The memorial site was established by the Civilian Conservation Corps and the U.S. Forest Service in honor of the crewmembers of Company 1212 that were entrapped on the 1939 Rock Creek Fire. This is a good location to begin the staff ride, as it is easy to find, has good parking capacity, and provides an excellent perspective of the site from the monument.

The Rock Creek Fire started at 1115 on July 28th, 1939 from lightning. The point of origin is located approximately five miles southeast of Orovada, Nevada and four miles due east of the Highway 95 monument. Between 1530 to 1600 the fire burned explosively downhill in a westerly direction, under the influence of a thunderstorm directly over the fire that produced 40 to 60 mile per hour downdraft winds. At the time the wind event occurred, six local residents were suppressing the fire and 23 CCC firefighters were hiking to the fire from Rock Creek. The CCC crew was divided into two squads. One squad hiked in from the north toward the left flank of the fire and the other traversed from the west to the bottom of the fire.

See the travel map, above.

See the Orthophoto map with the final fire perimeter and NAD 83 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

Click to link to National Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni. Interview excerpts from Kirk Studebaker, the store owner who reported the fire and helped with the initial attack of the fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

The Monument is located in the center of the Rest Area ½ mile South of Orovada, Nevada on Highway 95.

Looking to the east from the Rest Area on Highway 95 at significant area landmarks. Sawtooth Mountain is the predominant mountain on the left.

Looking to the east from the Rest Area on Highway 95 at the other Stand locations.

Approximately 1400 hours the CCC crew arrived at Rock Creek. They drove to the end of the two-track road leading into the creek. At this point, the Crew Foreman, Wilbur Timmons, divided the 23 person crew into two squads. He would take his squad and approach the fire along the ridge to the north of the fire. He placed Earnest Tippin in charge of the second squad. Tippin's group was directed to approach from the west to the bottom of the fire. Foreman Timmons believed the bottom of the fire would be safer for the less experienced squad boss Tippin. Timmons had briefed Tippin in the truck as they drove into the fire. Timmons gave a direct order to "keep the men in safety". The squads rapidly assembled and departed the truck heading to the fire. Tippin's route took him a short distance up Rock Canyon then south, crossing over a saddle, and following the McConnell Trail. The McConnell Trail followed a dry drainage west toward the fire. Timmons continued up Rock Creek ½ mile then started hiking a ridgeline heading to the north of the fire. Almost 300 yards due east of Stand 2, on the south facing slope above Rock Creek is the Vitale fatality site. This is a good time to point this out, however, Stand 4 will provide the greatest vantage point for discussion regarding Vitale's escape route.

See the orthophoto map with the final fire perimeter and NAD 83 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

The two squads hiked together up Rock Creek to the point were Tippin's crew turned to the south and crossed over the saddle you can see on the right side of the photo.

Looking back down the two-track road from the crew parking area toward the Gabica Ranch.

Interview excerpts from Raymond Gabica, ranch hand that helped initial attack the fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Tippin's squad crossed the saddle from Rock Creek heading east up a dry drainage. The McConnell Trail parallels this drainage leading up to the fire. They stopped and took short breaks several times as they hiked up toward the fire. They left one person at Rock Creek as a water boy. As they progressed up the trail, four squad members fell behind. Sometime between 1515 and 1530, Tippin and five of his squad reached the ridge at the head of the dry drainage. The fire was backing down the ridge to the north of this location. It is here that Tippin gave his tactical briefing, described by survivors as the "Pep Talk". He delivered his briefing before the four other squad members reached his location. Within seconds of finishing or during his briefing the wind abruptly shifted from the west to the east and increased to more than 40 miles per hour. They were now directly in the path of the oncoming head fire. He gave the order to begin walking back to the truck. The four squad members who were still hiking up saw Tippin and party hiking back toward them. They immediately turned around and began running back toward the truck. Tippin gives an order not to run and "save your breath for the fatal moment." Tippin then hears the roar of the fire, turns and looks again; he then gives the order to run. As they dropped down into the drainage the fire outflanks them on the ridgetops and heavy smoke hinders their orientation.

See the topo map with fire progression and stand locations, above.

Above Stand 3, looking west down the dry drainage that Tippin's squad hiked up.

Typical of the fuel conditions that were present in the area before 1939.

Interview excerpts from Kirk Studebaker, the store owner who reported the fire and helped with the initial attack of the fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Shortly after 1530 Tippins squad was in an urgent retreat back to Rock Creek where the truck was parked. All of the four squad members who did not make it to the Pep Talk on the ridge were running over the ridge into Rock Creek and down to the truck. These men did not follow the McConnell Trail through the saddle. They crossed the ridgetop well above the saddle. Tippin and the remaining squad members were steadily being driven deeper into the drainage. The fire was closing in from behind and on their flanks. In haste, Kennedy broke his ankle jumping into the drainage bottom only 50 yards downhill from Stand 3 and called for help as the fire rapidly approached. Tippin and James immediately turned back to help Kennedy "arm in arm" continue his way downhill. Meanwhile, Barker and Powers collided with each other. Powers jumped up and continued running to the saddle. At about this point, Tippin and James realized that they cannot outrun the fire while helping Kennedy. They left Kennedy behind and ran ahead to help Barker, who was now limping after his collision with Powers. The fire overran Kennedy and then caught Barker, Tippin, and James about ¼ mile down the drainage.

Squad member Vitale ran north into Rock Creek toward the truck. His vision was very poor and a later report indicated his eyeglasses were broken and he did not have them on this fire. This may explain why he did not run directly to the truck. Instead, his body was found approximately 300 yards north of the saddle on the south facing slope above Rock Creek. The remaining six squad members ran down the Rock Creek road until they were picked up and taken to Gabica Ranch. They assisted in the evacuation of the Ranch. From the time of the initial wind shift to the time the survivors reached the truck was estimated to be less than 45 minutes.

See the topo map with fire progression and stand locations, above.

See the Investigation Report Map with firefighter retreat routes, above.

Looking at Stand 4, which is in the area where the two un-named drainages converge and are south of Rock Creek.

Looking north through Rock Creek Saddle at the Vitale fatality site.

The Mendocino National Forest boundary sign is located at the mouth of Powder House Canyon and is a good location to begin the Staff Ride. It offers a good view of the point of origin and terrain layout. This site also has suitable parking and is easy to find.

The Rattlesnake Fire was started at approximately 14:30 on July 9, 1953. It was the second of two arson fires started by the same individual. The first fire was called the Hull Fire and was set near Chrome, about 10 miles north of this location on County Road 306. The Hull Fire was suppressed at 11 acres on State land.

The Rattlesnake Fire was started on Mendocino National Forest land, along Alder Springs Road, at Oleta Point approximately 2 miles from this location. It was discovered by Mr. A. B. Miller while he was returning to Alder Springs from the Hull Fire. Mr. Miller had to drive past the fire to a point near Powder House Turn to verify that the lookout at Elk Creek Butte had seen and reported the fire to central dispatch at Willows. He reported that the fire was 25' by 30' when he passed it.

See the travel map above.

See the Orthophoto with fire edge and NAD 27 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

The beginning point, Stand 1, of the Rattlesnake Fire Staff Ride is easily identified by the Mendocino National Forest Boundary sign at the junction of Highway 162 and Alder Springs Road.

Looking west from Stand 1 at the mouth of Powder House Canyon you can identify Oleta Point (to the right of the telephone pole), which was the Point of Origin for the Rattlesnake Fire.

Looking east from Stand 2 towards the Sacramento Valley. The valley is the source of very strong diurnal temperature changes, which can have a significant effect on fire behavior in this area.

The Point of Origin is located approximately 100' up the Alder Springs Road from this spot at Oleta Point. Initial Attack was made on the fire at 1515 by Miller and a suppression crew consisting of five men, a tanker truck, and hand tools. The head of the fire was beyond the reach of the hose, so they anchored handline to Alder Springs Road, near the origin, and began flanking the south side of the fire. Shortly after they began a State crew of eight men under Assistant State Ranger Casaurang arrived and began helping construct handline along the south flank. The flank soon became too active to continue direct attack. Charles Lafferty soon arrived and at about 1600, instructed Silva and his forces to abandon direct attack. J.M. Ewing also arrived at approximately 1600 and was appointed Fire Boss (IC) by Forest Supervisor Leon Thomas.

The fire at this time was spreading, primarily in a westerly direction, on both sides of the ridge from Oleta Point. The fire was moving toward Rattlesnake Ridge, which is approximately 1 mile from the Point of Origin. There were a total of 15 men at the time and they moved further west along Alder Springs Road towards Powder House Turn with a new plan.

See the Investigation Report Figure 1, above.

See the Feature Orientation Map, above.

The Point of Origin is located west from Stand 2 about 100'. The fire was estimated to be 25' by 30' when Miller first arrived.

Looking up the Alder Springs Road from Stand 2. Rattlesnake Ridge is on the horizon.

After failing to control the fire through direct attack near Oleta Point, Fire Boss Ewing made a new plan in consultation with Lafferty. The plan consisted of:

1. Control the head of the fire along Rattlesnake Ridge.
2. Construct line and burn where needed along Rattlesnake Ridge to the west to High Point (there was an existing old fuel break along Rattlesnake Ridge).
3. Construct line and burn from High Point down a ridge in a northeasterly direction to a point on Alder Springs Road near Powder House Turn.
4. Use Alder Springs Road and burnout going west until meeting up with the burnout coming from Powder House Turn.

Almost directly across from Stand 3 is the white cross that was placed in 1993 near the spot that the majority of the firefighters were overtaken by the fire.

Although two attempts were made to construct line down to Alder Springs Road (Figure 1 - Points 22 & 23) neither were successful. At around 1840 a handline was completed between High Point and Powder House Turn. Burning up the road from Oleta Point and firing out from High Point down to Powder House Turn both began around 1920. Casaurang with his crew, supported by tanker equipment, were bringing the burning operation up the road, while a crew was burning down from High Point was under the direction of Robert Werner. When burning operations began on the ridge winds were upslope, out of the east-southeast and the crew was having a tough time getting the brush to burn. Just before 2000 "a local wind of considerable turbulence developed for a brief period" caused seven or eight spot fires below Alder Springs Road near the old car (Figure 1 - Point 11), just west of this location. At 2015 burning was suspended along Alder Springs Road to take action on the spot fires. It is at this time that Forest Supervisor Thomas discovered the Missionary Spot Fire across Powder House Canyon from the old car.

See the Fire Progression Map, above.

See the Investigation Report Figure 3, above.

