Member	Perryville Detention Center	
Dave La'Tour*	Crew Rep.	Rural Metro, Tucson	

Other Fire Personnel

James W. Clawson	Law Enforcement Officer	Prescott NF	
Guy A. Jirrels	Fire Fighter	Chandler	602-786-2862
Clifford Pearlberg	State Representative	AZ Forestry	602-542-2612
Craig Ellis*	Fire Weather Forecaster	Weather Service	
		Phoenix	
Robert Berkovitz*	Fire-Weather Meteorologist	Weather Service	
		Phoenix	
Mark Tiffany*	Crew Foreman, Eng. 438	Payson RD	
Pat Velasco	Fire Mgt. Officer	Payson RD	
Alan Farnsworth*	FBA-Trainee		
Roy Sandoval	Rec. Guard, Eng. 438	Payson RD	
Bob Scopa*	Fire Captain	Yavapai Fire Dept.	
Paul Gleason*	Supt. Zig Zag Crew	Mt. Hood NF	
Bobbie Ortland	FS Regulars	Tonto NF	
Scott Hunt	District Forester	AZ Forestry Div.	
Jim Mattingly*	Foreman, Alpine Hot Shots	Zion NP	
Bob Wagenfehr	Tonto NF Fire Staff	Tonto NF	
Jeffrey Whitney*	Div./Sup.	Payson RD	
Bernal Gatewood*	Div./Sup., Div. "E"	Fort Apache-White	
		River	
Dr. Wes Romburger	Medical Examiner	Payson	602-474-6920
Bob Birgam	Deputy Sheriff	Gila County	602-474-2208
Mark Glossy	Air Attack (Trainee)	Region 5	
Louis Sorrell*	Crew Boss	BIA Fort Defiance	602-729-2307

D. Records

1. Witness Statements
2. Incident Objectives
3. Fire Behavior Forecast
4. Health and Safety Message
5. Site Photographs

1. Witness Statements

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

ASHCROFT, HALL

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

TONTO MESA DIST. TYPE II TEAM

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

SAFETY OFFICER

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

JERRY MONCUMITH
ELDON ROSE

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

ENDED

Date

Time

Date

Time

6/28/90

16. REMARKS

WENT INTO BONITO MONDAY NIGHT. FOUND SEVERAL ENGINES WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS IN A POTENTIAL DEATH TRAP BECAUSE THEY WERE LOCATED IN A BRUSH FIELD. SERVED AS A SAFETY OFFICER BECAUSE OF PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT SAFETY. TIED IN WITH 2 DOZERS WHICH HAD CAME IN WITHOUT SUPERVISION. ABOUT 1200, WAS AWARE THAT THE FIRE HAD SPOTTED ACROSS THE LINE OF THE PREVIOUSLY BURNED OUT AREA. HEARD FIRE HAD CROSSED THE CONTROL RD AND KNEW IT WAS A SERIOUS SITUATION. PROTECTED A FUEL TRUCK DRIVER & HIS SON.

FELT UNEASY ABOUT PUTTING IN THE DOZER LINE - BURNOUT WENT VERY WELL.

HELICOPTER IN THE AREA AT TIMES -

COMMUNICATION WAS A PROBLEM IN SOME AREAS.

AT THE TIME, FELT THE SHIFT CHANGE WENT O.K. & THAT WHITNEY HAD DONE A GOOD JOB IN GETTING READY FOR THE TRANSITION

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

W4

**USDA
Forest Service**

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION <i>Dude Fire Fatalities</i>			
3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle) <i>Berkovitz, Robert</i>		4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.	5. DOB
6. SEX		7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code) <i>Phoenix, AZ</i>	8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.
9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)		10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location) <i>National Weather Serv., Incident Fire Weather Forecaster</i>	
11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)		12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW <i>Incident Base</i>	
13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW <i>David W. Goens</i>		14. OTHERS PRESENT	
15. STARTED Date Time <i>6/29/90 1500</i>		16. ENDED Date Time <i>6/29/90 1600</i>	
17. REMARKS			

DOCUMENTATION ON THE TUESDAY AFTERNOON INCIDENT ON THE DUDE FIRE...

10/6
26
7/2

I had arrived at the Dude fire camp a little after 12 noon on Tuesday, June 25. I had checked in shortly after. The class I team was due to start coming in around 1 pm. I did wait around the fire camp for the fire behavior analyst for about an hour or so, but since nobody showed up, I took my compaq computer to the Payson Ranger station to hook to a phone in order to receive weather charts and other data. I was in Payson until around 5 PM.

While out at the fire camp earlier that afternoon, I did notice a convection column above the fire. There was a cloud cap that had developed above the smoke column. Someone said that they did see a few lightning strikes, and I did notice occasional bursts of static on the radio while driving to the camp. However, I did not hear any thunder.

I did meet the fire behavior analyst at the Payson Ranger district at about 4 or 4:30 and gave an informal briefing. I drove back out to the fire camp after receiving my charts, set my equipment up to read my charts and attended a more formal briefing later that evening.

Robert Berkovitz
Robert Berkovitz
Fire-weathermeteorologist

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE *David W. Goens* 18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

IM 15 / IM 10 / IM 9

Page ____ of ____

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

COOKE, DICK

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

RO-3

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

1. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

OPS SECTION CHIEF Type I

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

2. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

JERRY MONEYSMITH
ELDON ROSS

4. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/58

6. REMARKS

GOOT TOGETHER W/ PAT VALESICO ABOUT 10:30 AND WENT UP TO THE FIRE. PAT WAS PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE FOR FUTURE SUPPRESSION ACTIONS. DROVE UP THE CONTROL ROAD AND VISITED THE BONITA SPRINGS SUB-DIVISION DISCUSSED HAZARDS. MADE CONTACT WITH OPS CHIEF VANTILBERG WHO WAS CHECKING THE BURNOUT AROUND THE SUB-DIVISION. A STRIKE TEAM OF TYPE I ENGINE WAS PROTECTING THE STRUCTURES. CHECKED ON THE STATUS OF THE TYPE I DIVISION SUPS. ALL WERE IN THE AREA, J. WHITNEY, B. GATEWOOD & BEAD, 12:50-1:00. DIVISION SUPS HAD NOT TIED IN WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS. ASSIGNED BEAD TO THE WEST SIDE (DIV A), ASSIGNED GATEWOOD TO DIV. E FROM THE CONTROL ROAD AT WALK MORE CANYON UP TO ROAD 144. WHITNEY WAS TO STAY WITH THE STRUCTURE PROTECTION AND BURNOUT OPERATIONS. WALKED DOWN TOWARD WALK MORE CANYON AND MET WITH ENGINE S/T LDR SCOPA. PAT V. WAS WALKING UP WALK MORE FROM THE CONTROL ROAD. MET WITH PAT PART OF THE WAY DOWN.

(OVER)

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

AT 1315-1330 THE CROW SEQUENCE GOING DOWN THE CANYON WAS: ALPINE H.S., PERRYVILLE, & NAVAJO. NO BURN OUT WAS TAKING PLACE.

FIRE WAS BACKING DOWN ACROSS THE CANYON ABOUT $\frac{1}{3}$ THE WAY FROM THE TOP.

VEGETATION IN WACKMOORE WAS MUCH LIGHTER THAN ABOVE. AIR TURBULENCE WAS ALSO LESS.

HEARD A RADIO CONVERSATION THAT THE FIRE HAD CROSSED THE CONTROL ROAD. ON THE WEST SIDE.

ARRIVED AT THE CONTROL ROAD WITH PAT U. ABOUT 2:15.

AT 2:23, GOT A NOTICE FROM THE ENGINE ST LDR. THAT THEY THOUGHT THERE WAS A SHELTER DEPLOYMENT.

SEE COOKE'S CHRONOLOGY

WAS NOT AWARE OF AIR ATTACK (FIXED WING) ACTIVITY OVER THE FIRE.

WAS ANTICIPATING LESS PROBLEMS BELOW BONITA BECAUSE OF THE LIGHTER FUELS. WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY STORM ACTIVITY.

BELIEVED HE HAD NEVER CLEARLY TRANSITIONED RESPONSIBILITIES FROM VAN TILBORG. HAD A VERY SHORT TIME TO INTERACT WITH THE TYPE II TEAM AND CONSEQUENTLY THE TRANSITION DID NOT GO SMOOTHLY. HOWEVER, DIDN'T BELIEVE IT CAUSED THE ACCIDENT.

GLEASON & SCOPE'S ACTIONS WERE VERY PROFESSIONAL.

SCOPE HEARD ON HIS RADIO THAT PERRYVILLE WAS GOING TO DEPLOY SHELTERS.

WORST FIRE BEHAVIOR SEEN IN OVER 20 YRS OF EXPERIENCE.

Dick Cooke Chronology

Received from Dick Cooke
6/28/1538

- 228 - Strike Team 1
Shelter deployment
- 234 - Gleason reported injury
near Summer homes
- 237 - Gleason called for Burn Blanket
- 242 - Strike team #1 at scene with
medicine - Burn blanket etc
- 246 - Ordered Medicine Ship
- 252 - ~~Area~~ Fire behavior Recommended
Evac of other Summer home areas
- 254 - Heard Explosion from Summer Home area

- Duke Creek Spotting take out head
of Duke creek - Spot 1/2 mile East
of main fire -

- 301 Gleason advises other members of ~~Pennington~~
unaccounted for.
- 301 - Strike team 1 in black and apparently
safe

3:05 1/2 crew of Perryville walked out to control
Road

3:07 all of Perryville not accounted for

3:15 advised to order trauma stress
unit

Account on west in Dude Creek
Control had across sec 21
spot fire west of 144 sec 2-
NW of Sec 34 through 33

3:16 - Alfara - Helipad 100 yrd above
victim - cutting helipad

3:25 - Fire went over road on NE rim of
Fire - Spotted 1/2 mile 30 acres above rim

3:35 - Burn Victim - lifted out
to base

3:39 - 2 Perryville sent to Hospital with
Port Velasco's people - 1 difficulty
~~342~~ - Breathing, 1 possible broken rib.

