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Stand 4 - Post Point

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Post received Clayton's note but could not help. The Ranger withdrew up the hill to the timberline and safety. Bert Sullivan took the lead while Post and Tyrrell brought up the rear.

The spot fire consumed the fuels above Post's crew cutting off their escape to timberline, thus making Post Point the men's best chance for survival. Five men panicked and ran downhill through the fire. Of these five, only one would survive. Post, Tyrrell, and Sullivan made every attempt possible to keep the men in place.  Of the 37 who stayed at Post Point, only 3 would perish.

Even with limited technology in 1937, there was an aerial reconnaissance flight that had identified spots along Trail Ridge and higher up on top of the mountain. The recon flight personnel never noticed a spot developing in the bottom of Clayton Gulch below the crews building line.

Given the fire's origin was a tree struck by lightning, could this passing storm have produced more than one strike in the area? If so, could the strike have remained undetected until winds were in alignment to increase the fire behavior? Previous winds were from the southwest and the spot is sheltered from these winds in the bottom of the drainage below. The passage of a dry cold front switched the winds to the northwest.

When dealing with spots, typically one looks in the predominate direction of the wind as to where they might be found (e.g., downwind). The documentation of the event describes the spots on Trail Ridge as within 100 feet of the main perimeter. One probably wasn't looking one-quarter to one-half mile away for a spot.

Today as we fight fire in lightning-prone areas, are we looking for the sleeper that may be established in a site that could, given optimal conditions, come to life in a hurry and cause a similar situation?

Paul Tyrrell knocked down some of the panicked men and lay down on top of them as a human shield to protect them from the fire behavior. A few days later, Paul's severe burns take his life; he passed away at 1300 on August 26, 1937.

Given the fire progression (see Map D above) and the general wind speeds/direction, the likelihood that the fire cast a spot more than a quarter of a mile perpendicular to the major runs during the evening of August 20 and the following morning would be minimal. This was modeled using fire behavior software BehavePlus. This combined with the fact that the spot was not noticed by aerial reconnaissance might lead one to propose the hypothesis that the "spot" wasn't a true spot but a holdover lightning strike. The significance of the difference between a spot and a holdover lightning strike is that firefighters, even today, typically look for spots either close to the fireline and/or downwind in the direction of the smoke column. Burning embers typically are found in the direction of the smoke column. A holdover lightning strike could be anywhere - in this case, below the existing fireline and most likely out of the path of any smoke column from the previous 24 hours.

The fire rushed uphill from the spot in two waves. The group on the ridge top tried to move around to avoid the flame fronts (see Map D above), but there was little room on the ridge. One of the survivors was quoted as saying, "Anywhere you moved, the flames and heat could get to you."

Fire behavior specialist A.A. Brown completed the fire behavior report for the Blackwater Fire. Mr. Brown identified the following factors as key to the blowup:

  1. The ragged edge of the fire.
  2. Underburning of surface fuels that pre-heated the canopy crown.
  3. The heavy fuel model that the fire burned in - today's fuel model 10.
  4. Undetected spot fires.
Photo of Johnny Levine

Interview excepts from Johnny J Levine, Civilian Conservation Crewmember who helped fight the Blackwater Fire and was trapped at Post Point: transcript.

Looking up the ridge at the approach to Post Point.

Looking up the ridge at the approach to Post Point.

 
The view looking back down from Post Point. This is where the majority of firefighters were trapped by the firestorm.

The view looking back down from Post Point. This is where the majority of firefighters were trapped by the firestorm.

The plaque for the Post Point memorial. This is at the location where the firefighters with Post sought refuge. This is the third memorial built by the CCCs in 1938.

The plaque for the Post Point memorial. This is at the location where the firefighters with Post sought refuge. This is the third memorial built by the CCCs in 1938.