Hear an excerpt from New Tribes Mission Crew Boss Paul Turner's interview:  audio file (mp3); transcript.

Looking west from this location you can see the head of Powder House Canyon.

A new memorial was dedicated in July 2005 at the Overlook. The monument portrays the 15 firefighters who died on the Rattlesnake Fire. In the background across the drainage, crosses can be seen at the location where the firefighters were overtaken by the fast-moving fire.

From this location, you can see Powder House Canyon from top to bottom.

This point is located at the head of the Powder House drainage, along Alder Springs Road and offers personnel involved in the incident their best vantage of the overall fire and the Powder House drainage. It logically became the incident command post (ICP) for the incident. It is from this point that 21 Missionary crewmembers and three Forest Service overhead, in three different groups, were dispatched to attack and control the Missionary Spot Fire.

At approximately 2203 spot fires developed below the road at Powder House Turn (Figure 3 - Points 22,30,24,23,26, & 27) due to a wind shift shortly after 2145 from the west, down slope. Personnel at Powder House Turn took action on the spot fires. All the detected spot fires were either quickly controlled or burning upslope towards the road. While devising a plan to contain the rest of the spots a glow was observed further down the slope near the bottom (Figure 3 - Point 28). All focus was then directed to this new spot that was burning in a northeasterly direction. Lafferty soon realized that escape route for the men at the Missionary Spot Fire might become compromised. At 2215 Lafferty left Powder House Turn to warn the men working on the Missionary Spot Fire.

View the Fire Weather Summary above under "Research and Pre-study Resources".

See the Investigation Report Figure 2, above.

Looking from Stand 4 across to the Alder Springs Road. One of the spot fires started near the bottom of the drainage at this location. It was this spot that overtook the firefighters working on the Missionary Spot Fire.

Stand 4 looking east offers the best overall view of Powder House Canyon. This point also offers a good view of, and illustrates the importance of, the location of the Sacramento Valley in relation to the events that took place. This location, known as Powder House Turn, is where the Fire Boss and other overhead positioned themselves.

Looking west from Stand 4 shows the expansive Grindstone Canyon. This canyon offers an easy, natural funnel for heavier, cooler, marine air from the Pacific Ocean to rush down-slope and replace the condensing air of the Sacramento Valley in the evenings.

There is an interpretive site for the Rattlesnake Fire located at a rest area on State Highway 162. To reach this memorial continue west from Stand 4 on the Alder Springs Road for 2 miles until it reaches its junction with Highway 162.

This is identified in the Investigation Report Figure 1 as Point 10 and in Figure 2 as Point 4. The Missionary Spot Fire was originally detected at about 2015 by Forest Supervisor Thomas from Powder House Turn. The spot is believed to have originated sometime around 2005 when "a local wind of considerable turbulence developed for a brief period." Other spots were detected and extinguished just below Alder Springs Road and near the old car around this time.

Thomas, accompanied by dozer operator C.W. Randrup and a reporter Charles Gleeson, made a reconnaissance of the spot fire and it was determined by Thomas that it would probably burn to the top of Powder House Ridge and that they would attack it after it made its run. Shortly after 2035, when that decision was made, the upslope flow of air subsided. It was then apparent that the spot fire would not run to the top of Powder House Ridge.

At about 2100 Missionary Straw Boss Dave Johnson and three New Tribes Mission crewmembers were assigned by Lafferty to make initial attack on the spot fire. They were instructed to "not take chances and to start work at the head of the fire." This group walked directly from Powder House Turn, contour, to the fire, which is represented by Line 1 in Figure 2. At approximately 2115 Crew Boss Stanley Vote led 14 more New Tribes Mission crewmembers, including three more Straw Bosses, from Powder House Turn to join Johnson's group. Vote took his crew partway up the cat trail that had been constructed up Powder House Ridge and then down to the spot, which is represented by Line 2 in Figure 2. Lunches arrived at Powder House Turn shortly after Votes departure and at about 2145 Assistant Ranger Robert Powers and four additional New Tribes Mission crewmembers left Powder House Turn to take lunches to the people working on the spot fire. This group proceeded along Powder House Ridge to a point beyond the spot fire, down a ridge, and then back to the spot fire represented by Line 3 in Figure 2.

Upon arriving at the spot fire, the last group placed the lunches in the draw at the northeast corner of the spot fire. They were then told by Vote that the line construction was finished. It was there, in the draw that the lunches were counted and distributed. While that was taking place Vote and Powers discussed the fact that the main fire at the head of Powder House Canyon was flaring up and they walked a short distance up the ridge that the Missionary Spot Fire was on to observe the main fire. After returning to the draw Vote and Powers discussed whether the Missionary Spot would provide protection (safety zone). They decided to eat the lunches there, at the spot fire. They were all located in or near the draw on the east side of the spot fire. They had sat down for only a very few minutes when the warning came from Lafferty to get out, and hurry.

Read articles from the Willows Journal in 1953, above under "Research and Pre-study Resources".

Read the New Tribes Mission notification of the tragedy, above under "Research and Pre-study Resources".​

Click to see the 1957 Fire Task Force Report.

Looking at Stand 5 from across the canyon you can see the location of the spot fire, and distances traveled by the survivors and those who were caught by the fire at the cross.

From Stand 5 you can see where Vote and Powers walked to the ridge on the western flank of the spot fire and observed increased fire behavior at the head of Powder House Canyon before returning to the lunch spot to eat.

Stand 1 gives an overview of agency, firefighter/smokejumper training, policy, culture and values, as well as fuels and weather in August of 1949. How did the culture, attitudes, training and environmental conditions set the stage for the events of Mann Gulch on August 5, 1949?

At the time of the Mann Gulch Fire, the U.S. Forest Service was 44 years into its existence, and the smokejumper program was a 10 year old project with a strong reputation for performance and ability. The culture regarding fire suppression was one of aggressive initial attack and protection of valuable natural resources. The 10 am Policy, established in 1936, stated that upon the report of a fire, containment and/or control should be accomplished by 10 am the following day. Long duration fires on the land could often reflect poorly on the record of a District Ranger.

On a broader scope, the work ethic in the U.S. Forest Service and the firefighting community, stressed unquestioning compliance with a supervisors orders. Many of the firefighters were veterans of WWII and brought much in the way of attitudes and culture toward authority from their military experiences. Official training on areas such as Fire Behavior and Risk Management (LCES, 10 & 18, etc…) did not yet exist.

On August 4th a lightning storm moved through western Montana and on to the east side of the continental divide, starting numerous fires. August brought with it record high temperatures in an area of abundant light fuel build up. The Mann Gulch Fire was reported by the Colorado Mountain Lookout at 12:25 PM, August 5th. District Ranger Robert Jansson also spotted the fire from a patrol airplane, and when he got back to Helena at 1:30 PM he and his supervisor decided to order smokejumpers from Missoula due to the difficulty of getting ground forces to the fire rapidly. They also ordered 50 local firefighters to be sent to the fire. Because only one airplane (a C47) was available, 16 jumpers flew to Mann Gulch. The best overhead available was selected for the mission due to the extremely rough topography of the general area and the seriousness of the fire weather. The airplane departed Missoula at 2:30 PM.

This background discussion is best held at the mouth of Mann Gulch after getting off the boat. Logistically, the mouth of Mann Gulch offers a good place to stash contingency medical supplies, break into groups and provide a visual overview of the area being discussed.

Sign currently located at the mouth of Mann Gulch

Men at the mouth of Mann Gulch just after the fire.

About 1 mile from the mouth of Mann Gulch, this open bench where Dodge and Harrison rejoined the crew provides a view which includes most of Mann Gulch, the jump spot, the cargo spot, and the main fire. It is also a good location to discuss fuel type and arrangement on this terrain in 1949, as compared to today.

The jump ship arrived over the fire at 3:10 PM. Spotter Cooley and Foreman Dodge estimated the fire to be 60 acres and noted that it had burned to the top of the ridge between Mann and Meriwether Gulches, with considerable backing down slope into Mann Gulch. They picked a jump spot across the gulch and streamers indicated the wind was about 10 mph straight up canyon, from the northeast. The air was so turbulent that several jumpers got sick, most landed hard (Dodge actually injured his elbow on landing), the cargo got scattered, and the crew's only radio was broken on impact.

Around 5:00 PM, while the crew got a bite to eat, Dodge went across the gulch for a meeting with Meriwether Guard Harrison, who had yelled down to them. James Harrison, a smokejumper the previous season, was the first to attack the Mann Gulch fire, having hiked back and forth between the guard station to the ridge top twice during the day. Dodge instructed Hellman to follow him with the men after they had collected their cargo.

When Hellman brought the crew across, Dodge and Harrison came down and met them at a point about 100 yards up from the gulch bottom. Dodge decided that this flank was not safe. Around 5:20 PM he told Hellman to take the crew back across the drainage to this stand’s north side location, and on towards the Missouri River. Dodge and Harrison hiked back to the cargo spot to get food and water.

Route Hellman leads smokejumpers on between Stand 2 (Briefing and Overlook) and Stand 3 (Crew Turnaround Point).

Highly detailed photo from smokejumper cargo spot Aug. 16, 1949 Notice the difference between fuels then and now.

From mid-slope and contouring on this spur ridge, a half mile southwest from Stand 2, people can note the main fire’s progress, the development of a spot fire below and the steepness of this northern canyon side.

While at the cargo spot Dodge and Harrison saw the fire “boil up,” and determined to get the crew out of the canyon as soon as possible. They caught up to the crew - which had strung into smaller groups - around 5:40 PM; Dodge took over the lead, pushing the pace towards the river.

Within five minutes Dodge noticed that the wind had picked up. The fire had crossed the gulch, cutting off access to the Missouri River and a safe anchor point, and was burning up the ridge towards them through light grass and brush. He turned the men around and told them to head back up Mann Gulch at approximately this stand’s location. Flames were still not visible from the crew’s rear, but the smoke and noise had become significant. It is at around this time that Ranger Jansson got turned back by flames below them and retreated back to the river.

Even after turning around and heading away from the flames below, the fire blowing up across the canyon still preoccupied some of the firefighters’ attention. Navon and another jumper took pictures of the main fire from here.

Turnaround point with facilitator pointing out location where Dodge first sees spots in the bottom of Mann Gulch, cutting off the crew's access to the river.

View toward the bottom of Mann Gulch with historic terrain and fuels.

300-500 yards back to the northeast from Stand 3, on this slight bench on the upper third of the slope, people can notice how fire was likely to have behaved as well as how difficult it is to negotiate this top part of the ridge, where there are rockslides and where several outcroppings block escape.

