Dolliver's Dump as it looked in 1947 and 1983. The dump is considered to be the point of origin of the fire.

The Bar Harbor Fire of 1947, sometimes referred to as the Mount Desert Island Fire, started on Friday, October 17, 1947. The Bar Harbor Fire Department received a call at 1605 reporting a fire at Dolliver's Dump on the Crooked Road. They responded with one pumper truck and four personnel. Arriving at 1618, they found a rapidly spreading one-acre fire on the edge of Fresh Meadow. A direct attack was made, and an additional 16 men arrived. Fire Chief David Sleeper called Acadia National Park for additional resources at 1645; they responded with a fire truck, a dump truck, two portable pumps, and five men. Winds at the time were southwest at 8 to 10 miles per hour. The fire was burning across the bog and into the adjoining forestland. With these additional resources, crews worked through the night, and by noon on October 18 it had been contained at about 100 acres. Mopup and active patrolling continued through the evening of October 20.

Traveling along Crooked Road toward the photo point, turn left onto Betsy's Road to park for Stand 1. The turn to Betsy's Road can be seen off to the right in the center of the photo. Stand 1 is the vista on the north side of the road.

Dolliver's Dump was on the edge of Fresh Meadow. The fire spread from the dump, across the meadow, and into the timber.

The Northwest Regular Crew #6 and the District FMO arrived at the fire just after 0900 and the leaders met with the Entiat Superintendent. The FMO told Northwest Regular's Crew Boss Ellreese Daniels and Crew Boss Trainee Pete Kampen that the spot weather forecast was issued the evening before for the 1,000 acres Libby South Fire (located 50 miles south of Thirtymile Fire) had indicated low relative humidity, high temperatures, a wind event predicted greater than 10 m.p.h., and that the "fuel type was a trigger for fire behavior."

The Entiat Hotshots provided a GPS map of the hotspots. Mostly the fire was still a batch of spots at this time. The hotshots showed the Regulars the log they had used for crossing the river. All overhead present agreed the priority this morning should be given to two spot fires on the east side of the river. The FMO told the Regulars that they could expect support from Helicopter 13N for bucket work.

Crew Boss Daniels took over as IC with Kampen running the crew. The FMO said two local engines could be available and two pumps with plenty of hose and hardware were already delivered to the fire. The Entiat Hotshots departed to get some much-needed rest.

The Crew Boss Trainee directed the crew to set up the pumps and cross the log to the east side of the river. At about 1100 they had water to the fire and were digging line around it. By noon, the crew was having equipment problems. They couldn't keep the two pumps running and had broken four pulaskis during line construction. An increase in fire activity and lack of progress caused the Crew Boss Trainee to reassess his tactics and make some changes. He decided to send the crew to pinch the head of the fire. He called the pump operator away to dig line. Line construction was difficult with a lot of roots. Some crew members realized digging line in front of the fire was a "watch out" situation.

At 1208 the IC requested Helicopter 13N be launched, and 20 minutes later ordered additional crews from dispatch. He considered it unusual for green foliage to be burning as it was this early in the summer. In response to the IC's request for additional crews, the Entiat Hotshots returned to the fire at 1400, after only 2 ½ hours of rest.

At 1400 the IC pulled the crew member who had been serving as lookout off her post. The fire behavior had further intensified and he realized she would have poor access to the escape route. She was reassigned back to her squad. At this time, it was decided Air Attack would become the lookout for the Thirtymile Fire.

At 1427 Air Attack requested two engines. Engines #701 and #704 were dispatched to the fire. The supervisor of Engine #701 informed Engine #704 and three firefighters in a chase vehicle that their assignment was to keep the fire east of the road as per dispatch directions. At 1438 Helicopter 13N departed for the fire and began making water drops on small spots at the south edge of the fire.

At 1500 the Northwest Regular #6 Crew pulled back to the lunch spot. There they joined the Entiat Hotshots, and everyone ate lunch, rested, watered, and sharpened their tools. At about this same time, the District AFMO arrived on scene to speak with the IC about whether or not he was still comfortable with the IC role. Crew Boss Daniels said he was comfortable and remained the IC. At this time, the tanker Air Attack ordered a half-hour earlier showed up over the fire. The IC ordered two more tankers. Between tankers running out of time and the fire growing too large for them to be effective, only a couple loads of retardant were ever dropped.