342 - Reported 2 fatalities - Gleason -
"I think -"

344 - Reported to I.C. fatalities - Leach

352 - Ordered Fatality Investigation team

354 - total of 6 fatalities all others
are accounted for

401 - 35 mi Easterly - Move troops to
west slope & regroup -

444 - Called regarding Security - Stopped
at steel bridge

450 - Minn Run on West - holding at
bridge

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Bill
William Davenport

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Perryville Crew member

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

J. Monesmitz / ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29

16. REMARKS

Perryville crew was mixed in with the Navajo. One of the Navajo crew yelled "GET OUT!" All ^{of the} crew started down the dozer line. Got cut-off by flame coming across the line. Turned around and started running ^{back} up the dozer line. Don Love & La Tour were the only ones ahead. La Tour directed them to deploy shelters as they were running. Took back-pack off & took out ~~shelter~~ his shelter. Lost his glasses & Harley Davidson head band & ~~hardhat~~ after the deployment. Dropped ~~hat~~ ~~after deployment~~. Deployed next to Love. Deployed down the hill from the H₂O Jerry cans. Communicated with others ~~under shelter~~ under shelter. La Tour was directly behind. After the front hit, ~~heard one scream~~ "I CAN'T TAKE IT ANYMORE." ~~He then screamed from fear~~ F. T. was in the str after about 1/2 hour. A branch dropped on his shelter & burned his legs. Burn on arms was from touching

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

THE SIDE OF THE SHELTER DURING THE DEPLOYMENT BUT COULD NOT TRANSMIT. OF HIS SHELTER FOLLOWED BY LOUIS & LATOUR. LEFT DOWN THE CANYON. CHACON ON DONNY & THEN CONTEAS. TOOK THEIR SHELTERS WITH THEM. MET UP WITH HAKE WHO WAS STILL IN HIS SHELTER. NEXT MET ELLIS WHO WAS BURNED. FIRST THING HE SAID WAS THAT HE WAS DEAD - HE HAD TIED HIS SHELTER AROUND HIS FOREHEAD. LEFT ALL THEIR SHELTERS AT THE ROAD - THAT, GOGGLOS & GLASSES FELL OFF WHEN THEY CAME OUT OF THEIR SHELTERS.

**USDA
Forest Service**

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

Page 1 of 1

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

DUNDAS, GLEN

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

PRESCOTT N.F.

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

OPS SECTION CHIEF TYPE II TEAM

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

J. MONESMITH / ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

ENDED

Date

Time

Date

Time

6/28/90

16. REMARKS

WORKED TOGETHER WITH OPS CHIEF VAN-TILBORG WHO WAS HANDLING THE OPERATIONS ON THE GROUND. MET WITH THE TYPE I TEAM AT 4:30 AND RECONED THE FIRE WITH GEORGE LEECH AT ABOUT 8-8:30.

THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE TRANSITION OF THE DIVISION SUPS BECAUSE ONLY 2 CAME OUT TO THE FIRE RATHER THAN THREE.

THE STRATEGY WAS TO BURN OUT AROUND BONITA. SINCE THEY KNEW THE TEAM WAS GOING TO BE REPLACED, THEY DOUBLED UP THE DIVISION SUPS ON THE EAST SIDE AND THE BOTTOM. THESE WERE THE CRITICAL AREAS.

MET WITH WAGONFEHR TO AGREE ON THE STRATEGY. BEGAN MONITORING THE FIRING OPERATION ON BOTH THE EAST AND WEST SIDE BEGINNING AT ABOUT 10:00. SLOPOVERS WERE OCCURRING FROM THE START WITHOUT A SOUTHERNLY WIND. HOT FIRING, BUT SUCCESSFUL. FLEW THE FIRE AT ABOUT 1300 WITH LEECH. WINDS WERE BEGINNING TO BLOW DOWN SLOPE, INFLUENCED BY A THUNDERSTORM. TALKED TO GEORGE ABOUT FIRE

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

BEHAVIOR, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE AUGER
AND CREWS HAD BEEN ON THE LINE.

PULLED THE CREWS BACK FROM THE FIRING
OPERATIONS ON THE WEST SIDE AT ABOUT 1315-
1330 BECAUSE OF THE FIRE BEHAVIOR.

ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE AIRATTACK, BUT HE
WAS MONITORING THE WRONG FREQ. FINALLY
BI-PASSED THE AIRATTACK BY USING THE PILOT
TO COMMUNICATE NEWS TO THE LEAD PLANE.

HAD TWO DIFFERENT AIRATTACKS AND THE DIFFER-
ENCE WAS LIKE NIGHT AND DAY. ONE DIDN'T SOUND
QUALIFIED AND HAD DIFFICULTY LINING OUT
WHAT APPEARED TO BE "CLEAR" TARGETS.

WAS CONTACTED BY BASE THAT THEY NEEDED THE
HELICOPTER.

AT 1345, INSTRUCTED BUTCH THAT THE CONTROL
ROAD WAS NO LONGER DEFENSIBLE AS THE FIRE
HAD CROSSED IT. BUTCH DROVE DOWN TO
CHECK IT AND DETERMINED THE ROAD WAS NOT
PASSABLE.

TURNED RESPONSIBILITIES OVER TO LEECH AND
RETURNED TO THE HELIBASE ABOUT 1400.

REMAINED FRUSTRATED BECAUSE ONE OF THE
TYPE I SUPS. (BOMB) STILL HAD COME OUT
TO THE FIRE TO TRANSITION.

USDA Forest Service **MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW**
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Catcher

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle) Ellis, Craig	4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.	5. DOB	6. SEX
7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code) Phoenix, AZ	8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.	9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)	
10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location) National Weather Soc - Fire Weather Forecaster	11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)		

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW NWS Forecast Office Phoenix AZ	13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW David W. Goers	
14. OTHERS PRESENT	15. STARTED Date Time	ENDED Date Time

16. REMARKS

Telephone Weather Discussion July 26, 1990
for Dude Fire northeast of Payson from **Craig Ellis - Fire Weather Forecaster**

Fire Behavior Officer Trainee called from Dude Fire (northeast of Payson) late morning and asked for weather forecast update. Told him similar conditions as past 24 hours with variable winds mostly from the north or downslope late night and early morning hours occasionally to 15 MPH becoming mostly from the southwest or upcanyon upslope 10 to 20 MPH. FEW THUNDERSTORMS IN THE AREA during aftern & eve hours with little or no rain. **STRONG GUSTY VARIABLE WINDS NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.** Told him TSTMS appeared to be developing on radar near the fire already.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)



**USDA
Forest Service**

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Fairnsworth, Alan

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Type I Fire Behavior Analyst Trainee (SAAWS Team)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Telephone

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

7/3/90

1700

7/3/90

1710

16. REMARKS

Telephone interview for the purpose of determining if the Fire Weather Forecast received @ 11 AM 6/26 was transmitted to the line-

Fairnsworth indicated he had talked to the Natl. Weather Service forecaster Craig Ellis on 6/26. Fairnsworth needed a forecast for the night shift plan. The Forecast was given and Ellis mentioned that Thunderstorms were beginning to form over the NW area. I asked Fairnsworth if he had given this information to any of the line personnel on the line. He indicated he had only given the people responsible for the night shift plan. He commented that "everyone knew there were thunderstorms in the area" so he did not feel it was necessary to call the line with the information.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

David W. Jones

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)



USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Incident - Deployment facilities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

BERNAL GATEWOOD

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

FORT Apache - WHITE RIVER

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

B.I.A.

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Dude Base Camp

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

HANK WALTERS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date


Time

6/29 approx 0620

6/29 approx 0635

16. REMARKS

AN INTERVIEW WAS HELD WITH BERNAL GATEWOOD "Division Supervision" Division "E" ASSIGNED TO THE "SHOW" INCIDENT COMMAND MANAGEMENT TEAM. BERNAL'S ASSIGNMENT WAS TO CONTINUE LWE CONSTRUCTION FROM WEST EAST ROAD OF THE BOUTA CREEK ESTATES TOWARDS THE "FOREST SERVICE" STATION A+E. HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTIVITY TAKING PLACE IN DIVISION "F" WHICH WAS THE BOUTA CREEK SUMMER ESTATES. THE FIRST HE HAD HEARD OF THE DEPLOYMENT WAS AT APPROXIMATELY 1430. HE WAS NOT SURE OF THE DIVISION BREAKS BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF MAPS SHOWING THE DIVISIONS. HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WAS CONTINUING THE WORK STARTED BY THE CLASS II TEAM.



17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

Henry A. Walters

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

**USDA
Forest Service**

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

GILL, PHIL

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

KINGMAN, BLM ARIZ.

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

DIV. SUPER TYPE II TEAM

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

**JERRY MONSMITH
ELDON ROSS**

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/28

10:35

16. REMARKS

SERVED AS DIV SUP AND ASSISTED DAN ECKSTIN BECAUSE OF THE EMPHASIS TO PROTECT THE BONITA SUBDIVISION. ACTED AS THE FIRING BOSS, BEGAN BACKFIRING AT ABOUT 1100. DIV. SUP WHITNEY, DIV SUP TYPE I TEAM, JOINED THEM 10-1100. ZIGZAG CREW WAS DOING THE FIRING. A DRIZZLE STARTED SHORTLY AFTER 1:00 FROM A CUMULOUS CLOUD. THUNDERSTORM WINDS OCCURRED IN THE CAMP. HAD DIFFICULTY HOLDING THE LINE ALL MORNING. LOST A SPOT EARLIER WHICH THEY PLANNED TO LINE WITH A DOZER LATER IN THE DAY. THEY LEFT TO RETURN TO CAMP AT 2:00-2:15 AND HAD WHITNEY WITH THEM. WHEN THEY TRIED TO LEAVE THE SUB-DIVISION THEY FOUND, TO THEIR SURPRISE, THAT IT WAS SURROUNDED BY FIRE. THEY RETURNED AND HAD TWO DOZERS BUILD A SAFETY ZONE IN THE BLACK. DUNDAS HAD SOUNDED SOME ALARM AT ABOUT 2:00 IN REPORTING THE FIRE HAD SPOTTED ACROSS THE

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

CONTROL ROAD WHICH WAS SUPPOSE TO BE THE
LAST RESORT.

COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS EXISTED BECAUSE
OF TOO MANY PEOPLE ON THE SAME FREQ. HAD
OFF & ON CONTACT AND POOR COMMUNICATIONS
WITH THE AIR ATTACK.

THOUGHT THE DIVISION ENDED AT ABOUT DROP
POINT 1.

THOUGHT THE TRANSITION DID NOT GO SMOOTHLY
AND THAT TRANSITIONING DURING THE HOT
BURNING PERIOD WAS ASKING FOR IT.

WHITNEY & OTHERS DID A GOOD JOB OF DEALING
WITH THE SITUATION ONCE IT BLEW.

KNOW THEY HAD A DANGEROUS FIRE.. AND WAS
NOT SURPRISED IT BLEW, BUT WAS SURPRISE AT
THE INTENSITY. EVERYONE WAS IN SAFETY
ZONES IN PLenty OF TIME. LOOKOUTS HAD
BEEN POSTED ALL DAY.

THOUGHT THERE WERE 2 AIR ATTACKS-

IM 13/02

Page ____ of ____

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Paul Gleason

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Zig Zag Hot Shot Crew Foreman

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

dining area

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29/90 pm.

16. REMARKS

Could see high level Cumulus from camp.
1000 - at the base of Walk more.
While walking up, could see Cumulus.
They were generating heat and smoke from the
firing operation.
There was a little precip. Thought there must be a
thunderhead.
15-30 minutes later there were downdrafts.
They started breathing smoke from the burnout.
Erratic winds.
They tried to stay even with the main fire.
They were to burn a section, then hand off the torch.
Heard that the fire crossed the control road.
2. there was a deployment
3. the fire crossed Walk more.

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

Talked down with Paul Lindsey.
Alpine crew was running up the line.

Fire was spreading about 80 ft/min, mostly in the crowns.
It was not an independent crown fire.
Burned in little strips. Not a wall of flame.

Spreading cross-slope
There were downdrafts.

Uplandmore is a V shaped valley.
There would be cross-slope radiation and tremendous
heat release.

The thunder head would keep the heat down.
Felt there was no effect on the main fire by the
burnout.

There were strong convective currents.

It was a wind-driven fire.

6/30/90

Burnout in 150-200 ft. in
strips in. perpendicular to the cat line
Green patch was left due to burnout.
10 mph wind

runs 300-400 ft. strips

1/2 hr after deployment

lots of smoke on south of road
looked like a wind-driven fire, not convective.

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

GLEASON, PAUL

M

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

Supt. ZIG ZAG IHC MT Hood N.F.

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

INCIDENT BASE CAMP

POTNAM / MANGAN - MTDC

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

ENDED

Date

Time

Date

Time

6/29/90

16. REMARKS

THE ZIG ZAG IHC WAS INVOLVED IN BURNOUT OPERATIONS ON 6/26/90 IN THE VICINITY OF THE BOWITA CREEK SUBDIVISION, ALONG WITH THE FLATHEAD, ALPINE AND REDMOND IHC'S; HIS CREW HAD HIKED UP WALK-MOORE CANYON FROM THE CONTROL ROAD, AND PASSED THE PERRYVILLE AND NAVAHO #2 CREWS WHO WERE WIDENING LANE. ABOUT 1345-1400, SOME LIGHT PRECIPITATION FELL ON THE FIRE SIDE, AND A THUNDER CELL WAS OBSERVED IN THE AREA.

ROUGHLY 1/2 HOUR LATER, THE RADIO REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE FIRE HAD CROSSED THE "CONTROL ROAD", THE FIRE LINE, AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SHELTER DEPLOYMENT. THE ZIG ZAG IHC AND FLATHEAD IHC HEADED S.W. TOWARD THE AREA, AND PASSED THE ALPINE IHC HEADING UP THE FIRE LINE TOWARD THE SAFETY ZONE. THE FIRE WAS MAKING CROSS-SLOPE RUNS FROM WEST TO EAST IN THE CROWNS AT 80 FEET/MINUTE.

A PERSON (GOLF WATCH) CAME WALKING UP THE DOZER LINE, WITH NO HARD HAT, FIRE SHELTER OR TOOL. HIS BACK PACK WAS SMOKING. AS WAS HIS HAT(?). GLEASON CALLED ON THE RADIO FOR EMT'S, AND THEY CAME FROM THE ZIG ZAG, FLATHEAD AND ALPINE IHC'S; THE PARAMEDICS IN ENGINE S.T. #1 ALSO RESPONDED. GLEASON SENT THE REMAINDER OF HIS IHC WITH THE FLATHEAD IHC TO THE SAFETY ZONE BECAUSE OF THE IMMEDIATE FIRE DANGER.

— NEXT PAGE —

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest ServiceMEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

GLEASON, PAUL

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

16. REMARKS

AFTER THE EMT'S BEGAN TREATMENT, HATCH SAID THERE HAD BEEN 4 MORE SHELTERS DEPLOYED. AS THE RISK TO THE FIRE EMT'S INCREASED, THEY BEGAN MOVING HATCH TO THE SAFETY ZONE; THE ENTIRE FORCE AT BONITA CREEK SUBDIVISION WAS THREATENED, AND MOVED INTO THE SAFETY ZONE. THE FIRE BURNED HOT THEN AROUND THE SUBDIVISION, AND EVERYONE STAYED IN THE SAFETY ZONE FOR ABOUT 45-60 MINUTES. AFTER HE FELT THAT THE AREA HAD COOLED TO A SAFE LEVEL, GLEASON HEADED DOWN WALK-MOORE CANYON ON THE DOZER LINE. HE FIRST FOUND AN EMPTY SHELTER, HUNG A RED RIBBON AND MOVED ON DOWN THE LINE WHERE HE FOUND ANOTHER EMPTY SHELTER, THEN CAME UPON THE FATALITIES. HE GOT VERY SHOOK UP, BUT REGAINED CONTROL, CHECKED FOR VITAL SIGNS AND FOUND NONE. HE THEN KEPT MOVING DOWN THE LINE AND MET RON MELCHER (F.B.A.) COMING UP FROM THE CONTROL ROAD. GLEASON HAD FOUND THE UPPER 5 FATALITIES (BACHMAN, DENNY, CONTRERAS, CHACON + SPRINGFIELD); NOTHING HAD DISTURBED THE SITE UNTIL THE SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES ARRIVED. THE FIRE SHELTERS WERE DE-LAMINATED, BUT INTACT WHEN GLEASON SAW THEM.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Incident

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

GLENN HARDEN
TIM SMITH

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

PERRYVILLE CREW MEMBERS

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

J. MONESMITH

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

ENDED

Date

Time

Date

Time

6/29 2:30

16. REMARKS

*THEY WERE HELPING NAVAJO'S CLEARING BRUSH. SMITH
& AN INDIAN LOOKED UP & SAW THE FIRE
& HEARD IT. THE INDIAN YELLED TO GET OUT.
IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE CREW THAT
THE ESCAPE ROUTE WAS DOWN THE DOZER
TRAIL.*

*DID NOT KNOW THAT PERSONNEL WERE TRAPPED
BEHIND THEM - SAW BACHMAN FALL. DENNY
WAS HELPING PICK HER UP -
MET TARRA HEADING BACK UP -*

*NEVER PULLED SHOOTERS. THEY TRIED TO PULL THEIR
SHOOTERS BUT COULDN'T OPEN THE SHOOTER PACK BECAUSE
OF THE BACKPACK FULL OF FUSIL & COULD NOT FEEL WITH HIS
GLOVES. SUGGEST SHOOTERS BE ROLLED & POSITIONED*

*IN FRONT.
BEEN ON SEVERAL FIRES. NAVAJO CAME BACK UP
& ENCOURAGED THEM TO LEAVE -
HEARD EXPLOSIONS & WERE RUNNING UNDER A
CEILING OF FIRE WITH FIRE WHIRLS MIXED IN.*

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

ALL THE CROW WAS WITHIN 20 YDS OF GERRY
CANS WHEN THE BLOWUP OCCURRED

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

Page ____ of ____
1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Deade Fire Incident Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Gregory, Hoke

4. SERVICE NUMBER

41497

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

Serrano Correctional Ctr

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

San Pedro Fire Crew #2

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Department of Corrections
Building, PHX.

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Frank Quintana Lee Redding

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29 1:20p

6/29 2:00p

16. REMARKS

Had just finished my break (Swamp for
Joke Charon) we were at the water cans.
about that time I heard someone say
"Get the fuck out". I began running with
(Alex Contreras - Serrano Crew). I thought
of running, but I decided to deploy the shelter.
The wind was very strong, it almost blew me
over. I was in my shelter about 20 min.
I heard Ellis (James) outside my shelter
He said "I'm hurt bad", "my shelter didn't
work". I thought there were two blow-overs.
I told him to get some water from my pack.
Why did it take so long for people
to come to help.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dube Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Hoke, Greg

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

M

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

Perryville State Prison

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Inmate

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

D.C. Office

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

D.C. Officer

15. STARTED

Date

Time

6/27/90 13:10

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29/90 14:10

Frank Quintana

16. REMARKS

Was working with Hatch earlier then with Chacon summing. He had an axe. He heard shouting and saw flames. He and Conteras were together. He could see people above and below. Ran down + saw fire cross in front of him. Turned and saw flames cross above him between he & Conteras. Took pack off - got shelter out - it opened first try, but tab separated from pack halfway down so tore open rest of way + then deployed. Wind blew hard - almost blew shelter over. Timed himself by calling for help every minute. Another blast came from other side. After about 20 min Ellis came by said shelter didn't work. Hoke told him to get water from pack. Ellis said it was burned up. said shelter came apart and that he was hurt bad.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

He remembers rear of shelter ripped out.