At this point the fire was about 100 yards behind the crew, and seemed to be getting ahead of them both above and below on the slope. Flames are estimated to have been spreading at just less than 100 yards per minute. The men seemed to have finally become nervous about their situation. Rumsey recalled Dodge saying something about "getting out of this firetrap".

At this location, about 5:53 PM, Dodge ordered the men to drop their gear. Whether or not they all heard their foreman, they did not all respond. As the timber thinned, the fuels became flashier, and the winds pushed the fire to spread even faster, up to an estimated 600 feet per minute.

Location near tool drop looking upslope from rock slide area. Notice footing and steepness of slope encountered during crew’s retreat.

Investigators find dropped tools following the Mann Gulch Fire

Approximately 400 feet higher and .4 miles northeast of Stand 3 is where Dodge lit his escape fire at 5:55 PM. At this time no fewer than eight members of the crew were close to him. Dodge thought he tried to explain to the crew that he intended to wait a few seconds to let his fire burn down before entering the blackened area, and that he wanted them to follow. About 100 square feet had burned when a crewmember said: “To hell with this, I am getting out of here,” and everyone except Dodge continued up the gulch. Dodge kept trying to convince the men as they passed him to get into the ashes with him, but nobody did. These events took seconds to occur.

The rookie smokejumpers had gone through weeks of intensive conditioning and had been working in the field ever since. They reached speeds estimated at 4 to 6 mph on these steep slopes.

Staff Ride facilitator near the Dodge escape fire marker, utilizing a photo in conducting a strategic discussion regarding Dodge's actions.

Marker near the location where Dodge ignites his escape fire.

Here at the top of the ridge separating Mann Gulch from Rescue Gulch is a flat area large enough to gather a group for discussion. People can see much of Rumsey and Sallee’s escape route, some of Rescue Gulch, and many of the monuments placed where bodies were found.

Jumpers Sallee and Rumsey followed the north edge of Dodge’s fire to the ridge top where they escaped the flames. After the blowup had subsided, they found Hellman, who had followed the south edge of Dodge’s escape fire toward the ridge, badly burned but alive. Foreman Dodge, who had survived inside the fire he lit, joined Sallee and Rumsey and reported that he had found Sylvia alive, but badly burned. Dodge and Sallee proceeded down Rescue Gulch to the Missouri River to find help while Rumsey stayed with Hellman.

A rescue crew arrived on the scene at 12:30 AM on August 6th, and began to assist Dodge in the search and recovery of the men. At 1:30 AM, they came upon and tended Sylvia and Hellman. The two injured men were evacuated at 5:00 AM, but both died in a Helena hospital later in the morning. Before the day was over the other 11 bodies of those who died were found within 300 yards of each other.

During the blow up stage, the Mann Gulch fire covered an estimated 3,000 acres in 10 minutes and eventually burned 4,300 acres. 611 firefighters helped bring the fire under control.

Largely as a result of the Mann Gulch Fire’s tragic ending, a program was developed to study fire behavior, and the Fire Laboratory in Missoula was finally built in 1960. Today firefighters nationwide analyze fire behavior from investigative conclusions and follow the Ten Standard Fire Orders that were influenced in part by the events that occurred in Mann Gulch in 1949.

Looking down into Rescue Gulch from ridge top. Notice Hellman’s cross has been relocated to the rock slide, well below the ridge top (lower right of photo)

Looking down into Rescue Gulch from ridge top. Notice initial placement of Hellman's cross.

This optional stand is located .5 miles up from the mouth of Mann Gulch, near Gisborne’s Memorial Plaque. This stand is particularly pertinent if the Staff Ride is for fire managers, since that was Jansson’s job. From here you can note the fire origin and the spot fires that Jansson could see in the bottom and on the north side of Mann Gulch.

Ranger Jansson preformed multiple fire duties during August 4th and 5th, including making patrol flights, mobilizing and supporting firefighters, and dispatching.

At 5:02 PM on August 5th Jansson started hiking up Mann Gulch to scout the fire and ascertain if the jumpers had made it into Mann Gulch. He estimated the wind to be between 20 and 30 mph. After traveling about 40 chains he noticed the fire had crossed the bottom of the gulch in two places. He thought he heard voices and proceeded another 100 yards to investigate. Somewhere between 5:18 and 5:20 PM he turned around, ran back through flames, and passed out. When he revived the fire was only a few feet away and backing towards him. At 5:45 PM he headed back to Meriwether in the boat.

At 9:20 PM Smokejumper Foreman Dodge made contact with Jansson in the Meriwether camp and confirmed the jump and location. This was the first time Jansson learned that an accident had occurred, and from then he lead the rescue effort through Sunday afternoon the 7th.

Staff ride participants at optional Stand 6 near the Harry T. Gisborne memorial marker. He became the 14th victim of the Mann Gulch Fire, when in September of 1949, he suffered a heart attack while studying the fire behavior and effects of the Mann Gulch Fire.

Historic photo of Canyon Ferry District Ranger, Robert Jansson. Stand 6 focuses heavily on the aftermath of the Mann Gulch Fire and it's impacts on the survivors and our culture.

On May 5, 1980 employees of the Mio Ranger District, Huron-Manistee National Forests ignited the Crane Lake Prescribed Fire. They intended to burn a 28 acre unit, along side State Highway M-33. The goal was to reduce the slash fuel load to prepare the site for planting jack pine to create habitat for the endangered Kirtland’s Warbler. Fuels on the site included grass, shrubs and scattered discontinuous logging slash. Resources on hand were 11 personnel, 1 John Deere 450 tractor plow, a 125 gallon engine, and a 6x6 1000 gallon engine. Several of the personnel were inexperienced or were not very familiar with this fuel type. The tractor plow operator was also inexperienced and planned to have his final certification on the plow later in the week. The primary operator of the tractor was not available along with several other firefighters due to a training class being held that day. The burn was surrounded by tractor plow line. The Burn Boss planned to ignite the fire around 0900 and complete the burn before 1200. The afternoon weather conditions were predicted to have temperatures in the 80’s, humidity in the 20’s with gusty southwest winds changing to northwest due to the predicted passage of a cold front during the mid-afternoon.

Due to wildfires the previous day, they were not ready to ignite the burn until 1026. During the initial stages of the fire it spotted 4 times along the east control line. These spots were quickly suppressed. However, the fire continued to cause control problems and the 125 gallon engine became stuck on a stump and then later broke down. These problems complicated the suppression of 3 more spot fires. The seventh spot fire on the north flank escaped containment. The 1000 gallon engine radioed that the seventh spot fire was moving east towards the highway.

Located just south of Stand 1, the best parking option for Stands 1 through 4 is this opening along State Highway M-33.

Panorama of the Crane Lake Prescribed Fire. The right side of the photo is the area labeled “standing timber” next to the “M-33” shield on the hand drawn map (Appendix B4) from the Investigation Report.

The walk from Stand 1 to Stand 2 passes one of the visual buffer islands of larger trees that are still standing.

Fire behavior in fine grass fuels with pockets of light logging slash.

Initial ignition operations along east fireline in grass and light slash fuels.

Kirtlands Warbler.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake staff Ride.

This 1000 gallon tanker (engine) was on the Mack Lake Fire in 1980. It was a brand new piece of equipment on the district at that time. Photo was taken in 2009 when the engine was still in service.

At approximately 12:06 the seventh spot escaped initial control efforts and began to move east towards the highway. This forced the personnel on the fire to use M-33 as the next logical control feature. The Burn Boss requested another Sheriff’s patrol at 1208 for M-33 due to continued heavy smoke. At approximately the same time the escaped fire was burning downslope towards M-33 on the west side of the highway. The tractor plow had constructed a line along the north side of the spot fire and connected it to M-33. However, the line did not hold.

The first spot fire was detected on the east side of the highway during this time period. The 1000 gallon engine attacked the spot but was delayed as it tried to climb the cut-slope due to the steepness of the grade. The Burn Boss then directed the tractor plow to contain the spot across the highway. The tractor plow put in two lines around the spot, successfully containing it with crewmembers patrolling the plow lines.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake Staff Ride

The 1000 gallon tanker (engine) that was on the Mack Lake Fire in 1980. This was a brand new piece of equipment on the district at that time. This photo was taken in 2009 and the engine was still in service at that time.

Tractor with plowline.

Mack Lake Stand 2 with plaque.

Between 1215 and 1230 a second spot fire was detected on the east side of M-33 just north of the original spot fire which had been contained by the tractor-plow and other personnel. This spot was in grass on the highway shoulder and was pushed by wind. The fire torched and then crowned within 100 feet of the origin in a stand of sapling sized jack pine. Surface fuel was primarily sedge, pine litter and duff at this point.

The tractor plow and 1000 gallon engine quickly attacked this second spot. However, they were not able to contain it as it spotted across their line and continued to move east gaining in intensity. The crews still felt they could catch the fire with the tractor and 1000 gallon engine. However, the District Ranger who also was serving as the tractor’s spotter conferred with the Burn Boss and decided to leave the scene and serve as an aerial spotter as they felt the fire had escaped. During this time a reporter briefly talked with the District Ranger along the powerline in regards to the fire’s status. The tractor plow operator was now without a spotter. The District Ranger stopped a passing motorist to get back to the nearby airport as a truck was not available. The 1000 gallon engine and the tractor continued flanking the fire to the east after failing to contain the spot fire. There was no radio communication between the two pieces of equipment after they left the powerline.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake staff Ride

Old plow lines can be identified by the rows of jack pine growing in them. Plow lines make a perfect seed bed after a crown fire in jack pine.

Mack Lake Stand 3 with plaque.

Mack Lake Stand 3 with sign and engine.

The tractor plow operator continued to plow fireline to the east, creating a slightly indirect line on the north flank of the fire. It was approximately 1230 and he was working alone initially. The fuel type was dense sapling and pole size jack pine. The 6x6 followed behind the plow using a wetline sprayed at the base of the fire which was about 30 feet away from the engine as they progressed.

Both the 1000 gallon 6x6 engine and tractor plow were forced to stay away from the flamefront and not use direct suppression tactics. The tractor plow was slower than the 6x6 engine and was passed by the engine. The tractor plow operator and engine operator did not speak face to face or use the radio when this pass was made. They did make eye contact. From that point on the engine remained in front of the tractor plow with no communication between them. The fire then began to make a push to the north. The 6x6 engine radioed that they were being forced to disengage the fire and retreated to the north and to safety. No communication was heard from the tractor. The tractor plow operator realized at approximately the same time he was in trouble. He raised his plow and began to move north away from the fire. After only 110 feet he abandoned the tractor and ran to the northeast. The fire burned over him 276 feet from his tractor.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake staff Ride

Looking north along the southwest flank during the Mack Lake Fire. Although the main fire spread was to the southeast when this photo was taken (left to right), the flames at this location are being driven to the southwest (right to left in the photo). The action of a horizontal roll vortex could account for this apparent anomaly.