Air Attack reported at 1520 that the fire had reached about 50 acres, was crowning and headed for the eastern ridge. Within 15 minutes the fire grew to 100 acres and had nearly hit the ridge top.

See the Entiat Hotshot's briefing map showing spot fire locations, above.

Hear interview excerpts from Marshall Brown, the Entiat Hotshot Crew Superintendent:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

The log near the Lunch Spot where crews crossed the Chewuch River. This is also the site where pump operations were set up

Fire behavior on the east side of the Chewuch River during early afternoon hours on July 10, 2001.

Entiat Hotshot Crew at the Lunch Spot after returning to the fire at approximately 1400 hours on July 10, 2001. Note fire behavior on the east side of the Chewuch River.

Around 1530 both engines, #701 and #704 arrived at the fire, and drove past the Entiat Hotshots and the Northwest Regular #6 Crew where they are eating lunch beside the road. Neither engine checked in with the IC (or anyone else) for a briefing.

A few minutes later the IC received a call from the Engine #701 supervisor, asking for help with a spot up ahead on the east side of the road. The engine folks considered the spots to be "rather small at this time." The IC decided, after conferring with his Crew Boss Trainee, to send a squad up to support the engine.

The Crew Boss Trainee for Northwest Regulars dropped the IC and the Northwest Regular Squad 1 (Tom Craven's squad) off at Engine #701. The Crew Boss Trainee then returned to the lunch spot with the van. A few minutes later Thom Taylor, the Squad 2 Boss, was told by the Crew Boss Trainee to drive his squad up to support the engines.

When Squad 2 reached the first engine, Engine #704, they were told their help was not needed. They continued up the road to Engine #701 (where Squad 1 was already working on the spot). Just after Squad 2 arrived, Engine #701 left to work some spots further south (back down) along the road. The two squads remained working spots about 100 feet to the east of the road, and about a quarter of a mile farther up the road from where Engine #704 had been working

Squad 3 was then called to support Engine #704. Within 2 minutes of arriving at the location of Engine #704, they were ordered back in the van. The fire was actively spotting and had moved up to the east side of the road. They quickly drove back down the road to the lunch spot. Crewmembers from the Northwest Regular's Squad 3 had to shield their faces from the intense heat as they drove past the fire.

At 1634, as Squad 3 retreated, The Crew Boss Trainee and others radioed the IC to get people out of the area. The crewmembers from Squads 1 and 2 dropped their gear and nine of them jumped into the van, with the IC driving. The other four begin running down the road. As the IC drove the van down the road, he saw a "wall of flames," and knew he had been cut off from the only escape route they had planned. Four people were still behind them on the road. The IC quickly turned the van around, went back and picked up the other crewmembers and the crew gear. They drove north evaluating their options as they went.

See the fire progression map from the Thirtymile Fire Investigation Report, above.

Hear interview excerpts from Thom Taylor, a Squad Leader for the Northwest Regular #6 Crew:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Fire breaching the road, entrapping Northwest Regular #6 Crew on the other side of the flaming front. This view is looking up the canyon with the Entiat Hotshot Crew vehicles and a Methow Valley Ranger District engine in the foreground.

View from Winthrop of the Thirtymile Fire column during the entrapment. Note split column and lenticular clouds developing between the two columns.

Aerial view of the fire taken by the Air Attack at the approximate time of entrapment.

As the van drove north the IC talked with Air Attack to identify a good safety zone site. The IC selected the fourth possible site they considered as the best place he thought they could safely watch the fire pass by. It was characterized by extensive rock scree above and west of the road. The Chewuch River and a sand bar were just east of the road. There was relatively sparse forest vegetation in the surrounding area. The scree slope consisted of a jumble of six-inch to six-foot diameter rocks interspersed with woody debris and duff.

The IC and the crew members unloaded and began to congregate on and above the road as they watched the fire. There was no formal briefing given concerning possible deployment. People began to wander around and take pictures of the advancing fire and growing smoke column. Squad Leader Taylor made a few suggestions about possible places to deploy and about having the sawyers cut down some trees, but the IC didn't think it was necessary. So instead Squad Leader Taylor went up onto the rockslide to see what he thought about using it for a deployment site. One of his crew members followed him.

They decided there was too much vegetation among the rocks, and they turned to head back down to the road. They met five other crew members from the same Naches district that had also gone a little ways above the road into the rocks. Several times the IC tried to tell the people on the rocks to come down to the road, but only one person, crew member Rebecca Welch, followed his directions.