 
Location (SRS)
POINT (-109.7333333 44.4138889)
Related Stand
Staff Ride to the Blackwater Fire

NWCG Latest Announcements

2025 Paul Gleason Award Winners Announced

Date:  August 13, 2026
Questions? 
Please contact: Leadership Development Subcommittee

The NWCG Qualifications Management Committee (QMC) and Leadership Development Subcommittee (LDSC) are proud to announce the recipients of the 2025 Paul Gleason "Lead By Example" awards. Award categories include Initiative and Innovation, Mentoring and Teamwork, and Motivation and Vision.

Congratulations to the awardees:

  • Hunter Bell, U.S. Forest Service — Initiative and Innovation
  • Shannon Deane, U.S. Wildland Fire Service— Initiative and Innovation
  • Chris Delaney, U.S. Wildland Fire Service — Motivation and Vision
  • Sean Peterson, U.S. Forest Service — Mentoring and Teamwork

References:

Paul Gleason Lead By Example Award

Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program (WFLDP)

Leadership Development Subcommittee

LMC Equipment Bulletin 26-001: Aquatic Invasive Species – Seasonal Reminder for Mussels

Date:  July 30, 2026
Questions? 
Please contact: Equipment and Technology Subcommittee

The Logistics and Equipment Management Committee (LMC) issued Equipment Bulletin 26-001: Aquatic Invasive Species - Seasonal Reminder for Mussels, reminding the wildland fire community that aquatic mussels continue to be a problem. Mussels rapidly colonize hard and soft surfaces, including aquatic plants and fire equipment, clogging pipes, fouling motors, disrupting water systems, and impacting native species.

To help prevent their spread, fire personnel must follow the decontamination procedures outlined in the NWCG Guide to Preventing Aquatic Invasive Species Transport by Wildland Fire Operations, PMS 444. Additionally, report any sightings immediately to your Lead Resource Advisor and include clear, close-up photos (with a pen or your hand for size reference) and location details.”

Read the complete LMC Equipment Bulletin 26-001, to learn more. 

References:

NWCG Alerts

LMC Equipment Bulletin 26-001: Aquatic Invasive Species - Seasonal Reminder for Mussels

NWCG Guide to Preventing Aquatic Invasive Species Transport by Wildland Fire Operations, PMS 444

Intermediate Faller (FAL2) Position Task Book Update

Date:  July 24, 2026
Questions? 
Please contact: Tree Felling Subcommittee

NWCG Operations Management Committee (OMC) has issued an update to the NWCG Position Task Book for Intermediate Faller (FAL2), PMS 311-91. To ensure clarity for both trainees and evaluators, the updated FAL2 Position Task Book (PTB) explicitly states who is authorized to sign off on your tasks:

“Evaluators must be qualified as a FAL2, or an Advanced Faller (FAL1).”

If you are currently working out of a previously published version of the FAL2 PTB, you do not need to restart. However, OMC highly encourages you to take the following step to prevent any confusion in the field:

  • Print and replace the updated evaluator information page (page 2) in your current physical PTB.

References:

Intermediate Faller (FAL2) Position Page

RMC Memo 26-01: Transition Plan for Implementing Updates to Intermediate Faller (FAL2) Position Qualifications

NWCG Position Task Book for Intermediate Faller (FAL2), PMS 311-91

Equipment Advisory 26-001: Potential Front Driveline Joint Failure on 2018 and Earlier Ram Pickups

Date:  July 10, 2026
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Please contact: Equipment and Technology Subcommittee

The Logistics/Equipment Management Committee (LMC) has released Equipment Advisory 26-001: Potential Front Driveline Joint Failure on 2018 and Earlier Ram Pickups. This advisory highlights multiple U.S. Forest Service regions reporting front driveline joint failure incidents.

This advisory recommends firefighters and fire managers to: 

  • Follow all Ram-issued inspection, maintenance, and service guidance for front driveline joints. 
  • Consider installing a driveline loop. 
  • Coordinate with fleet managers and service providers to determine the most appropriate driveline loop kit for each pickup.

For further details, please refer to the complete advisory.

References:

Equipment Advisory 26-001: Potential Front Driveline Joint Failure on 2018 and Earlier Ram Pickups

Technical Service Bulletin: 03-002-21