Mack Lake Stand 4 with north symbol and plaque.

Photo of burnt over tractor taken during fire investigation in 1980.

James Lee Swiderski fishing.

James Lee Swiderski’s memorial stone at the NIFC Wildland Firefighters Monument.

The fire continued to advance on the Mack Lake Subdivision at a spread rate of almost 3 miles per hour with spotting ¼ of a mile in advance of the head. The fire hit the edge of the subdivision at approximately 1310 and had burned through the whole subdivision by approximately 1325. Forty-four structures where lost, many more survived the fire and were saved or spared for one reason or another.

The rapid spread of the fire and high intensity did not allow for effective structure protection. However, evacuations were effective and no civilian lives were lost. One civilian was injured trying to get a closer look at the fire. After the fire passed, firefighters were able to quickly return to the subdivision and prevent further structure loss from residual burning and smoldering.

The Fire continued to advance to the south and east, consuming a total of almost 24,000 acres.  By 1830, two factors changed: vegetation and weather.  The fire reached a hardwood forest type and relative humidity increased significantly reducing fire intensity.  Crews were able to create control lines and engage in mop-up activities.  By 1800 on May 6, 35 miles of control line contained the fire, there were no further significant runs.

History attempted to repeat itself on April 25, 2012.  Swift action by firefighting resources stopped the 820-acre Little Mack Lake fire from taking any lives or homes.  Firefighters were aided by the extensive fuel breaks around the subdivision.  These fuel breaks did not exist in 1980.

In 2014, The Maple Ridge prescribed burn was ignited adjacent to the subdivision to remove hazardous fuel.  This 50-acre fire burned with similar intensity and rate of spread as previous wildfires.  The prescribed burn was designed with emphasis on using the lessons learned from the 1980 Mack Lake Tragedy.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake Staff Ride

This is the Perma-Log house that survived the Mack Lake Fire and is pictured on the cover of the General Technical Report NC-83. The house next to it did not survive. The siding of this house is a concrete mixture making it very fire resistant.

This property was private in 1980. It has since been acquired by the Forest Service and this fuelbreak constructed. The fuelbreak is approximately 200 feet wide with all jack pine removed.

Crown fire advancing north towards the Mack Lake Subdivision.

Maple Ridge RX “Crown fire consumes the 50-acre unit. 300’ Fuelbreak in foreground was burned in September of 2013.

Hear excerpts from Bear Divide Foreman Cliff Johnson's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

El Cariso Regional Park was established by the County of Los Angeles in honor of the hotshot crewmembers who were entrapped on the 1966 Loop Fire. This is a good location to begin a Staff Ride as it is easy to find, has good parking capacity, and provides an excellent perspective of the site from the monument.

The Loop Fire started at 0519 on November 1, 1966, from a faulty electrical line at the U.S. Army's Los Pinetos Nike Missile Site. This facility is approximately 1 mile north of Contractors Point. The fire burned downhill in a southwesterly direction under the influence of 40 to 60 mile per hour Santa Ana winds. Contractors Point was a key anchor point on this east flank of the fire, which was designated as Division A. Suppression efforts in Division A on the morning of November 1st were focused on protecting the missile facility and establishing a control line south from that facility toward Contractors Point.

See travel map above.

See fire perimeter map above.

The entrance to the park is well marked. It will be a right turn if traveling north on Hubbard Street. The actual monument is to the back of the parking area.

When viewing the San Gabriel Mountains from the park, one gains an appreciation for the extreme terrain over which the Loop Fire burned.
Contractors Point is the high point of the ridge just behind the tree on the left. The south point of the ridge is clearly visible in the center.

El Cariso Hotshots: Photo of crew 1 taken in October 1966.

El Cariso Hotshots: Photo of crew 2 taken in October 1966.

By mid day, the north flank of the fire had been contained along the Santa Clara Fuelbreak up to Contractors Point. With the exception of a few minor slopovers, the east flank of the fire was holding along the ridge to a point 40 chains south of Contractors Point (Stand 3). The Chilao Hotshot crew, two Los Angeles County crews, and several tankers (engines) were working a large slopover near Contractors Point. At 1200 the Dalton Hotshot crew on-scene at Contractors Point and were assigned by Division Boss William Westmoreland to build direct handline south from the Chilao crew along this east flank of the fire. At about 1300 the Del Rosa Hotshot Crew arrived, and Westmoreland directed them to work down the ridge ahead of the Dalton crew. At 1430 the El Cariso Hotshot crew arrived on-scene. Line Boss Hugh Masterson briefed El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King. Masterson's instructions were to "leap-frog the Del Rosa crew and to cold trail the fire edge if possible." He also mentioned that "the main ridge could be used as an alternate if impossible to follow the burned edge."

See the southeast flank topo map with NAD 27 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

Hear excerpts from Dalton Superintendent Chuck Hartley's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

View looking toward the south point of the ridge from Contractors Point. Notice the break in the chamise brush field. This indicates the location of the fireline as it progressed south from Contractors Point during the late morning and early afternoon. The fireline was mostly built by dozers between the missile facility and Contractors Point. From Contractors Point south, handline was required.

Loop Canyon is the major drainage looking down and to the west from Contractors Point. This is the drainage where the fire made its initial downhill run.

Typical Angeles National Forest front country brush and terrain looking east from Contractors Point.

This is shown as Point A in the investigation report photo referred to as Figure 3. El Cariso Superintendent King led his crew to a small bench below this south point of the ridge and held them there until he could determine if it was possible to cold trail the fire edge all the way down. King could see the Los Angeles County dozers and crews working the lower edge of the fire and believed he could tie in with them. At about 1445 Line Boss Masterson requested Division Boss Westmoreland to go down the east flank and make sure the crews were lined out. Westmoreland had a radio and several of the crews did not have radios, including the El Cariso Hotshots. By the time Westmoreland reached the tail end of the El Cariso crew, King had led the first units of his crew well down into the steep rocky chimney staying directly on the fire edge. As a result, King never had a radio exchange or face-to-face meeting with Westmoreland, who was his Division Boss.

See the southeast flank orthophoto map with fire edge shown, above.

Hear excerpts from El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Looking back from Stand 3 along the ridge toward Contractors Point. This was the 40 chains of open fire edge that was assigned to the Dalton and Del Rosa crews.

The direct attack route that the El Cariso crew followed down.

The alternate indirect route mentioned by Line Boss Masterson. This ended up being the location of the final control line on this flank.

Rocks arranged in an 'M' or a 'W' pattern about six feet across can be found about 100 yards below Stand 3. This is about where the El Cariso crew would have left the ridge and entered the chimney as they cold trailed along the fire edge. Division Boss Westmoreland probably caught up with the tail end of the crew in about this location.

Pacoima Reservoir as seen from the vicinity of Stand 3.

This is shown as Point E in the investigation report photo referred to as Figure 3. By about 15:30 the El Cariso Hotshots were fully committed, cold trailing their way down through the steep rocky chimney canyon with Superintendent King and the lead elements of the crew just starting to approach this point. Division Boss Westmoreland had followed them about halfway down and observed minimal fire activity, but he also stated that it was not a clean burn.

Hear excerpts from El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

At about this same time, line construction by the Los Angeles County dozer and crews, that were working west along the bottom of the slope, was halted by a deep gully. This gully was adjacent to and just below the chimney canyon that the El Cariso crew was working down. There was no radio communication capability between the two groups, but they did have visual contact. Independently, both were trying to figure out how best to tie in the line. At this point, there was no more than 500 feet separating them.

Several individuals, who were working at the bottom of the fire, stated that the fire behavior was in a static situation with hot spots near the bottom of the gully and that there were favorable southeast winds. In addition, a helicopter was making water drops on the hotspots. According to these same observers, sometime between 1535 and 1545, the fire started to cross the bottom of the gully. Within the next 5 to 10 minutes the fire crossed the gully, made a run upslope to the bottom of the chimney, and then flashed very quickly up the length of the chimney. The steep rocky terrain made it very difficult for firefighters to move toward the previously burned area. Terrain conditions combined with the rapid fire spread resulted in all members of the El Cariso Hotshot crew being burned over as they worked from this stand location and up several hundred yards in the chimney above.

See the Investigation Report Figure 3 map, above, showing the fatality site with fire edge.

Looking up from Stand 4 at the rock slide in the chimney canyon.

Rock cairn that marks Stand 4. This was put up in 2002.

Looking down from Stand 4 toward the gully that impeded the Los Angeles County crews line construction effort.

Reptile hazard encountered on the hike up in warm weather.

Rescue operations began immediately after the burnover. These efforts included having the helicopter hover over very rugged terrain while the fire was still active to pick up the survivors in the upper end of the chimney canyon.

Hear excerpts from El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

That evening the Del Rosa and Dalton Hotshot crews went on to complete the handline down to the bottom of Pacoima Canyon using the ridge and indirect line location that was identified as the alternate strategy by Line Boss Masterson. The fire was contained that night at approximately 2,000 acres.

A Washington Office investigation and safety review was ordered following this accident. Several recommendations from the investigation and safety review caused significant changes in wildland firefighting equipment and procedures.

Pacoima Dam Road offers a good perspective of the entire working area around the fatality site, making it a good location to conduct the integration phase of the Staff Ride by having participants share their observations at the end of the day.

Read Paul Gleason's 30 year commemoration remarks

Read the Report of the Fire Safety Review Team from 1967.

Looking at the chimney canyon and fatality site from Pacoima Dam Road. Highest point visible on the ridge is Stand 3.

Fire behavior and air tanker working just above Pacoima Canyon before the entrapment of the El Cariso Hotshot crew.

Loop Fire under the influence of the Santa Ana winds.

Investigation team on site.

Looking down the chimney canyon. Several of the investigation team members are barely visible on down the ridge. This photo was taken by Bud Moore, one of the team members, during the onsite investigation.

Looking across the deep gully from the location where the Los Angeles County dozer and crews were stopped. Note the individual standing in the bottom of the gully, a short distance farther up from that point in the gully is where the spot fire crossed and began its upslope run. This photo was taken during the winter following the fire.