At 1700 and Air Attack reported the fire is over 500 acres and moving up the east canyon slope. At about the same time, two civilians arrived at the entrapment site after having driven up the road earlier in the afternoon. At 1724 the behavior of the fire changed dramatically. The crew was completely surprised as suddenly the fire was "coming very fast, roaring," towards them.

Despite the lack of forest vegetation and brush near the crew, the intensity of the fire overwhelmed the area and the crew. They were not in a heightened state of readiness. Shelter deployment was no longer optional. The IC directed the crew members to "get your shelters out and use against the ash" to protect them from falling embers. Very quickly after that, he told the crew members on the road to deploy.

See the Thirtymile Fire Lessons Learned presentation from MTDC.

Hear interview excerpts from Matthew Rutman, a crewmember on the Northwest Regular #6 Crew:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Aerial view looking down the Chewuch River drainage at the entrapment site. Arrows indicate the two different locations where firefighters deployed their fire shelters.

Flame front approaching just below the tree line on the east side of Chewuch River. Note the numerous white exposure dots from the heavy ember shower. Photo was taken by a crewmember on NWR # 6 just before deployment.

Entiat Hotshot Superintendent and Squad Leader (EMT) at the entrapment site during rescue operations. The road bed and the river sand bar below the road (to the left in this view) were the locations where surviving firefighters deployed their fire shelters.

This rock scree slope above the road was the location where the four firefighter fatalities occurred. Two other firefighters who were initially in the rocks moved down toward the road and river during the entrapment. Note the variable size of the rocks and the impact this could have on the ability to move and the ability to get into a fire shelter.

Thirtymile Fire Memorial located at the entrapment site.

Stand 1 is located at the Storm King Mountain Memorial Trailhead. This trail is a tribute to those who lost their lives while battling the South Canyon Fire and a tribute to firefighters everywhere. It also allows us to reflect on the lessons we have learned to help reduce the likelihood of similar tragedies in the future.

The trail was built by a community literally working through the grieving process. It began as a footpath made by families of the firefighters and others as they hiked the mountain to pay their respects to those who had died, and to try to understand what had happened. In response to the community's need, and to increase understanding, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), and volunteers built the trail.

The South Canyon Fire started on July 2, 1994, because of a passing lightning storm. The point of origin was on a ridge which was paralleled by two deep drainages (known as the East & West Drainages). The fire was not reported until July 3rd, it was estimated to be ½ acre in size at that time.

On the afternoon of July 3^rd, a BLM engine crew met with the Garfield County Sheriff at a vantage point below the fire. An initial size-up was completed. There were several higher priority fires in the area, the fire was judged to be inaccessible, and the rate of spread was low. The District Fire Control Officer agreed with initial assessment - the fire would be put in monitor status until the higher priority fires were staffed. Over the next two days, the South Canyon Fire steadily increased in size. On the evening of July 4^th, the fire was estimated at 11 acres by the Aerial Observer.

The Trailhead is located approximately 7 miles west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado on Interstate Highway 70. Take Exit 109 and make an immediate right to follow the frontage road eastward; this road will dead-end at the Trailhead parking lot.
Over 100 volunteers from Glenwood Springs and the surrounding area built the main trail and water bars in October 1994. In April 1995, 60 Cadets from the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs installed wooden and stone steps, hauled mortar to the observation point for stone benches, dug holes for interpretive signs, and developed an area for reflection at the base of the hill where 12 of the firefighters fell. Local businesses donated goods and services throughout the trail's construction.

This photo was taken from the Canyon Creek Estates subdivision on July 4th, 1994 at 12:00. The subdivision is located about 2 miles west of the fire.

The trail up to the ridge takes visitors on the journey of the firefighter. It was left steep and rough allowing visitors to experience something similar to what firefighters encounter. Signs provide visitors with information about why firefighters would choose this job and what they need to be aware of to do their job safely and efficiently.

Early in the morning on July 5^th, an initial attack response consisting of an Incident Commander and a crew of seven from the local BLM District was sent to the South Canyon Fire. They walked to fire up the East Drainage which took approximately 2 ½ hours. The crew cut a helispot (H-1) on the ridge above the fire and began direct line construction downhill along the fire edge below the helispot. The Incident Commander ordered another engine crew, a helicopter, and a 20-person crew. Due to a shortage of hand crews, it was decided that a load of eight smokejumpers would be substituted for the 20-person crew.