Then love & Tony Davenport and Ellis (he was surprised to see Ellis - thought he had gone down line). They reached hose lay when Ellis said he was dead & walked over to ditch and sat down and died. He & love continued to road. Love had rubber could receive but not sand. Did get response at road and was told to go right. They threw shelter down.

Remembers Davenport and Tony falling^h back behind them as they came down.

After 2nd wave of fire he looked out & saw flames on ground close to him so inched shelter up about 10 ft which was mistake since ground was very hot.

Remembers having hard time getting to shelter behind him.

It was calm before fire.

He wants crew to continue.

He had heard that Penny went back to help Sandy with shelter. He got burned & Chacon layed on top of him to help. Wondered why no-one was looking for them.

IM 8

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

Page ____ of ____

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

ED HOLLENSHEAD

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

PRES COTT N.F.

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

IC Type II TEAM

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

J. MONESMITH / ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/28/90

10:00

16. REMARKS

TRIED TO TRANSITION WITH THE TYPE I TEAM AT 1300. TRANSITION WAS A PROBLEM IN THAT IT DIDN'T APPEAR THE INCOMING TEAM WAS RECOGNIZING FIRE BEHAVIOR AND OTHER CONCERNS. TWO DIVISION SUPS. FROM THE TYPE I TEAM CAME OUT TO THE FIRE AT 0600 TO SHADOW WITH THE TYPE II DIVISION SUPS. UNTIL 1300. HOWEVER, THE TYPE II DIVISION SUPS STAYED ON THE FIRE THROUGHOUT THE SHIFT.

AT 11:00, LINE PERSONNEL WERE BECOMING UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE SITUATION.

COMMUNICATIONS WERE A PROBLEM. THE OVERHEAD WAS OPERATING ON A TONTO FIRE FREQ. WHILE THE CREWS WERE ON A STATE FREQ.

DID A STANDUP INCIDENT ACTION PLAN.

TWO PEOPLE WERE CHANGING OFF AS AIRATTACK.

ONE DID NOT PERFORM WELL AND WAS NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF THE GROUND PERSONNEL.

ONCE IN A LIFE-TIME FIRE BEHAVIOR SITUATION.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

1 Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

La Tour, Dave

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

1111 E Limberlost Tucson AZ

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

293-4001

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Chief - Rural Metro - Training Instructor

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

La Tour Home

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Lee Redding

14. OTHERS PRESENT

NO

15. STARTED

Date

6/30

Time

1400

ENDED

Date

6/30

Time

1610

16. REMARKS

Dave was laying on the couch with both legs wrapped and one arm wrapped. I asked him to start at the initial phone call. He was called by the state dept. of forestry local officer ^{Bryan Huber} around 5 PM on 6/25 to go to Payson as a crew Rep for the Perryville crew. He & Chief Packer left about 6 PM & arrived at Payson @ 9:15 PM. He tried in with crew and was sent to Bonita Creek Estates (BC) about 1:15 AM 6/26. At BC they prepared to safety the homes. He held a safety meeting with emphasis on fire conditions and making sure all had shelters and escape routes. Vehicles were painted out. Dale Ashby was Division supervisor. He told them cut a line to creek but they had to evacuate to Control Rd where Ashby & Ops Chief had them drive to Walk Moore Creek and clear a 2' line to the telephone line and then up that line to BC.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

[Signature]

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

While on tele. line they were passed by
a Hotshot crew (H.C.). They cont. to do line
until light and then worked on safetying
ropes and dozer line. Took breakfast
break around 9 AM with HC. Ashby then
told them to improve ^{dozer} line downhill
for burnout. They went below Alpine
HC and started work. He only had his
radio on the State Freq. (154.280). They
couldn't reprogram to Ashby Freq so he
programmed his Freq into H24bys. They
had good commo all morning with an
occasional lapse while Ashby switched to
other channel. Terra & Denny also had
radios. Also Scobe on engine Test Force.
He could see main fire in distance above
them along with slurry drops. Some runs
but well above BC on other side of
Walk Moore. Ashby (A) alerted them to
watch for spot fires. Crew was notified
and began to watch. Fire would come to
ridge and die down. Some talk on his
radio from engine crew. Around 11:30
he asked A for water but none came.
During morning the Zig Zag & Redmond HC
passed them on the way up about an hour
apart. He still had crew spread out
and watching for spots. The Alpine
foreman had a shift plan with
a Freq. but he couldn't get it for

3
A
work. A called to be sure they were spread out, watching for spots and improving line. Could see main fire slowing coming down but not in their drainage. At lunch with Alpine HC leaders. There was some wind, squirly with some spots showing up in drainage. He put crew back to improving line.

A called and said stay below Alpine HC. They had about a 200 yd gap between them. About 1-1:30 it got smoked in. He was hit by a 40-50 MPH wind, downdrafts and squirly. It got dark like a sunset. He ran down to crew, heard shouting about evacuation. Embers the size of pine cones were falling. Had not talked to A since noon. He had been told their escape route was downhill. When he got to crew he could hear shouting and see people running downhill. Heard yelling & saw people coming back and a solid wall of fire behind them. It was roaring and solid black. He turned and went back telling people to get shelters out but don't deploy until up hill. There were 2 people ahead of him and about half way up hill they had to deploy. The others deployed in drainage. He asked for a name count

and radioed they were deploying. He then began to talk to those around him to stay calm, to talk to him, that they would make it, to stay in the shelters. He could hear voices above & below him probably 2 or 3 below him. The fire hit on the down hill left side of shelter. Tore it badly lifted it, heat & debris came under but he held it down. Heard lots of noise and screaming. He looked and right side of shelter had delaminated and was flopped on left side. He knew he was burning bad but stayed on his right side with back to right side of shelter. Another fire came from the right and finally a third one. He heard someone stand up and fall over his tent. Screaming continue through all 3 fires. He heard shelters moving and kept telling them to stay put. He kept talking to them & encouraging them. They asked if it ok to get out & he told them to stay put. He tried calling on radio but no answer - tried all channels. Heard some fantastic that help was on the way. He waited about an hour, stuck hand out - it was cooler (no help had come) he sat up saw 2 below him caped & standing

told them to hang on. Help was on the way then he saw some of the crew was dead. He waited a little while then told 2 above to get up and don't look - that a tragedy had happened + they had to get out. He was weak + shaky but they started down. He saw one body move but knew the person was dying or dead. At end of bodies he saw one shelter completely delaminated asked if OK, got an answer, got the person up. It appeared some had moved since they had no shelters. They started downhill and passed another shelter with person in it. He got out + joined them. Don(?) and Davenport were above him 1 person just in fiberglass below him plus 1 shelter. They all started out - 3 went ahead Davenport stayed to help him because he was weak and wandering. All had shelters wrapped around them. They got to the road and no one was there to help. He tried the radio - no answer - took mike off and got Chief - he told them to turn right. They walked about 200 yds and a F.S. pickup met them and took them to clearing where gear was removed and 1st aid administered. Five flared up they were given shelters

and moved by truck to base camp
more, I staid and then flight to
hospital

He had all his gear and remember
carrying a 5 gal water container.

He remembers telling Terra to go
get water for crew which was
delivered by ATV.

Remembers some radio talk about
 $\frac{1}{2}$ hour before fire about it burning
Foller Canyon which is West of them
Some rain 45" to 1 hr before fire
long before fire there was a slurry
drop to east of them

He's been a fireman 17 yrs - Red
Carded Trk Fore leader - Training for
Dir. Sup. 13 years at Yellowstone & Oregon
& numerous State fires in S. part of
state

He has had a lot of training courses
Woud like to locate his gear & wallet

His wife came in so I thanked
him and went to see Chief Hamby
for copy of his training records.
Taked Hamby how arrangement
with state works. He said employees
are allowed to work for state who
pays them and they can take leave
with or w/o pay from Rural Metro.