On June 25, 1990, a lightning strike sparked a fire beneath the Mogollon Rim about 10 miles northeast of Payson. Conditions were such that the fire burned quickly and within a matter of hours the Dude Fire had become extremely active. The fire was reported at 1315. Initial attack resources arrived at 1400 to find a very active10-acre fire. An hour later over 360 firefighters including engines, dozers, handcrews, aviation resources, and a Type II Incident Management Team had been ordered. The Type II IMT was on site and assumed command of the fire by 1800.

Around 1930 the 20 person Perryville inmate crew arrived at the Payson Ranger District. The crew was instructed to eat and report to base camp. Following dinner, they were redirected to the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision. At 0100 the Perryville crew arrived at the Subdivision and they were quickly moved to the junction of Walk Moore Canyon and the Control Road, they arrived there at 0230. By this time a Type I IMT had been ordered and was to shadow the Type II team beginning at 0600 and then transfer command at 1300.

The Mogollon Rim rises 1,000 feet above the ponderosa pines north and east of Payson. It often created its own weather. From mid-July through September, large thunderheads gather almost daily along the Rim's edge. The vegetation in the fire area was drastically different from what we see today. The vegetation consisted primarily of dense Ponderosa Pine with decadent Manzanita underbrush covered in needle-drape. Due to heavy ponderosa over story, visibility was extremely limited for resources working in Walk Moore Canyon as opposed to the unrestricted visibility of today. It is important to note the change in vegetation composition as it relates to how we now implement LCES.

This location provides an overall view of the area including the Mogollon Rim, Walk Moore Canyon, and the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision.

Parking for Stand 1 is in this undeveloped gravel borrow pit. From the parking area walk up and over the Control Road to the east for Stand 1 location.

From Stand 1 participants can view the point of origin, Walk Moore Canyon, and Bonita Creek Estates.

At 0230 the Perryville crew met with Division Supervisor Dale Ashby at the Control Road and Walk Moore Canyon Junction. The crew's assignment was to anchor at the Control Road and construct line up the jeep trail. The crew completed the line on the jeep trail and continued up the power line right-of-way into the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision.

By 0300 the main fire was within one-quarter mile of the Subdivision structures. The brisk down canyon winds continued to push the fire to approximately 500 acres by 0500. By 0600 the fire was estimated to be 1900 acres.

The Perryville crew and Prescott IHC (Interagency Hotshot Crew) worked in the Subdivision until approximately 0930. By this time the jeep trail in Walk Moore Canyon had been bladed by a dozer, the crew was instructed to improve this line.

From the junction of the power line and Walk Moore Canyon, one can look up the power line through the brush and see the direction the crew began working. At the time of the fire, the hillside consisted of thick Pine trees with a brush and needle-cast understory. Saw work in the dense dog-hair-thicket was slow and finding a place swamp the cut material was tough because of the density of vegetation. The crew's original assignment was to proceed up the jeep trail in the bottom of the canyon, it changed to building line up the power line and around the south and east of the Subdivision.

This is the developed interpretive site/parking area. It is utilized to access Stands 2-4 and has a capacity for approximately 10 vehicles.

Looking up the handline that was constructed by the Perryville crew in the powerline right-of-way immediately after the fire.

The powerline looking in the direction the Perryville crew built line.

Saw team working in the area of Bonita Creek Estates during the Dude Fire – note the vegetation conditions.

As the intensive prep work near the corner house was completed a firing operation began. By 1300 Perryville had continued to improve line and made it approximately one-third of the way down Walk Moore Canyon where they ran out of drinking water. The crew boss and one crewmember walked to the Control Road and sent water back to the crew via ATV.

Around 1300 the firing operation was stopped due to holding difficulties. Around 1330 it was discovered travel south through the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision was blocked by fire. At this point, two dozers were instructed to build an impromptu safety zone within the recently attempted firing operation. At 1345 a spot fire was reported below the Control Road on the west side.

Shortly after 1400 Perryville had resupplied with water and returned to work as the Hotshot crews above them began to move into the impromptu safety zone. The fire began to crown and Perryville began to move down the canyon towards the Control Road.

The corner house became a landmark and reference point during the fire. This location served as a meeting point for the numerous resources on this portion of the fire. It was a tactical focal point being at the head of Walk Moore Canyon and the portion of Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision closest to the fire.

Looking north at the corner house.

Looking southwest at the corner house and down Walk Moore Canyon.

Fire approaching corner house on June 26, 1990.

Looking northwest up Walkmoore Canyon from a small mesa above the corner house. This photo was taken about 45 minutes before the blowup on June 26, 1990.

Deployment site with fatality markers and shelter deployment markers in place.

As the Perryville crew noticed the fire moving above them, they also saw that the Navajo Scouts crew was running past them and yelling to "get out". Everyone began to run towards the Control Road. The Perryville crew became separated into an upper and lower group, the lower group being closer to the Control Road. Several crewmembers had trouble with equipment such as chaps falling down and difficulty removing fusees. The upper portion of the crew was cut off when the fire crossed the dozer line below them. Those cut off were forced to move back up the canyon. The cut off crewmembers struggled to deploy their fire shelters.

At this location, 11 Perryville crewmembers were entrapped resulting in six fatalities. At the time of the fire, this canyon was full of closely spaced Ponderosa Pine trees limiting the view of the surrounding area. The existing jeep trail in the canyon bottom had just been bladed by a dozer for use as a control line.

Walk Moore Canyon immediately following the fire showing the height and density of the trees at the time of the fire.

Looking up Walk Moore Canyon at the deployment site immediately following the fire.

From his initial deployment site, James Ellis walked down the canyon, then back up the canyon where he met survivors. He was then escorted back down the canyon to this location where he stated "I'm dead," laid down with his head on a log, and expired.

This location provides a powerful and convenient site for field integration sessions.

Potential field integration site near Ellis' cross. The cross was positioned out of the canyon bottom and away from the actual fatality location to avoid erosion damage.

Actual location where Ellis declared: 'I'm dead'.

This memorial was organized and erected by the residents of the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision in honor and recognition of the ultimate sacrifice made by the members of the Perryville crew.

The Perryville crew memorial erected by the residents of Bonita Creek Estates.

An expanded view of the memorial site and surrounding area. Parking opportunities are limited.

The Cerro Grande Fire began as the Upper Frijoles Prescribed Burn on the Bandelier National Monument. It escaped prescription on May 5, 2000, and became known as the Cerro Grande Fire due to the fire being on Cerro Grande Mountain, a prominent geographic feature of the area.

As you approach the staff ride area from Los Alamos you will see Cerro Grande Peak and the fire scar from the May 2000 Cerro Grande Fire. This picture was taken from the Bandelier Fire Center on August 2005.

The town of Los Alamos and adjacent Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL) had been threatened previously by fire. The La Mesa Fire occurred in 1977 and burned 15,300 acres, taking 10 days to control. The fire did not serve as a wake-up call for land management agencies or LANL.

In 1996 the Dome Fire threatened the LANL and Los Alamos and was another huge wake-up call. During this fire, there was a fire engine burned over and deployment of fire shelters. As a result of the Dome Fire, a local "Interagency Working Team" was organized. The team's focus was on hazardous fuels reduction, interagency communications, and cooperation. The team consisted of the Department of Energy, LANL, Santa Fe National Forest, New Mexico State Forestry Division, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the National Park Service.

Bandelier National Monument had an approved Management Plan in 1997 that allowed for a full range of management including suppression, wildland fire use, and prescribed fire. A 10-year prescribed fire program was identified in the plan. The primary fire management concern in the Park was Upper Frijoles Canyon. Park fire managers were concerned that a potential ignition during extreme fire danger would burn out of the Park, threatening the town of Los Alamos and the LANL.

There is an established parking area that can be used for the staff ride. This is a view of the parking area as you approach from the east (Los Alamos) on Highway 4. The parking area has room for approximately 15 vehicles.

A good site for Stand 1 is these rocks at the head of Frijoles Canyon looking down the canyon toward the Bandelier National Monument Headquarters. This location is about 100 yards south of Highway 4 and about ¼ mile east of the parking area.

The Baca Ranch (currently referred to as the Valles Caldera Trust) is located northwest of Cerro Grande Peak with the boundary located in the saddle west of the peak. This first stand is accessed from the parking area by hiking directly up Frijoles Canyon.

After working a regular workday in preparation of the Upper Frijoles Prescribed Burn implementation, Upper Frijoles prescribed fire personnel including a 10-person Type II crew and 10 NPS employees hiked approximately 2½ hours up Cerro Grande Peak to attend a second operational briefing from the Burn Boss at 1900 on May 4, 2000. At 1920, a test fire is ignited near the summit of Cerro Grande Peak. The test fire is successfully completed and the fire behavior is within parameters. The go-decision is made to continue the prescribed fire by the Burn Boss.

Crews began blacklining by burning down the northeast edge of the fire from the test fire area. The holding crew will use backpack pumps, spruce bows, and changes in fuels and terrain to limit fire spread during blackline operations. Progress was slow using the ignition pattern outlined in the plan. The ignition pattern was changed to speed up the progress and the decision made by the burn boss to stop suppressing the fire on the interior side of the ignition lines.

Photo was taken in September 2003 from the west side of Cerro Grande Peak, looking northwest towards Baca Ranch (Valles Caldera).

Photo was taken in September 2003 from the saddle that borders Baca Ranch (Valles Caldera), looking towards Cerro Grande Peak. The fuels consist of primarily clump grass with light brush.

Photo was taken in September 2003 from top of Cerro Grande Peak looking along the east flank toward Los Alamos. Fuels are primarily clump grass with mixed conifer only on the north edge outside the planned burn unit.

The modified blackline operation continues down the east flank and completed about 2200. The Burn Boss walks back to the area of the test fire and discovers that the fire had burned through the blackline and burning southwest into the burn unit faster than anticipated. The decision is made to curtail the fire burning towards the west perimeter (Baca Ranch) by burning out the west flank into the saddle.

At 2300, the ignition crew and holding crew return to the test fire area (via Cerro Grande Peak) to complete this operation, while two additional personnel arrive and are assigned to the east flank. Upon successful completion of this operation, the Burn Boss is becoming concerned about the fatigue levels of his personnel. The hand crew plus six NPS employees hike down to the vehicles to rest. The burn plan calls for the Type II crew to be the holding crew during the night operations and once they are released, the remaining NPS personnel become holding resources for the remainder of the night.

The Burn Boss leaves the burn to return to the Bandelier office to begin requesting additional resources.