Suppression efforts that day consisted of direct hand line and airtanker drops. The drops were deemed ineffective due to high winds and steep terrain. Late in the afternoon, the BLM firefighters left the fire when the eight smokejumpers parachuted onto the main ridgeline. The two crews never made face-to-face contact and the smokejumpers talked with the Incident Commander by radio to get instructions for their assignment.

That evening the fire had crossed the line constructed earlier by the BLM crew and was burning actively. After sizing up the fire, the Jumper-in-Charge called Grand Junction District Dispatch and ordered two Type 1 hand crews. The smokejumpers began building a downhill fireline on the east side of the ridge.

On July 5^th, the fire grew from 29 acres at 0800 to 50 acres by 2200.

This location provides an excellent vantage point of the Double Draws, the Lunch Spot, Petrilli's photo point, and Longanecker's position above the West Drainage. Anywhere along this ridgeline between where the trail first crests the ridge and the Overlook Point can serve as Stand 2. This location is approximately ½ mile from the Trailhead.

The trail follows the ridgeline, there are great vantage points all along the ridgeline.

The trail follows the top of the ridgeline from Stand 2 for approximately 1/3 mile to a spur ridge looking east toward Hell's Gate Ridge below Storm King Mountain where most of the events occurred. At this location, interpretive signs tell the story of the fire. If constrained by time or physical limitations, this stand may serve well as the last stand and the group can conduct Integration discussions at this point.

The Overlook Point is approximately one mile from the Trailhead (Stand 1). This stand provides an observation point offering an excellent view of the memorial sites along with interpretive signs explaining what happened during the South Canyon Fire. The signs also describe the fire season of 1994, different types of firefighting crews, and how the mountain is coming back to life. This stand may serve as a final destination for individuals who are constrained by time or may have physical limitations. This is a good location to conduct a terrain orientation and describe the locations of the various resources working on the South Canyon Fire.

On the morning of July 6^th, the Jumper-in-Charge ordered a helicopter for gear removal and requested a fixed-wing aircraft with an Aerial Observer. After discussions with Dispatch, it was agreed upon to use the helicopter for reconnaissance instead of the fixed-wing aircraft with Aerial Observer.

The local hand crew, now consisting of 11 firefighters walked back up to the fire that morning. Helicopter 93R arrived at 0930 with a limit of 4 hours of flight time. Eight additional smokejumpers parachuted into the top of the fire at 1030. The Prineville Interagency Hotshot Crew arrived at Canyon Creek Estates subdivision at 1200.

When the Prineville Hotshot Crew arrived, the Jumper-in-Charge requested they be ferried into the fire by helicopter and then resume using the helicopter for reconnaissance. By mid-afternoon, the local hand crew was working between H-1 and H-2 improving line and the smokejumpers were working on the west flank of the fire along with nine Prineville Hotshots.

These plaques describe the fires of 1994, the various types of firefighting crews, the role of fire in the ecosystem, and the events of July 6, 1994.

The illustration on this plaque provides the observer with good terrain orientation and description of where the firefighters were located.

While standing on the West Flank Fireline your vision is obscured by the dense Gamble Oak beginning to grow back to pre-1994 conditions.

The arrival of the second half of the Prineville Hotshot Crew was delayed due to competing priorities for bucket drops from the helicopter. Visibility during line construction was limited due to the tall Gamble Oak brush.

On July 6th between 1130 and 1300, two flare-ups occurred on the west flank which forced the group of smokejumpers to momentarily retreat up the fireline toward the top of the ridge. Several of the smokejumpers discussed their concerns about the safety of building the fireline downhill. After a water drop from the helicopter cooled the flare-up, the smokejumpers proceeded back down the fireline; the tree that flared up was cut down leaving the stump as identified as Stand 4.

The second half of the Prineville Hotshot Crew remained on the ridge to work spot fires along the ridge. The Incident Commander, Jumper-in-Charge, and Hotshot Superintendent discussed strategy and fire behavior. At mid-day, the winds were observed to be about 6 to 10 m.p.h. out of the southwest. Helicopter bucket drops were being used below the fireline on the west flank to help contain some areas that were heating up. The decision was made to continue building line down the west flank.

From Stand 3 the trail drops down into West Drainage and climbs up the opposite side to Zero Point Ridge. Going south from Zero Point the trail is the West Flank Fireline, follow the trail down through fatality sites until you see the marker for The Stump.