Bill Ralphy

Prior to leaving his home, I reviewed his personal training file which contained the following

E.M.S., E.M.T.	8/3/78
Fireman I	1/8/79
Fireman II	8/31/79
Recruit Fire Training	10/28/79
Basic Wildland Fire	3/28/81
Fire Officer Development	5/16/89
Fire Command	7/7/83
Emergency Stabilization	9/23/84
Vertical Rescue	10/28/84
S-230 Crew Leader	85
Driver	11/27/85
National Fire Academy Fire Supervisor	2/12/86

He also stated he had completed the following

Fire Fighter Safety + Survival	89
Division Supervision	89
Stand and Fight - Cut and run	90

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

Page 1 of 1

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DWDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

DON LOVE

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Perryville Crew, Assist S&D Boss

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

J. MONESMITH / ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

ENDED

Date

Time

Date

Time

6/29 12:05

16. REMARKS

FELT THE FIRE SHELTERS WORKED. ~~RIGOR~~ GATHERED TO GET DRINKING WATER. AFTER GETTING WATER, PROCEEDED TO IMPROVE THE LINE. SHORTLY AFTERWARD, AN NAUJO CROW MEMBER YELLED "GET OUT." ALL OF THE CROW BEGAN RUNNING DOWN THE DOZER ROAD TOWARD THE CONTROL ROAD. FIRE HAD CROWNED OVER THE DOZER LINE & ~~ENTERED~~ SPLIT THE CROW. HIS SUT HATCH, Denny, CONTRAS, CHACON, ELLIS, SPRINGFIELD, DAVENPORT, LA TOUR & BACHMAN WERE ABOVE, THE REMAINDER WENT DOWN. HEADED TOWARD BONITA. LA TOUR GAVE DIRECTIONS TO DEPLOY THEIR SHELTERS. LA TOUR RADIOED THAT PERRYVILLE WAS DEPLOYING SHELTERS. DENNY WAS HELPING BACHMAN TAKE HER SHELTER OUT. LOVE, DAVENPORT, SPRINGFIELD & LA TOUR PROCEEDED UP ANOTHER 15 YARDS. CHACON HAD DEPLOYED HIS SHELTER, SPRINGFIELD WAS IN HIS & LOVE GOT IN HIS. ALSO DAVENPORT & LA TOUR. COMMUNICATION FROM LA TOUR TO STAY CALM. FIRE HIT & LOVE HEARD & SCREAMS. ONE JUST TO FIGHT.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

CAN'T TAKE IT ANY MORE & GO TO
LOVE'S SHELTER. DAUGHERT SAID YES, THAT HE
IF HE WAS O.K. SAID YES, THAT HE
WAS BURNED. 10-15 MINUTES OF
EXTENSIVE HEAT. SAW FLAMES THROUGH
PIN HOLES. CONTINUED RUN FROM LA TO
DAUGHERT GOT OUT OF HIS SHELTER. LOVE
LA TOUR DID ALSO. LA TOUR DIRECTED
THEM TO WRAP THE SHELTERS AROUND
THEM & MOVE DOWN THE CANYON TOWARD THE
CONTROL ROAD. CAME TO SANDY WHO HAD
HER HAND BEHIND HER BACK AS IF SHE WAS TRY
TO GET HER SHELTER, THEN DENNY & CHACON. ~~SANDY~~
~~WAS LATER~~ CHACON WAS LIEING ON DONNY,
CONTINUED & RUN INTO GREG HOKES WHO
WAS IN HIS SHELTER. GREG WENT WITH
THEM. CONTINUED & MET ELLIS COMING
UP THE CANYON. HE HAD SERIOUS BURNS.
SHELTER WAS HANGING DOWN FROM HIS
HEAD. HE TURNED AROUND & CONTINUED
WITH THEM. ELLIS SAID HE WAS DEAD.
HE WENT TOWARDS A HOSE & ROLLED OFF
INTO A DITCH. LOVE CALLED ON RADIO
& CONTACTED PUMPER TRUCK 2. KEPT
GOING TO THE CONTROL ROAD. TURNED TO
THE RIGHT AFTER GETTING TO THE ROAD. LOVE
& HOKES DROPPED THEIR SHELTERS THERE.
~~ELLIS JUMPED OFF A SHELTER BEHIND~~

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5300.11)

Page 1 of 1

1. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Jim Mattingly (Fireman)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

Zion NP.

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Alpine Hot Shot foreman

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

dining area -

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Pat Andrews

14. OTHERS PRESENT

Gary Benson
crew member

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29/90

0630

6/29/90

0730

16. REMARKS

Belt weather obs taken on fire. Records with fire weather meteorologist report.

0810, 0900, 0930, 1000, 1100, 1130, 1230, 1310, 1300, 1400

Rain drops recorded at 1310.

Dead calm for 5-10 min just before blowup.

Ervatic (speed & direction) winds 1230 - 1400

1400 - note of gusty winds - 5-10 sec. gusts

The handline around the cabin helped give them direction to the safety zone.

Programmed the Perryville radio @ 1410 to match his.

OK - but not all the time.

Tried to contact them - no answer.

Mattingly was walking up the trail 25 ft behind Gleason & Lindsey.

Hatch came out of the smoke at 1433 (according to Mattingly's foot watch).

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

Mattingly was with him 2-3 minutes alone.

The F-100 arrived.

Requested burn blankets, etc.

Dave & Jim walked down the line.

Fire behind them - all around.

Went about 120 feet to the corner of the line & looked.

Then the fire really started to cook. They got to safety.

[1527 helispot half done.

[1536 helispot complete - Hatch loaded.

The fire kept coming.

Not a wall of flames.

Finger runs up the slope.

Victim said "It's gonna get me" - Tried to sit up.

Ashby was the original Dir. Sup.

They were given maps and 1 radio channel 170.500 to everyone.

Took off Hatch's chaps - left them on the line.

Mattingly kept Hatch's shirt & gloves. (later given to investigator team)

1000 - engine captains radioed in -

"We won't stay during the burning show without shelter.

At least 40 people were up there without shelter.

They seemed more concerned with saving structures.

1300-1330 - the spot really went. They fought the spot inside the burn.

1350-1400 - major wind gusts.

Moved back to improve line.

At the briefing they were told that the fire spread from 100 to 1500 acres from 4pm to 5pm - extreme fire behavior.

"Should we have been in there at all?"

Hatch was carrying his gloves. They were not damaged.



USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

MELCHER, Ron

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Type 1 FIRE BUR Analyst (SHAW'S TEAM)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Telephone

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

DAVID W. GOENS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

7/3/90

1600

7/3/90

1610

16. REMARKS

Telephone interview for the purpose of determining if the forecast received by Farnsworth & Melcher @ 11AM 6/26 was transmitted to the line.

Melcher indicated Farnsworth had received the forecast via Telephone from the Natl Weather Serv. in Phoenix at around 11AM. Melcher Transcribed the forecast for the shift plan, but indicated that the information was not transmitted to the line that Thunderstorms were developing in the area.

Note: Forecast copied by Melcher from Farnsworth's notes and statement by Craig Eller, Fireline Festr, Phoenix are included in the witness statements and document files.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

David W Goens

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Ron Melcher

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

FBA - Type I team

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Car - on the way to the site

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Pat Andrews

OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29/90

REMARKS

0600 - 0800 6/26 - at the Bonita Creek subdivision
Sitting on the water tank on the NE corner.
0630 - retardant drop on the west side of the canyon.
Winds were calm.
The fire was "cooking" under an inversion.
Went looking for Bob Berkowitz (fire weather meteorologist)
who had just gotten assigned to the fire.
It was after 1300 - went to get lunch.
A convection column was building.
1315 Gusty winds in camp - like from a thunder head.
5-6 drops of rain
Heard that there was a spot over the Control Road.
Took the truck to Payson.
There was a shower for 1/2 - 3/4 mile - enough to use
the wipers.
Found out that Berkowitz was in camp setting up a RAN'S.

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

as at the District Office when he heard that there was deployment.

The steel bridge on the way to the fire stopped a tractor operator from going to get his tractor.

Called Dick Cooke - suggested that they evacuate more homes.

Travel to fire delayed maybe 5 minutes by talking to people along the road.

565 - At the base of Walkmore Canyon found 2 people walking with their shelters

One had no hard hat on - Held the shelter tightly around his face.

Donald Love & Greg Hoke loaded them into the pickup

Then into a NW Fire Dept. truck which had EMT's. Transferred the people to them.

Went back toward Walkmore & found two more people. David Latoure & Donnie Davenport.

One said "There's four dead guys up there."

David Latoure had all of his equipment on.

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Ron Melcher. (Mark Zumwalt)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Pat Andrews.

OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

7/2/90

am.

REMARKS

*This is second-hand information
Ron Melcher talked to Mark Zumwalt, Div/Sup
on the rim on 6/26. (Ron talked to Mark, then Ron called Pat)
Conducting a burnout on the top of the rim
by the 300 road.
They were staying just ahead of the movement
of the main fire.
The smoke was sucking down off the rim. (see ^{can} tape)
He was in the Center of Section 21.
There was lots of heat in Section 28.
The smoke from sect. 21 was being sucked into sect 28.
15 minutes before Bonita blew, the fire in
Section 28 blew up and ran into sections 33 & 34,
down to the SE toward Ellison Creek Subdivision*

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest ServiceMEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

M

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29/90

16. REMARKS

BOB SCOPA WAS THE ENGINE STRIKE TEAM LEADER FOR THE S.T. AT BONITA CREEK SUBDIVISION. HE WORKED ON STRUCTURE PROTECTION FOR DIVISION SUPERVISORS ASHBY AND WHITNEY. HIS COMMUNICATION WAS ON THE INTERAGENCY NIMS FREQ (154.280), AND HE HAD TALKED WITH THE CREW REP FROM PERRYVILLE. WHEN THE TYPE II/TYPE I TEAM TRANSITION OCCURED, HE COULD NOT TALK DIRECTLY WITH DIV. SUPV. WHITNEY. SCOPA GOT A RADIO CALL ON 154.280 INDICATING "PERRYVILLE HAS DEPLOYED". HE ASKED THE PERSON TO REPEAT THE CREW NAME; THE RESPONSE WAS AGAIN "PERRYVILLE HAS DEPLOYED; THERE'S 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 PEOPLE". SCOPA GOT A TACTICAL RADIO FROM THE PAO AT BONITA CREEK SAFETY ZONE AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED DIV. SUPV WHITNEY TO REPORT THE DEPLOYMENT. UPON HEARING ABOUT THE WALKING BURNED VICTIM (HATCH) WITH THE ZIG ZAG IHC'S, SCOPA WENT WITH THE GLENDALE FIRE DEPT PARAMEDICS TO ASSIST. BECAUSE OF THEIR ADVANCED SKILLS, THE PARAMEDICS RELIEVED THE IHC EMT'S, AND SENT THEM TO THE SAFETY ZONE. AFTER STARTING AN I.V.,

— NEXT PAGE —

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest ServiceMEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

SCOPA, BOB

HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

REMARKS

THE 4 PARAMEDICS AND SCOPA BEGAN HAULING HATCH ON A BACK BOARD TO THE EVACUATION POINT. THE FIRE CONTINUED TO MAKE A RUN ON THEM, AND THEY QUESTIONED IF THEY COULD CONTINUE TO HAUL HATCH AND STILL SAVE THEMSELVES. THEY KEPT MOVING, AND FINALLY REACHED THE SAFETY ZONE WITH HATCH. SCOPA FELT THE 4 GLENDALE PARAMEDICS WERE WORTHY OF SPECIAL COMMENDATION FOR THEIR ACTIONS.