Photo was taken in September 2003 from the east flank of Cerro Grande Peak looking southwest. The fuels consist of light grass and more prevalent mixed conifer on the interior portion of the burn.

USGS brass marker on the top of Cerro Grande Peak.

Photo was taken in 2003 from the ridgeline east of Cerro Grande Peak looking towards the location of the slop over. Notice the 'clump grass' and difficulty in walking in this vegetation.

Early on the morning of May 5, additional resources are being ordered through Zone Dispatch. About mid-morning, the Burn Boss is informed that the interior backing fire has burned below the black lining operations. Approximately an hour later, holding personnel on the east flank inform the Holding Boss that they are concerned the fire may "hook" them and they begin black lining operations to stay below the east flank backing fire.

Later that morning, the Burn Boss formally transfers command due to fatigue issues. Shortly thereafter, the east flank holding crew detects a slopover a short distance uphill from their location and mention difficulty holding it. They request a helicopter with a bucket and additional firefighters to assist in their efforts.

At this point, additional resources have been ordered through the dispatch center. An airtanker is also requested for assistance with the slopover. At this point, the Burn Boss decides to convert the prescribed fire to a wildland fire, which then becomes the Cerro Grande Fire. The Burn Boss then assumes responsibility for the fire as the Incident Commander and additional resources are ordered. Efforts then focus on suppressing the wildfire.

Photo was taken in 2003 looking from the meadow towards Cerro Grande Peak.

Photo was taken in 2003 showing the numerous snags that still stand in the meadow as a result of the fire.

This memorial is in honor of Gene Campbell (January 2, 1920 - July 16, 1977), Dwight Emery Hodgkinson (December 10, 1954 - July 16, 1977), and David Kay Noel (June 11, 1941 - July 16, 1977) who lost their lives on the Cart Creek Fire. The memorial was erected by contributions of money and physical effort by friends and families of the three deceased men. It is located at Firefighters Memorial Campground (formerly Bootleg Campground) on Ashley National Forest.

The Cart Creek Fire started at about 1200 on July 16, 1977, from a lightning strike. The fire was burning in low sagebrush and grass with scattered areas of mahogany and bitterbrush, and scattered junipers and ponderosa pine. The point of origin was about 0.4 miles south of the confluence of Cart Creek and Spruce Creek and approximately 2 miles southwest of Flaming Gorge Dam. District FMO Dennis Hatch saw smoke from the fire, drove as close as possible, and walked to the west rim of the Cart Creek Canyon (below the Firefighters Memorial Campground) where he could see the fire. At that time, he estimated the fire to be about ½ an acre. He called the helitack crew based at Dutch John Airport, 3 ½ miles northeast, to initiate suppression action and then went to Cedar Springs Lagoon, about 1 mile north of the fire where he could be picked up by helicopter.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 1 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

The helicopter placed a two-person initial attack crew near the fire about 1235. They were instructed by Helicopter Foreman Don Black to wait until additional help arrived before beginning initial attack. The fire was about 1½ acres in size at this time. The helicopter then went to Cedar Springs Lagoon, picked up Hatch and another firefighter, made an aerial recon of the fire, and placed two additional firefighters at H-1. Hatch recognized the small squad could not control the fire and promptly radioed for retardant and 20 additional firefighters.

Many of the District's firefighters were attending a rodeo at Manila, about 30 miles away. The District Office contacted the rodeo and a call was made over the loudspeaker system for all District personnel to report to the gate. They were informed of the fire and the need for firefighters. Other District personnel were also alerted and instructed to report to the Cedar Springs Lagoon for transport to the fire site.

The firefighters' memorial is easily located at the Firefighters Memorial Campground off U.S. Hwy 191. It was dedicated on July 8, 1978. It's found at the end of the campground with a short path leading the way to the overlook point.

View from the monument looking toward the Cart Creek Fire site.

When the first firefighters arrived, the fire was about 1 ½ -acres in size and was centered in Stand 2's general location. The fire was spreading slowly uphill against the wind and moderately in all other directions. The head of the fire was possibly along the north side spreading toward the confluence of Cart and Spruce Creeks. Hatch took two firefighters with him and walked partway up the slope to a point near the origin of the fire and began building a fireline along the edge of the fire uphill to the west. One helitack crewmember was left at H-1 to receive personnel and Helitack Foreman Black set up a helibase at Cedar Springs Lagoon.

Tom Plasky and Dave Strantz were placed on the fire at 1300 and joined Hatch's squad. The strategy at this point was to build a line along the southeast flank of the fire uphill and then swing northwest to cut it off before it reached the ridge top. As the flame lengths were ½- to 1½-foot high, the squad worked a direct line with one foot in the black. The helicopter returned to Dutch John Airport for a load of tools and water. In the meantime, the fire had burned downhill far enough that the original landing area (helispot) had to be moved east. This new landing area is referred to as H-2. The exact location of H-1 and H-2 is not known but must have been between Stand 2 and Spruce Creek. The tools and water were dropped at H-2.

Barry Sheakley and John Uphoff arrived over the fire at 1340, and Sheakley requested a recon of the fire so he could assess the situation. Recognizing the desirability of heading off the fire at the ridge top, Sheakley had the pilot place Uphoff and himself on the ridge above the point where Hatch and his squad were building line. Sheakley established voice contact with Hatch and they discussed the situation. Sheakley and Uphoff began to build a separate indirect and unanchored section line along the ridge line to the west. Hatch sent Plasky and Strantz up to assist Sheakley in building this line. Karen Coleman, Yolanda Jenkins, and Dwight Hodgkinson were delivered to H-2 at 1350. These three firefighters left H-2 and began walking uphill to join Hatch's squad.

This is the locked gate at the dirt road turnoff from Highway 191. Travel down the dirt road to the footbridge across Cart Creek to get to Stand 2.

View of the site from near the point of origin.

At 1400, Hodgkinson, Jenkins, and Coleman arrived at the fireline to tie in with Hatch's squad while retardant was being placed on the fire. Hatch felt they were needed in Sheakley's squad; so, he sent them up to tie in with Sheakley, who now had a total of six personnel plus himself. During this time, Dave Noel was organizing crews at Cedar Springs Lagoon. Noel, Ray Purdy, Geary Searfoss, and Darrell Parks were all shuttled in on the first load into H-2, followed by Dave Simpsom, J. Martin, Pat Crevelt, and Carel Jackson.

Martin drew a four-person squad from this group consisting of Crevelt, Searfoss, Simpson, and himself. At Noel's direction, the squad proceeded from H-2 up the slope to tie in with Hatch. Noel had radio contact with Hatch and picked a point where Martin's squad was to build the third section of unanchored line. A second squad was formed but had to wait for one more load of firefighters to be delivered. The next load was delivered to a new Helispot (H-3). At the time, some squad members were unaware of the change from H-2 to H-3, which was moved 65 yards to the southeast. The load consisted of Ray Ruble, Val Norman, Gene Campbell, and Annette Rogers. Purdy was designated as the squad leader of the second squad and was instructed by Noel to begin at the bottom of Martin's line and build line downhill. Purdy's squad headed out, picked up their tools at H-2, and walked across the relatively flat terrain of sagebrush and grass as Noel and Campbell followed about 20 yards behind the last member of the squad.

At 1450, Purdy's squad walked upslope toward the fire and were essentially parallel to the burning edge of the fire. During this time, the helicopter returned to H-3 and dropped off another firefighter, who was to tie in with one of the squads. The helicopter was running low on fuel and lifted off with Helicopter Foreman Black on board to return for fuel.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 3 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

View from H3 looking toward Noel and Campbell fatality sites.

As the helicopter lifted off at 1450, the fire suddenly intensified along the entire length of the line. Helicopter Foreman Black, recognized the change in fire behavior and notified those with radios.

Hatch had also noted the change in fire behavior as he saw it moving into heavier fuels near the ridge top. He radioed to Sheakley, but his message was not understood, so Sheakley came off the ridge where he could talk directly to Hatch. The two felt they could be successful in tying their two lines together to cut off the head of the fire.

Martin's squad also recognized this change and began backing off from their line. However, after observing that they had fire coming from below, Martin instructed his squad to move across the line to the safety of the black.

Purdy and his squad were just arriving at the lower end of Martin's line and were deciding where to begin building line downhill. When Purdy looked toward the fire area, all he could see was a wall of fire. He yelled for his squad to move into the burned area in front of them; this was passed along to the rest of the squad.

Campbell and Noel were last seen about 20 yards behind Annette Rogers, the last member of Purdy's squad. None of the squad members that looked back after the fire's intensity increased saw Campbell or Noel; all they could see was smoke. Campbell and Noel were cut off from Purdy's escape route and turned south and up a low stony ridge, attempting to outrun the fire. The best estimate on their attempted escape is that after they reached about 50 yards up the stony ridge, they turned east toward H-3 and continued running. After turning toward H-3, Campbell moved about 35 yards and Noel about 20 yards. The location of tools, canteens, and radio established their route.

Dumas, the Assistant Helitack Foreman, and another firefighter heard Black's radio alert and moved from H-3 to H-2 where they were able to see what was happening. Martin observed Campbell and Noel running toward the helispot and saw them fall at about the same time. After falling, Noel did not move. Campbell however, struggled to get up and was seen pouring water over himself moments before the fire overtook him. Dumas and another firefighter realized the fire was moving toward them but managed to outrun the east flank of the fire and were picked up by the helicopter along the edge of Spruce Creek.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 4 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Photo from the original investigation report showing the final escape route of Noel and Campbell.

Looking from the area of Stand 4 toward Noel and Campbell’s memorial sites.

Another view from Stand 4 (Noel's memorial) looking toward Hodgkinson's memorial.

Just as with Purdy's squad below, the situation with Sheakley's squad changed dramatically with the increased fire intensity. Sheakley instructed his squad to drop back off their line. They moved a short distance down the ridge to the east with Sheakley calling out instructions. They were separated briefly, but Sheakley was able to gather them back together and line them out in an orderly fashion. They ran along in a single file along the ridge for about 330 feet to a point where they could come down off the rocks. Sheakley was below them and in voice contact with the squad.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 5 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

As they retreated, the order in line was Uphoff, Coleman, Hodgkinson, and Jenkins. When they came down the rock face, Hodgkinson stepped aside and told Jenkins to go ahead of him. He then came down the rocky slope immediately behind her. Word was passed to drop their tools and run. As they came down the rocky slope, each crew member dropped his/her tool in an orderly fashion and ran toward an opening in the fire created by Hatch's line and into the black. Hodgkinson was the last person in line and did not come through behind the other crew members. Immediately they called to him but got no response.