Smokejumpers and part of the Prineville Hotshot Crew on the West Flank Fireline, surrounded by thick Gamble Oak on the slope of Storm King Mountain. Photo by Tony Petrilli, U.S. Forest Service.

When you stand at the Lunch Spot you can see the double draws and the large drainage off to the west between you and the Overlook Point. It is here, after a lunch break, that a few of the smokejumpers and hotshots were instructed to work back up the west flank looking for hotspots and improving the line. Several individuals at different locations saw that the wind speed was beginning to increase. A Line Scout was working south from the Lunch Spot, down the hill past the end of the fireline and requested some help. The decision was made to focus on holding the existing line that was constructed while three smokejumpers tried to assist the Line Scout. Soon after that, the fire made several rapid runs within a previously under burned area just above the Line Scout. The three smokejumpers decided it was not a good idea to commit to the area where the Line Scout was located. At 1600 the fire blew up. It crossed the West Drainage at the base of the gully below the Line Scout. Within minutes a wall of flame was racing up the opposite slope. The Incident Commander directed the Jumper-in-Charge to bring the firefighters up from the bottom of the fireline. A smokejumper with the view of the blowup called the Jumper-in-Charge to tell him that the fire had crossed the main drainage and was "rolling." The fire was now being pushed by 30 m.p.h. winds.

The West Flank Fireline stops here at the Lunch Spot. The top of the Double Draws, Longanecker's location, and Petrilli's photo point are accessible from this location.

Longanecker working as Line Scout well below the Lunch Spot and on a spur ridge to the south. When the fire blew up, he worked his way back to the area designated as the Lunch Spot and stayed there throughout the entrapment without deploying a fire shelter.

At 1611 the Incident Commander called Dispatch to report that he was losing the fire on the side where the homes were and that he needed airtankers. At 1620 an airtanker was dispatched.

Between 1614 and 1618 the fire was observed to spot back to the east side of the drainage below the crew that was walking up the fireline on the west flank. As the fire raced up the slope, it was influenced by increasingly stronger winds estimated to be 40 m.p.h. The spot fire grew rapidly and reached the ridgeline in less than 10 minutes, overrunning 14 firefighters.

On the afternoon of July 6, 1994, there were 16 smokejumpers, 20 hotshots, a 6-person helitack crew (two on the fire and four at the helibase), and 12 local firefighters (11 on the fire and one at the helibase) assigned to the fire, for a total of 54 firefighters.

The trip from the Trailhead (Stand 1) to Zero Point (Stand 6) and back is about four miles. It climbs 700 vertical feet to the Overlook Point (Stand 3), and another 450 feet to the top of the ridge leading to Zero Point. Visitors making the entire trip should plan on spending between three and four hours and should bring food, plenty of water, and wear sturdy hiking shoes and clothing appropriate to the weather.

At Zero Point, you get a feel for the gravity of the situation, this is where the last survivors from the west flank were literally "blown" over the ridge into the East Drainage. All the other survivors from the ridge also used the East Drainage to escape imminent death. This location serves as an excellent place to conduct an Integration session of the Staff Ride. Facilitators can build a terrain model for individuals to discuss their perceptions of how events unfolded that fateful day.

From Stand 5 participants can hike back the West Flank Fireline approximately a ½ mile to Zero Point. Another option is for participants to hike up Lunch Spot Ridge to H-1 and walk due north to Zero Point.

The junction of the Main Ridge and the top of the West Flank Fireline is an important geographical location regarding firefighter location and movement. This point was identified in the Research Paper RMRS-RP-9, Fire Behavior Associated with the 1994 South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain, Colorado, and was used as a reference for distances along the Main Ridge and the West Flank Fireline.

A group called the Storm King 14 Committee raised over $165,000 and erected a statue and individual memorials at Two Rivers Park in Glenwood Springs.

If there are time constraints or physical limitations, this location may serve well as the first stand or the last stand. In addition, this area provides a good initial meeting point for conducting a staff ride with a large group.

Two Rivers Park covers 22 acres and has plenty of parking. In addition to the memorial site, the park includes restrooms, picnic areas, and two park shelters.

This plaque is a duplicate of the one located at the Overlook Point (Stand 3). The memorial honors those who fell on this day describing the events of July 6, 1994.

Map of the Two Rivers Park Memorial located in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, at the confluence of the Colorado River and the Roaring Fork River.