SCOPA HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PERRYVILLE CREW JUST PRIOR TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT, AND DID NOT KNOW WHO THE PERSON ON THE RADIO WAS.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest ServiceMEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

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7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29/90

16. REMARKS

BOB SCOPA WAS THE ENGINE STRIKE TEAM LEADER FOR THE S.T. AT BONITA CREEK SUBDIVISION. HE WORKED ON STRUCTURE PROTECTION FOR DIVISION SUPERVISORS ASHBY AND WHITNEY. HIS COMMUNICATION WAS ON THE INTERAGENCY NIMS FREQ (154.280), AND HE HAD TALKED WITH THE CREW REP FROM PERRYVILLE. WHEN THE TYPE II / TYPE I TEAM TRANSITION OCCURED, HE COULD NOT TALK DIRECTLY WITH DIV. SUPV. WHITNEY. SCOPA GOT A RADIO CALL ON 154.280 INDICATING "PERRYVILLE HAS DEPLOYED". HE ASKED THE PERSON TO REPEAT THE CREW NAME; THE RESPONSE WAS AGAIN "PERRYVILLE HAS DEPLOYED; THERE'S 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 PEOPLE". SCOPA GOT A TACTICAL RADIO FROM THE PAC AT BONITA CREEK SAFETY ZONE, AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED DIV. SUPV WHITNEY TO REPORT THE DEPLOYMENT. UPON HEARING ABOUT THE WALKING BURNED VICTIM (HATCH) WITH THE ZIG ZAG IHC'S, SCOPA WENT WITH THE GLENDALE FIRE DEPT PARAMEDICS TO ASSIST. BECAUSE OF THEIR ADVANCED SKILLS, THE PARAMEDICS RELIEVED THE IHC EMT'S, AND SENT THEM TO THE SAFETY ZONE. AFTER STARTING AN I.V.,

NEXT PAGE

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest ServiceMEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE INCIDENT ENTRAPMENT

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

SCOPA, BOB
HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

0. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

2. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

16. REMARKS

THE 4 PARAMEDICS AND SCOPA BEGAN HAULING HATCH ON A BACK BOARD TO THE EVACUATION POINT. THE FIRE CONTINUED TO MAKE A RUN ON THEM, AND THEY QUESTIONED IF THEY COULD CONTINUE TO HAUL HATCH AND STILL SAVE THEMSELVES. THEY KEPT MOVING, AND FINALLY REACHED THE SAFETY ZONE WITH HATCH. SCOPA FELT THE 4 GLENDALE PARAMEDICS WERE WORTHY OF SPECIAL COMMENDATION FOR THEIR ACTIONS.

SCOPA HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PERRYVILLE CREW JUST PRIOR TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT, AND DID NOT KNOW WHO THE PERSON ON THE RADIO WAS.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

Louis Sorrell
Crew Boss
Navajo Area
Fort Defiance, AZ

0700 Supply--No radio(s) for crew boss. Dave Dennison had the only King radio, which we brought with us from Ft. Defiance. It was clone by communications at fire camp.

At Briefing, S.T.L. Van Tilboard was our contact at Bonita Creek.

1130 We arrived at Bonita Creek Sub-division-housings. D. Dennison tried to contact, over the radio, with S.T.L. Negative Contact.

1200 We left, back to control road #64. We met Van Tilboard at the intersection. He briefed Dave and I. Our instructions were to go back to

1230 Over the line. We walked approximately 1 mile until we met up with the crew rep. Dave ? for the Perryville crew.

I spoke with Dave. We exchanged fire status, weather conditions, watch-out situations, and last, but (not least) lease escape routes.

1315 I strung out my crew back down the dozer-line.

All this time, we still had no communications with the outside forces, besides the Perryville crew and among ourselves.

I walked the line a few times. I warned my crew about what a dangerous place we were in. Of the sudden wind changes, the wind was erratic. Our escape route was the same place we came in from. That was the only way out. There were tons of unburned fuel, the forest was dense, between the fire and us.

I warned them of the slurry drops.

1400 Dave of the Perryville crew inform (informed) me of the duty changes. We were to help his crew reinforcing (reinforce) the dozer-line. They had a couple of chain-saws.

1410 I walked back down the line to inform my crew, and I also told them to move up the line to help the others.

1415 Meanwhile the fire had moved past us, towards the control road--south southwest of where we were working.

1420 My post-lookout (Edison Notah) notice (noticed) the windshift changes to the east. The fire started crowning. We yelled to everyone to

Louis Sorrell (continued)

start running back down the dozer-line. The smoke was so intense, we could barely see 20-30 feet in front of us.

Some members made it down the line faster than others. Some just ditch (ditched) their tools.

1422 Some Perryville crew members ran by us. Some of them, behind me were running with their chain-saws. We told them to ditch the saws and run, but they did not.

1425 I sort of stayed behind the Perryville crew. Because two of my crew members panic (panicked). They did not want to run any farther.

One of them asked me to leave and run for my life. But I could (couldn't). I took her pack and we kept on going.

The fire was right on our tail. We could hear the roaring and crackling, running sound. I thought about deploying my fire shelter right then, because both of my crew members stopped again.

Some how, I encouraged them to keep on going. We stopped about 4 times. (They told we ran .7 miles.)

1426 We finally reached the control road and there were vehicles packed, and everyone on my crew made it out in a vehicle.

All this time a helicopter was above us and not once did he inform us of the situation.

No communications.

The Perryville crew were cut-in half. Some made it out with us, others were trapped behind us.

2 of the ten-standard firefighting orders were ignored, and a few of the watch-outs situations.

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

MARK SPANN, COMM TECH TONTO

RONALD REBAN COMM TECH COCONINO

HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

JERRY MONE SMITH
ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29

16. REMARKS

RON WAS DISPATCHED TO THE FIRE MONDAY NIGHT AT ABOUT 1:00. THE TYPE II TEAM WAS IN PLACE. THE TEAM HAD BROUGHT A BIFC EACHES SYSTEM WITH THEM AND HAD PLACED A REPEATER ON THE RIM. A COMMUNICATION PLAN HAD BEEN PUT IN PLACE BY RUFUS COLE. EVERYONE WAS STILL ON THE TONTO NET ON THE 26TH. THERE WAS LACK OF DIRECTION ON THE LINE, GROUPS WERE ARGUING AMONG THEMSELVES ON THE FREQUENCIES THEY WOULD USE. EVERYONE WAS COMPLAINING ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO TALK TO ~~ONE~~ ANYONE. THE INITIAL SET UP HAD PROBLEMS. SOMEONE CALLED COMMUNICATIONS (AT THE BASE CAMP) FOR A MEDICAL, BUT NO ONE RESPONDED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT MONITORING THE FREQ. ANOTHER BIFC COMM UNIT ARRIVED AND FRED BUHR (TYPE I COMM UNIT LEADER) HAS STRAIGHTENED THINGS OUT.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

LARRY TERRA

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

PERRYVILLE

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

CORRECTION SERVICE OFFICER III
FIRE CREW SUPERVISOR

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

J. MONSMITH/ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

ENDED

Date

Time

Date

Time

6/29/90 10:30

16. REMARKS

LARRY IS THE FIRE CREW SUPERVISOR & A FIRE SAFETY COORDINATOR. THE CREW IS UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE ARIZ STATE DEPT / DIVISION OF FORESTRY. THE CREW ARRIVED AT THE PAYSON R.D. ABOUT 1930 MONDAY 25TH & CHECKED IN WITH OPERATIONS. AT 1030 THEY WERE DIRECTED TO GO TO BASE CAMP TO BED DOWN. THEY ATE DINNER AT 2300-2400 AND WHILE ENROUTE TO BASE CAMP, A PARK RANGER REDIRECTED THE CREW TO THE LINE AT BONITA CR. ARRIVED AT THE BONITA SUBDIVISION ABOUT 0100. RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO PARK THEIR VEHICLES HEADING OUT IN EVENT QUICK ESCAPE WAS NECESSARY. LA TOUL INSTRUCTED THEM TO TAKE THEIR SHELTERS OUT OF THEIR PACKS & PUT THEM ON THEIR HIP. THEY HAD MET UP PREVIOUSLY WITH LA TOUL AT THE PAYSON R.D. LA TOUL HAD WORKED WITH THE CREW ON OTHER FIRES. SHORTLY AFTER, THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO PUT THEIR SHELTERS BACK IN THE PACKS & TOOL UP. MINUTES LATER, ABOUT 1130 I WAS TOLD TO GET IN THE VEHICLES & GET OUT.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

THEY DROVE FOR OVER AN HOUR IN THE SAME DIRECTION THEY HAD COME IN. ARRIVED AT THE JUNCTION OF THE CONTROL ROAD & WALK MOORE CANYON ABOUT 0230. WAS INSTRUCTED TO CUT LINE ALONG THE JEEP TRAIL. A DOZER HAD NOT BEEN THROUGH THE AREA.

AREA WAS EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS, HEAVY FUELS.

THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO BUILD A 2' WIDE LINE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. LATER THEY

WERE BUMPED UP TO WHERE THE POWERLINE CROSSED THE JEEP TRAIL. INSTRUCTIONS WERE

TO IMPROVE THE POWERLINE R/W TOWARD THE SUBDIVISION BY CLEARING A 3' LINE.