While overhead, the helicopter pilot and foreman observed Hodgkinson running a few yards behind Jenkins when a Juniper flared in front of Hodgkinson. Hodgkinson stopped and turned around and began to run toward the opening in the bluff where the squad had come down. The helicopter dropped low over him and tried to get his attention to turn him back around and follow his squad but to no avail. Hodgkinson continued struggling up the slope and became disoriented in the smoke. He was last seen falling among the rocks.

Looking downhill toward Hodgkinson’s memorial.

Photo from the original investigation report showing the final escape route of Hodgkinson.

Stand 5 looking toward Stand 4.

Rock bluff above Hodgkinson’s memorial.

This memorial is dedicated to the brave men who perished during the Blackwater Fire of 1937.

The fire started on August 18, 1937, as the result of a passing lightning storm during the late afternoon. The point of origin was traced to a sub-alpine fir located on the west bank of Blackwater Creek approximately four miles from this point.  The Blackwater Canyon is a tributary to the North Fork of the Shoshone River. The canyon is mostly oriented north/south, with the high country at the southern end of the range. The elevation ranges from 6,200 to 11,096 feet with canyon walls rising to rims of decomposing granite. The local winds are out of the southwest; any frontal passages would produce typical wind shift patterns. 

The fire slept through August 19 and came to life the afternoon of August 20, 1937. Men of the Bureau of Public Roads Crew (BPR), the Wapiti Civilian Conservation Corps Crew.

Note: To relieve economic hardships during the great depression in the 1930s the U.S. Government created the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The CCC employed out-of-work young men to help battle the destruction and erosion of our natural resources. These crews were involved in firefighting around the country. Training for firefighting was "very basic" at best. National Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni.

(CCC - Company 1852), and the Lake (Yellowstone NPS) CCC Company arrived at the fire that afternoon and evening. Forest Supervisor Sieker and District Ranger Charlie Fifield, were the men in charge of the fire. They used direct attack tactics, as the strategy was to anchor and flank the fire. The expectation was that the fire would not grow appreciably during the night. However, about midnight the winds increased causing the fire behavior to increase and run up the drainage to the southeast of Trail Ridge. This was a short-lived run, but the fire continued to burn throughout the night. By next morning, the aerial reconnaissance observed the entire drainage was consumed by crown fire behavior with two spot fires between Blind Creek and the drainage to the east. See Map A above.

The firefighter memorial is easily located alongside Highway 14/16/20. It was built by the CCCs and dedicated in 1938. There is a large paved turnout here and a Forest Service parking area below the roadside turnout. The road turn-off to Blackwater Canyon is just east of the memorial site.

The plaque on the firefighter memorial.

This sign along Highway 14/16/20 shows the turnoff to the Blackwater Lodge. This is also the turnoff for FS Road 435 that goes to the upper trailhead in Blackwater Canyon.

FS Road 435 goes south from Highway 14/16/20 and crosses the North Fork of the Shoshone River.

FS Road 435 ends two miles from Highway 14/16/20. This is the upper trailhead, sometimes referred to as Lower Camp. Note the limited parking.

Trailhead footbridge near Lower Camp at the end of FS Road 435.

The shift change began along this ridge during the late morning of August 21st. Smoke was hanging in the drainage, and the fire was backing down the north side of Trail Ridge. The Ten Sleep CCC relieved the Wapiti CCC Crew. The Ten Sleep CCC crew had been expected to arrive about 0800 to the base camp but didn't arrive until 1200. The BPR crew and Yellowstone CCC continued to work. Supervision of the suppression activities was transferred from Forest Supervisor Sieker and District Ranger Fifield to District Rangers Urban J. Post and Alfred G. Clayton. Deputy Forest Supervisor Carl Krueger continued to fly air patrol and report the fire's status.

Mr. Krueger reported several spot fires near the fireline at 1240. The spot fires were suppressed as the line was constructed. Krueger didn't identify any spots in the vicinity where the blowup originated. The strategy and tactics were that Ranger Post would take the lead with assistance from Jr. Forester Paul Tyrrell. Ranger Clayton followed to improve the line and catch any new spot fires. As Post and crew hiked the ridge to start work, he was on the lookout for spots over the line and into the next basin. At that time, no spot fires were seen below [see map B]. They were unaware that the relative humidity dropped to 6% with a temperature of 90° down at camp or that a spot was in the bottom one-third of a mile below them; they didn't anticipate afternoon winds. See Map B above.

Note: During the 2003 fire season, the Shoshone National Forest experienced the worst fire season on record with five large fires and 50 total starts. See Map C above.

Looking down from the trail into the area where the Blackwater Fire originated from a lightning struck tree.

First distinct switchback in the trail is the suggested location established for Stand 2.

Areas of overlap between the 1937 and 2003 fires can be seen. Notice the older snags evident in the foreground and the recently burned terrain in the background.

In 1937, this area was a stand of mature trees. If you look uphill from where you are standing and visualize the fire creeping downhill, you can see that the fire was out of alignment. During the morning of August 21, the fire had a slight southwest wind. This wind pattern is a typical airflow over Wyoming's Wind River and Absaroka Mountains. At this time, the BPR and Ten Sleep CCC crews were cutting underslung line across the drainage. Firefighters didn't think about using lookouts. Foreman Saban and Junior Assistant Hale from the Wapiti CCC with five or six men from the Ten Sleep CCC enrollees stopped and dammed up the creek to fill backpack pumps. See Map D above.

As Post and his group gained the ridge to the north, they noticed the smoke below Clayton and his group. Clayton also noticed it and prepared to abandon line construction and attack the new smoke. Clayton directed his crew to the gulch to fill their backpack pumps while he headed down hill to scout out the spot in the hole. The last word received from Ranger Clayton was a written note to Ranger Post.

Post,
We are on the ridge in back of you, and I am going across to "spot" in the hole. It looks like it can carry on over ridge east and south of you. If you can send any men please do so since there are only 8 of us here. 
Clayton

Around 1530, the wind increased to 30 miles per hour from the northeast, blowing embers over the line. Then the wind subsided for a brief time. When the wind began again, it was associated with the frontal passage and blew strongly out of the northwest. The spot fires below the main fire were in direct alignment with topography, slope, and wind.

The spot fire rapidly ran up the drainage. With no escape routes or safety zones, the fire trapped Clayton and his men at the dam in the drainage. Whether Clayton and his men actually started down to the spot or not was never determined.

As you walk up the ridge from Stand 2, you will come to this point with a vantage of both Clayton Gulch and Post Point. If time is limited, you can use this as an alternate location to conduct discussions for both Stand 3 and Stand 4. This location is identified as Stand 2A on the maps and in the Facilitator's Field Reference.

The distinctive vegetation pattern below Clayton Gulch shows the old burn scar and the location of the spot that would initiate the firestorm.

The gulch as it appeared in 1937.

The gulch as it appeared in 2004.

The Clayton Gulch memorial is on the ridge to the north and just above the gulch where the actual fatality site is located. This is the second memorial built in 1938 by the CCCs.

The plaque on the Clayton Gulch memorial.

Post received Clayton's note but could not help. The Ranger withdrew up the hill to the timberline and safety. Bert Sullivan took the lead while Post and Tyrrell brought up the rear.

The spot fire consumed the fuels above Post's crew cutting off their escape to timberline, thus making Post Point the men's best chance for survival. Five men panicked and ran downhill through the fire. Of these five, only one would survive. Post, Tyrrell, and Sullivan made every attempt possible to keep the men in place.  Of the 37 who stayed at Post Point, only 3 would perish.

Paul Tyrrell knocked down some of the panicked men and lay down on top of them as a human shield to protect them from the fire behavior. A few days later, Paul's severe burns take his life; he passed away at 1300 on August 26, 1937.

The fire rushed uphill from the spot in two waves. The group on the ridge top tried to move around to avoid the flame fronts (see Map D above), but there was little room on the ridge. One of the survivors was quoted as saying, "Anywhere you moved, the flames and heat could get to you."

Fire behavior specialist A.A. Brown completed the fire behavior report for the Blackwater Fire. Mr. Brown identified the following factors as key to the blowup:

1. The ragged edge of the fire.
2. Underburning of surface fuels that pre-heated the canopy crown.
3. The heavy fuel model that the fire burned in - today's fuel model 10.
4. Undetected spot fires.

Interview excepts from Johnny J Levine, Civilian Conservation Crewmember who helped fight the Blackwater Fire and was trapped at Post Point: transcript.

Looking up the ridge at the approach to Post Point.

The view looking back down from Post Point. This is where the majority of firefighters were trapped by the firestorm.

The plaque for the Post Point memorial. This is at the location where the firefighters with Post sought refuge. This is the third memorial built by the CCCs in 1938.

From Stand 1, you can look up at the crash site of air tanker T56. From this location, you can see the road to the Rulison blast site. This was the site of a 43-kilo ton atomic blast 8,426 feet below the surface, which was conducted as part of the Operation Plowshare project on September 10, 1969. The blast was part of a program to convert the government's 27 nuclear programs into one of various peacetime uses of atomic power. At the time of the fire, there were still large amounts of equipment and two aboveground storage tanks on site. Each tank contained explosive vapors and low-level radioactive materials. Additionally, the well had been plugged at the top and bottom but had not yet been cemented.

T56 was a converted military B-26, adapted to fire suppression activities. It was flown from Denver to Grand Junction on July 15, 1976, and assigned to work with two other air tankers on the Battlement Creek Fire. On Friday morning, July 16, 1976, all three planes were assigned to continue working on the Battlement Creek Fire. The first plane arrived to the fire at approximately 0735. T56 was the third plane to arrive at about 0840. T56 circled the fire as the lead plane flew the desired flight path. Both the lead plane and T56 flew south into the large bowl. It was determined that T56 never completed its turn prior to impacting the ridge. The pilot did jettison the retardant load just prior to impact.

At 0855, pilot Donald Goodman of Missoula, Montana, was killed.

As a result of the impact, a fire was started and involved approximately 1 acre of scrub oak. The Line Boss and the Sawtooth Interregional Crew worked the resulting fire.

Tanker operations were halted after the accident and not resumed until the following day.

The main fire camp was located up toward the flag and down among the aspens. There were several hotshot and Snake River Valley crews that had just come off the July 15th night shift that must have been filtering into camp at the time of this accident.

View looking upslope from Stand 1. The Memorial Flag is located to the left and above the band of bare shale at the top of the ridge. This area is on private property and there is no public access to the site.