THEY HAD TWO OF THEIR OWN POWERSAWS (PRO MAC 700'S). TIME IS ABOUT 09-130.

LA TOUR WAS IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH DIV. SUPERV. ASHBY.

THOUGHT A DOZER WAS BUILDING LINE UP THE JEEP TRAIL FROM THE CONTROL ROAD. THEY IMPROVED THE LINE UP TO THE SUBDIVISION, ARRIVING THERE ABOUT 0500. WORKED THERE UNTIL 09-1000. LEFT THE SUBDIVISION & MET WITH THE PRESCOTT H.S. WHERE THE JEEP RD TIED INTO THE ROAD AROUND THE SUBDIVISION. THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO IMPROVE THE DOZER LINE MOVING DOWN WALK MOORE CANYON, 8' ON THE FIRE SIDE. MADE CONTACT WITH SCOPA WHO HAD AGreed TO USE HIS RADIO.

EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE VEGETATIVE CANOPY OVER THE DOZER LINE TO SCOPA & LA TOUR.

AT APPROX 1100 THE CROW RAN OUT OF WATER. ORDERED WATER THROUGH LA TOUR BUT NONE ARRIVED IN OVER 45 MIN. TOOK FRED HILL & LEFT TO GET WATER & FUEL FROM THE VEHICLES ON THE CONTROL ROAD.

LEFT HIS RADIO WITH SANDRA BACHMAN WHO WAS TO BE IN CHARGE. PASSED LA TOUR ON THE WAY DOWN & NOTICED AN AIR TANKER HAD DROPPED RETARDANT ON HIM. AN ATV TOOK THE WATER UP AND DROPPED IT OFF FOR THEM. THEY LEFT THE CONTROL ROAD

(2)

CONDITIONS BECAME VERY DARK & THEY RECOGNIZED IT WAS NOT A GOOD SITUATION.

MET UP WITH NAVAJO II WHO WERE WORKING BELOW THE PERRYVILLE CROW. THE NAVAJO'S HAD LITTLE OR NO RADIO COMM. AT APPROX 12:15, THEY WERE ABOUT AT THE LAST ~~PERSON~~ PERSON ON THE CROW & HEARD A CROW MEMBER yell "GET OUT." CROW STARTED RUNNING DOWN & OUT. THEY CONTINUED UP THE TRAIL TO TIE IN WITH THEIR CROW. HEARD WIND LIKE A LOCOMOTIVE & SAW A WALL OF FLAME ON THE SIDE RIDGE. CONTINUED TOWARD THE CROW. DIDN'T HEAR ANY RADIO COMM. THREE OF THE PERRYVILLE CROW RAN ^{DOWN WALK MOORE} PASSED THEM AT TOP SPEED WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING. THREE MORE CAME RUNNING TOWARD THEM. THEY ASKED ONE WHY HE WAS RUNNING WITH A CHAINSAW. TOOK THE CHAINSAW FROM THEM & EVENTUALLY CARRIED IT OUT. FIRE CROWNED & THEN DROPPED IN FRONT OF THEM WITH INTENSE HEAT. 100+ ORANGE FLAME ON ALL SIDES. APPEARED THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO DEPLOY THEIR SHELTERS. HILL HAD ALREADY STARTED BACK. DECISION WAS MADE TO RUN BACK. MET UP WITH NI ENRIQUEZ WHO WAS WALKING. WALL OF FIRE ON EAST WAS ADVANCING FASTER THAN THE FRONT ON THE WEST. BOTH CONTINUED RUNNING & CAUGHT UP WITH FLIPPEN, & SOON GOT TO THE CONTROL ROAD.

AT 1547 WAS NOTIFIED BY LOVE THAT THEY WERE ALL DEAD (SANDA, JAMES & JOE).

HAD SENT TWO - 2 PERSON LOOKOUTS TO CHECK THE

LEFT FOR WATER. THEY SCOUTED & RETURNED
TO THE LINE.
ALL AIR TRAFFIC STOPPED AND IT WAS
SPRINKLING ABOUT 1330-1400. HEARD
EXPLOSIONS OVER THE RIDGE.

NO SAFETY ZONES WERE DESIGNATED.

ESCAPED ROUTES WERE UP OR DOWN THE
DOZER LINE.

THUNDERSTORM CAME OUT OF NOWHERE AND
CREATED AN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION.

INTERVIEW 7/2 @ 2:30 PM BY J. MONESMITH
TERRA SAID THAT HIMSELF, BACHMAN, CHACON,
DENNEY, ELLIS, HATCH, LONG, ENRIQUEZ, AND
HILL DID NOT TAKE THE STEP-TEST DURING 1990
BECAUSE THEY WERE CONCENTRATING ON TESTING
THE NEW PERSONNEL. THEY WERE CONDUCTING
DAILY EXERCISE FOR 1/2 - 1 HOUR INCLUDING
JOGGING, WIND SPRINTS, ROPE JUMPING,
BIKE & WEIGHTS.

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 6306.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Catastrophe

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

MARK T. HAN

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Payson Engine 438 Crew Foreman

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Incident Base Camp

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

David W. Goens

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/30/90

1400

6/30/90

1430

16. REMARKS

6/26/90 - This interview was for the purpose of determining weather conditions

4 AM 6/26 - The engine was stationed at the intersection of Walhwa Canyon and the Control Road -

A spot fire was reported south of the Control Road, west of Walhwa Canyon -

1 PM - A few light sprinkles noted -

2 PM - Winds were calm

2:30 PM - Rapid wind shift to NW 30+ MPH - The engine left the scene 2 1/2 to 3 min later - Fire was everywhere -

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

DW Goens

17. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

Page 1 of 1

1. CASE NUMBER

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Duke Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Mark Tiffany

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, Zip Code)

Tyson Engine Crew

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

TTO Model 70

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

plans tent.

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Pat Andrews

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/30/90

pm.

16. REMARKS

Mon 1300. 6/25 - water tender
met with crew on west line off 129 road.

1700 - waiting for helitak

Supposed to go to Bonita for structure protection

2400 - got there.

John Day - with water tender.

Shots reported major runs to the SE.

Runs up hill then switch to down canyon

Sat at the edge of the subdivision and watched
the fire until 0300.

Spotting down slope.

Watched embers land and quickly grow to spot.
fire 0200-0300.

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

The fire moved into the canyon and out again.
It would run for a half section or so and
then die down. Ran for 20 seconds. Die down 5-10 min.
Watched it do that for about an hour.

The fire would spot - Make spot fires. Then
the main fire would catch up to the spots.

Left at 0300.

Went to the Control Road to regroup - by 1208 road.
Urban engines went in for structure protection.
He was for forest protection so went to the
base of Walkmore Canyon to set water for the
burnout.

Got to base of Walkmore at 0400.

They were short on hose & nozzles. Got 600 ft of
line out. - to the power line.

The dozer went up the line.

Saw white/black/red clouds all morning
around NE of estates - burnout.

Spot over Control Road @ 1000 or 1100.

He came down - but another engine was sent to it
and got it.

He saw what he thought was the burnout coming -

It looked nice. NE winds ~ 5 mph.

The head was moving SW - Watched it come for 30-60 min.

Still thought it was the burnout.

~1200 report of fire over the Control Road. Some confusion
on the radio with the earlier spot over the road.

Pleasant valley HS confirmed it was the main fire.

Calm - Dead Calm. At Control road. Ridge line blew up.

Crews ran out. They picked up people. 50-60 mph blast - 2 1/2 - 3 min.

Navajo crew. Sprinkler 2 hrs. before.

Communication bad before blowup - impossible after.

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

DUDE FIRE FATALITIES

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

VAN TILBORG, BUTCH

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

BRADSHAW R.D., PRESCOTT N.F.

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

Ops. Sect. Chief, Type II team

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

JERRY MONROE SMITH
ELDON ROSS

14. OTHERS PRESENT

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/28 12:00

16. REMARKS

WORKED TOGETHER WITH DUNDAS DURING THE FIRST SHIFT. CONCENTRATED EFFORTS ON THE BONITA AREA. DIVISION E WAS FROM THE CONTROL ROAD NORTHEAST TO APPROXIMATELY THE BEGINNING OF THE BURNOUT. DIVISION POINTS WERE NOT WELL DEFINED.

EVERYONE KNEW THE CONDITIONS WERE CRITICAL. ECKSTIN AND GILL WERE MONITORING THE FIRING OPERATIONS, ASHBY HAD THE CREWS AND THE STATE STRUCTURAL ENGINES IN BONITA. THE SEQUENCE OF CREWS AT ABOUT 1:00-1:15 WAS: ZIGZAG, PRESCOTT H.S. (PROTECTING THE LAST HOUSE), PERRYVILLE, NAVARO SCOUTS, ALPINE H.S. (TO CONTROL ROAD).

TURNED RESPONSIBILITIES OVER TO COOK ABOUT 1:30. WASN'T COMFORTABLE ABOUT THE TRANSITION, HOWEVER, THE DIVISION SUPS WERE SHADOWING. WOULD PREFER NOT TO TRANSITION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SHIFT IN THE FUTURE. 3 DIVISION SUPS WERE REPLACED BY ONE.

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

DID NOT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE AIR ATTACK
OR LEAD PLANE. WORKED THROUGH GLEN FOR
ANY AIR OPERATIONS.

COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES WERE VERY BUSY.

JUST BEFORE RETURNING TO CAMP, CHECKED
WHERE THE FIRE HAD CROSSED THE CONTROL
ROAD AND FOUND IT WAS NOT PASSABLE.



USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

(Reference FSH 5309.11)

Page 1 of 1

1. CASE NUMBER

2. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Incident - Deployment Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Jeff Whitney

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St., City, State, ZIP Code)

Prescott, Arizona

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

U.S. Forest Service, Prescott, AZ

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Dude Incident Base Camp

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

14. OTHERS PRESENT

None

15. STARTED

Date

Time

ENDED

Date

Time

6/29/90 App 0700

16. REMARKS

There were four general questions that the team requested be addressed during the interview with Jeff. The first being what was his position and responsibility. Jeff stated that he was Group Supervisor, Group Division, with the responsibility for the protection of structures within the Bonita Creek subdivision. Whitney's major assignment was to supervise the burn-out operation being conducted along the western edge of the development. Assigned to the burn-out operation was the Prescott shots, 212-209s, plums, 212-209s and Florida shots. In addition there were teams of Type I engines. Most of the time in the morning spent fire proofing structures and supervising the burn-out operations. Between 1330 and 1400 Phil Gill took Whitney to the south eastern portion of the Bonita Estates for him to pick-up his vehicle. At that time he noticed a spot-fire on the east side of the estates. He then attempted to drive out the road

17. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

Harry A. Walker

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)



TO THE CONTROL ROAD AND ENCOUNTERED ANOTHER SPOT FIRE blocking this access. He then returned to the Northwest side of the estates and ordered the building of the safety zone.

THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER WHICH WHITNEY UNDERSTOOD WAS ~~GROUP F~~ HIS RESPONSIBILITY WAS 'GROUP F' ALL WITHIN THE BONITA CREEK ESTATE.

ANOTHER QUESTION WAS HAD HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE PERRYVILLE CREW PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYMENT? HIS ANSWER WAS HE HAD, HAD NO RADIO CONTACT WITH THE PERRYVILLE CREW BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCES IN RADIO FREQUENCIES BEING USED BY THE OVERHEAD. THE OVERHEAD WAS OPERATING ON THE BIFC RADIO NETS AND THE PERRYVILLE CREW WAS OPERATING ON THE STATE NIMS FREQUENCY.

DURING THE WORK PERIOD THAT WHITNEY HAD BEEN IN GROUP F NO STAKE TEAM LEADER HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISION WHERE THE NAVAJO CREW #2 OR PERRYVILLE CREWS.

USDA
Forest Service

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW
(Reference FSH 5309.11)

1. CASE NUMBER

NATURE OF INVESTIGATION

Dude Fire Fatalities

3. NAME OF PERSON INTERVIEWED (Last, First, Middle)

Jeffery C. Whitney

4. SOCIAL SEC. NO.

5. DOB

6. SEX

7. HOME ADDRESS (St, City, State, ZIP Code)

8. DRIVER'S LIC. NO.

9. PHONE (H) (Area Code)

10. EMPLOYMENT (Occupation and Location)

11. PHONE (W) (Area Code)

Dir/Sup

12. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW

Fire Camp - Plans bus.

13. NAME OF OFFICER CONDUCTING INTERVIEW

Pat Andrews

14. OTHERS PRESENT

none

15. STARTED

Date

Time

6/28/90 2200

ENDED

Date

Time

2300

16. REMARKS

Has worked on the District 80-83. Hot Shot Crew.
Knows typical fire on the rim. Was surprised to see
the fire burning downslope at 1:30 on 6/26. Head fire
was running down slope.
Briefing done 6:30 6/26. @ 0700 fire was active, not crowning,
some touching.
Shadow & replace team @ 1300. Comfortable. Knew the people.
Uncomfortable that there was no good anchor.
Crews had been on for 18-20 hours. 0900 Back to camp.
Burnout - slow - good air support.
tear-downer - off to N+E. Spot over the line
30 - Dick Cook didn't assign a section of the line.
"Whitney" was running the burnout.
The transition was complete, but he stayed because
they needed help.
Everything was going well. Zigzag was doing the lighting.
He shot them off.

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

18. WITNESS' SIGNATURE (If Applicable)

Started out. Heard it crossed the Control Road.

"don't have a secure position"

Ashby (div. gr. sup.) had mutual aid communication

Gatewood was there, but did not assert authority.

About 150 people secure.

5 frequencies - crew, command, mutual aid,
maybe 25 radios among the 150 people

For 45 minutes there was no air cover. - Need eyes in the Sky.

Heard that the fire crossed the Control Road.

Went to get rig on east side of subdivision

Saw a spot south of subdivision - not the one from the
burnout.

5 min to get rig - 5 min to come back

While getting the rig someone said "Can't get into
subdivision."

Called Prescott - said get into safety zone.

Orderly movement to safety zone.

Thought the fire blew at the top - that the rest could
go down.

2. Incident Objectives

<h1 style="margin: 0;">INCIDENT OBJECTIVES</h1> <p style="margin: 0; text-align: right;">ICS 202</p>		1. INCIDENT NAME <div style="font-size: 1.5em; text-align: center;">Dude</div>	2. DATE PREPARED <div style="text-align: center;">6-25</div>	3. TIME PREPARED
4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME) <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 5px;"> 6-26-90 0600 - 1800 </div>				
5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES)				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1- Suppress fire insuring maximum firefighter and Public safety 2- Protect private land and structures at Bonita Creek, Whispering Pines and Verde Glen. 3- Protect timber resource on top of the rim & at the bottom. 4- Protect T & E plants in riparian zones. 5- Hold fire south of FR 300 on top of rim. 6- Protect General Springs Cabin Historic Site north of FR 300. Notify host if evacuation necessary. 7- Minimize impacts to General Crook Hiking Trail north of FR 300. 8- Hold fire at lowest acreage possible to minimize visual quality scars on side of rim and along FR 300. 9- Avoid cultural resource sites during line construction and other 				
6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: -20px;"> <u>SUPPRESSION/SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u> </div>				
7. GENERAL/SAFETY MESSAGE <div style="padding: 10px;"> <p>Extremely steep terrain; watch for falling rocks, numerous snags, watch for spot fires. Beware of rapid rates of spread.</p> </div>				
8. ATTACHMENTS (/ IF ATTACHED)				
<div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; padding: 10px;"> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203) </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206) </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LISTS (ICS 204) </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205) </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN </div> </div>				
202 ICS 3-00		9. PREPARED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) <div style="font-size: 1.2em; text-align: center;">B. Shaver</div>		10. APPROVED BY (INCIDENT COMMANDER) <div style="font-size: 1.2em; text-align: center;">[Signature]</div>

3. Fire Behavior Forecast

FIRE BEHAVIOR FORECAST NO. 1

NAME OF FIRE: DUDE PREDICTION FOR: DAY SHIFT
FOREST: TONTO SHIFT DATE: 6/26/90
TIME AND DATE
FORECAST ISSUED: 6/26/90 @2200 SIGNED: P. Velasco

WEATHER SUMMARY:

See Attached 'Spot Fire Weather Forecast'

FIRE BEHAVIOR

GENERAL: Severe burning will continue to be present today.
Heavy Brush. Heavy timber stands and steep topography. Fuel moistures are very low at this time. Fire will be active all night and pick up by as early as 0900.

SPECIFIC:

Top of Rim: Expect upslope runs to cause spotting. Be alert for spots across the control line.

West Side: Winds may actually be favorable for line construction and burning out.

East Side: This will be the critical side. Expect extreme fire behavior with long range spotting, torching and high rates of spread.

South Side: Also a very critical flank. Expect very active fire behavior. Predicted afternoon, erratic winds will escape, intense fire behavior. Watch for hot runs.

AIR OPERATIONS: Smoke will hamper operations. Thunder storms will produce turbulent flying conditions.

SAFETY: Extreme rates of spread (100 chains per hour), possible, and predicted high temperatures and dry thunderstorms.

Call for maximum alertness.

4. Health and Safety Message

Health and Safety Message

Incident:

Dude Fire

Date:

6/25

Time:

2100

Major Hazards and Risks:

Mogollon Rim Fire - All hazards associated with a Rim Fire. Steep slopes, erratic fire behavior, high intensity fuels, possibility of lightning.

Narrative:

Study "watch out" situations and survival checklist below carefully both have messages which can help in working the Dude Fire. Be especially aware of the following: 1. Rolling rocks and other materials on the line 2. Spotting and other extreme fire behavior 3. Gusty shifting winds 4. Hazardous transportation conditions.

"Watch Out!" Situations

1. Fire not scouted and sized up.
2. In country not seen in daylight.
3. Safety zones and escape routes not identified.
4. Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.
5. Uninformed on strategy, tactics and hazards.
6. Instructions and assignments not clear.
7. No communication link with crew members/supervisors.
8. Constructing line without safe anchor point.
9. Building fireline downhill with fire below.
10. Attempting frontal assault on fire.
11. Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
12. Cannot see main fire, not in contact with anyone who can.
13. On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below.
14. Weather is getting hotter and drier.
15. Wind increases and/or changes direction.
16. Getting frequent spot fires across line.
17. Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
18. Taking a nap near the fireline.

Your Safety Team

Safety Officer

Survival Checklist

- Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
- Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.
- Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.
- Ensure instructions are given and understood.
- Obtain current information on fire status.
- Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor and adjoining forces.
- Determine safety zones and escape routes.
- Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations.
- Retain control at all times.
- Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively.

5. Site Photographs

A view south along Walk Moore Canyon. The large ponderosa pine at the right is charred on the west side, but not the east.

A view north in Walk Moore Canyon approximately 14 chains from the Control Road FR 69. Nomex clothing is laid out at the location where fatality, J. Ellis, was found lowest in the Canyon.

A view north in Walk Moore Canyon at the accident site. Nomex clothing is laid out where victims were found. Shows deployed shelter location of J. Denney lower left, S. Bachman, center, and A. Contreras, center right side of trail.

A view north in Walk Moore Canyon at the accident site. Nomex clothing is laid out where victims were found with their shelters. Shows location of J. Chacon's deployed shelter and his hardhat.