Memorial presentation photo presented to Donald Goodman's family at the July 21, 2001, memorial service. The flag and plaque serve as the location marker for the impact site. The plane's control levers are entwined in the brush at the base of the flagpole.

Memorial placed at the Grand Junction Interagency Air Center, Walker Field Airport, Grand Junction, Colorado.

Close-up of memorial.

Stand 2 is located at the BLM land ownership boundary. The mixed mountain shrub fuel type you see is representative of what the area looked like in 1976. The dominate brush was Gambel's oak, mountain mahogany, serviceberry, and snowberry. The Gambel's oak was 10 to 12 feet tall.

The remnant dozer line you see was constructed on Friday, July 16th, as part of the overall strategy to impede the fire's southerly progress and protect the Rulison blast site. The dozer operations were completed around 1600. At this time, fire activity in the bowl to the north (16th Bowl) was extreme. The fire made a run from Battlement Creek Road to the ridgeline, generating two large fire whirls.

The Mormon Lake Hotshot Crew and Happy Jack Hotshot Crew began burning out the dozer line around 1615 and reached the road about 2030. The burnout was 60 feet wide with some deeper pockets and continued downhill. There were no spot fires south of the line.

As night fell, crews attempted to continue the firing along the road to the north; it did not carry as well. The burnout on the road was primarily a ground fire and left a considerable amount of unburned fuel in the Gambel's oak. Both crews reached fire camp around 0100 to get some sleep prior to the morning briefing to be held a few hours later.

Looking upslope from the cattle guard. Note how much of the old dozer line is still visible.

View of the fatality sites, 17th bowl, saddle, and ridgeline from the dozer line. Note the steepness of the terrain across the face of the bowl. The bare area in the center was caused by erosion after the fire.

Stand 3 is located up the ridge from a prominent juniper tree in between the 16th and 17th Bowls. The two bowls have been named as to reference the fire behavior which occurred on those days in each bowl.  The bowl to the north is referred to as the 16th Bowl and the bowl to the south is referred to as the 17th Bowl.

Fire behavior in the 16th Bowl was extreme, characterized by intense surface and crown fire, hooking uphill runs, and fire whirls late in the day. Most of the 16th Bowl was burned by night fall.

View looking north into the base of the 16th Bowl. County Road 302 can be seen along the bottom of the slope. In the distance is Morrisania Mesa and the community of Parachute, Colorado.

Looking east from Stand 3, up the 16th Bowl. Re-growth vegetation is 3-4 feet high in most places, with some unburned pockets still almost 10 feet high. Vegetation is primarily a mix of Gambel's oak, mountain mahogany, and serviceberry.

From Stand 4, you can see the bowl to the south which is referred to as the 17th Bowl. You can also see the flagpole at the site of the T56 crash on the southern-most horizon ridge.

View from the Observation Point looking up towards the cliffs at the top of the draw. The north draw is in the foreground and the south draw is in the background. The Ponderosa Pine trees in the center of the photo are located on a small spur ridge which was spared during the July 17th blowup. The area that has slid below the cliff face occurred after the fire and was due to erosion. The Mormon Lake Hotshots' fatality site is near the top left of this photo.

Directly up this spur ridge, just below the main north-south ridge, are the Mormon Lake Hotshot fatality sites (look for the flagpole and drip torch memorials).

From Stand 4, you can see the three key control lines which were used as part of the suppression strategy:

1. The road which is downhill to the west.
2. The dozer line which is located directly south on the southern ridge of the 17th Bowl.
3. The handline which was located uphill along the main ridge from the rock outcropping to the helispot.

Strategy and tactics for July 17th were to work on the critical spot on the ridgeline to the southeast. The Mormon Lake Hotshots were assigned to this ridgeline and would be flown in by helicopter. The Happy Jack Hotshots were assigned to the burned out section of the south dozer line and Battlement Creek Road with instructions to continue burning out inside of Friday's blackline and also mopup along the outer edge of the burn. Other crews were assigned to secure completed sections of the fire, which were now in the mopup stage.

Looking downslope from the Observation Point, portions of the old fireline can be seen on the top of the ridge between the 16th and 17th Bowl; (right side of photo). County Road 302 is visible at the bottom of the drainage. Jack's Pocket is in the next drainage west. This was the furthest east area that was burned during the Battlement Mesa Fire of 1987. That fire was 3,600 acres in size and was started by children playing with a magnifying glass.

Dozer line as seen from the Observation Point.

At the morning briefing on July 17th, the Mormon Lake Hotshots were assigned to improve the line on top, the ridge which was previously worked by the night shift. Line construction was just to the lee side of the slope. Fire shelters were not mandatory equipment for BLM personnel at the time of the fire. The Mormon Lake Hotshots had fire shelters but left them in camp that morning because of their weight - a common practice at the time.

The Mormon Lake Hotshots arrived at the helibase at 0730; due to a series of other priorities, they never reached the upper helispot until about 1100. At this time they began improving the line from the rock bluff back down to the upper helispot.

From their position along the top of the ridge, Mormon Lake Hotshot crewmembers would have seen residual smoke in the 16th Bowl and few smokes along the dozer line from the burnout operation on July 16th.

Fire activity was established in the bottom of the 17th Bowl from the Happy Jack Hotshots' burnout operation. The 17th Bowl mirrors the 16th Bowl in fuel and topography. Suppression actions on July 17th were based on the previous days' fire behavior in the 16th Bowl.

Radios at the time were typically single-channel or had only a few channels. Radios had "crystals" in them and could not be field programmed like today. They were also very expensive and only issued to key personnel. Crew Boss Tony Czak had to carry two radios: one to talk to his crew and a second to talk to overhead.

From the upper helispot looking south, up the slope, evidence of the old fireline can be seen, tying the lee side of the slope to the cliff face. Note the vegetation change of the northeast aspect slopes to large thick stands of aspen.

To the east of the upper helispot, you can see the edge of the Roan Plateau, and in the far distance, the Flat Tops Wilderness and Storm King Mountain. Storm King Mountain was the site of the fatalities which occurred during the South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain in 1994.

At approximately 1315, the Happy Jack Hotshots had completed the lower burnout along the road. Unbeknownst to the Mormon Lake Hotshots, the fire was starting to work its way up into the 17th Bowl.

At about 1330, the Mormon Lake burnout crew was to burn out a 60 to 80 foot strip along the improved line on the main ridge. The burnout progressed slowly and was difficult to keep burning. The Crew Boss sent a burnout squad up the ridge to watch for spot fires. This left Crew Boss Tony Czak, Squad Boss John Gibson, and crewmembers Stephen Furey and Scott Nelson to finish the burn.

At 1400, the burn squad encountered dense oak brush which produced erratic fire behavior. During this same time period, the fire behavior in the 17th Bowl was increasing. Steepness of the slope ranged from 10% at the bottom near the road to 75% near the ridgeline.

At this time, the Sector Boss called Czak to move the Mormon Lake line improvement crew to the safety zone because of incoming air tankers. The crew moved off the ridgeline to the safety zone. The conditions became smokey. The two Squad Bosses had only the crew radio frequency. When the order to leave was made by the Sector Boss, only Czak heard it and had to relay the message to the Squad Bosses. The Sector Boss heard the report that all had made it to the safety zone and assumed that included the members of the burnout squad.

However, the Mormon Lake burnout squad was separated from the rest of the crew by 100 to 200 yards, with a wall of fire between them. The time was between 1425 and 1430. Unable to reach the safety zone, Crew Boss Czak radioed his Squad Boss who was in the safety zone and told him that they were trapped and unable to make it to the safety zone. Czak also radioed the Sector Boss with the same information and told him that the burnout squad would be moving back up the ridgeline toward the rock bluff. The time was now between 1430 and 1435.

At approximately 1440, the burnout squad was unable to go any further up the slope toward the rock bluff. After being given orders by the Crew Boss, the crew took off their canvas vests, wet down their vests, shirts and trousers and laid down on the fireline. At approximately 1440-1445, the fire roared over the burnout squad. During the burn over, at approximately 1448, crewmember Scott Nelson got up and ran downhill. Shortly after Nelson got up, Crew Boss Tony Czak got up and ran down the ridgeline in the direction of the safety zone and died approximately 1,000 feet away. At 1510, the Sector Boss arrived at the original burnover site and found Gibson and Furey still alive. Shortly after that, Stephen Furey passed away. John Gibson was airlifted to St. Mary's Hospital in Grand Junction and then on to a burn center in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Gibson survived the burnovers.

In the foreground is the fireline where the four firefighters laid while the fire roared over the top of them.

This was a rock cairn that was discovered while preparing for the 2001 memorial. This was the site where Tony Czak's body was found.

Tony Czak's memorial torch and presentation photo presented to his family during the July 21, 2001, memorial service.

Scott Nelson's memorial torch and presentation photo. Nelson's family was unable to attend the memorial service.

Steve Furey's memorial torch and presentation photo presented to his family during the July 21, 2001, memorial service.

The Mormon Lake Crew's first season photo taken early in the 1976 fire season.

During the winter of 1997, the Parachute/Battlement Mesa Volunteer Fire Department decided to develop a memorial for those killed during the Battlement Creek Fire. The project started by placing memorial markers at the locations where the pilot and firefighters died. Not knowing whether the people who died were religious, it was decided that drip torch cans would make the perfect markers for those that died while performing the burnout operation and a simple flagpole and plaque at the location of the T56 air tanker crash would be appropriate. A flagpole was also erected at the site of the burnover to mark the site and make the location more visible to those who could only view the area from the county road below.

During the summer of 2000, it was decided to have a formal memorial placed where more people could learn what happened during the summer of 1976. Working with the State of Colorado Department of Transportation and the town of Parachute, permission was granted to erect the memorial at the Parachute Rest Area off Interstate 70.  Working with a company in Arizona, the memorial sign board was created and built using both words and drawings. An area artist developed the concept of the memorial using plants native to the area of the burn with a snag from the fire area serving as the centerpiece. Tools were placed at the memorial similar to what would have been used at the time.  The propeller hub from T56 that was recovered at the base of the impact slope in dense brush was also placed at the memorial site.

Battlement Creek Fire Memorial in the Parachute, Colorado, Interstate 70 rest area. The actual fatality site is in the distant background.

The families of those who were killed were contacted early into the project. They helped with information regarding their loved ones. Three families were able to attend the memorial; two of the three families were escorted up to the actual sites. With this memorial, it is hoped that those who were killed on those two days will never be forgotten.  For years to come it will serve as a reminder to those that visit this memorial to be ever vigilant in their training and watchful in their situational awareness as firefighters continue to fight wildland fires into the future.