The Cerro Grande Fire began as the Upper Frijoles Prescribed Burn on the Bandelier National Monument. It escaped prescription on May 5, 2000, and became known as the Cerro Grande Fire due to the fire being on Cerro Grande Mountain, a prominent geographic feature of the area.

As you approach the staff ride area from Los Alamos you will see Cerro Grande Peak and the fire scar from the May 2000 Cerro Grande Fire. This picture was taken from the Bandelier Fire Center on August 2005.

The town of Los Alamos and adjacent Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL) had been threatened previously by fire. The La Mesa Fire occurred in 1977 and burned 15,300 acres, taking 10 days to control. The fire did not serve as a wake-up call for land management agencies or LANL.

In 1996 the Dome Fire threatened the LANL and Los Alamos and was another huge wake-up call. During this fire, there was a fire engine burned over and deployment of fire shelters. As a result of the Dome Fire, a local "Interagency Working Team" was organized. The team's focus was on hazardous fuels reduction, interagency communications, and cooperation. The team consisted of the Department of Energy, LANL, Santa Fe National Forest, New Mexico State Forestry Division, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the National Park Service.

Bandelier National Monument had an approved Management Plan in 1997 that allowed for a full range of management including suppression, wildland fire use, and prescribed fire. A 10-year prescribed fire program was identified in the plan. The primary fire management concern in the Park was Upper Frijoles Canyon. Park fire managers were concerned that a potential ignition during extreme fire danger would burn out of the Park, threatening the town of Los Alamos and the LANL.

There is an established parking area that can be used for the staff ride. This is a view of the parking area as you approach from the east (Los Alamos) on Highway 4. The parking area has room for approximately 15 vehicles.

A good site for Stand 1 is these rocks at the head of Frijoles Canyon looking down the canyon toward the Bandelier National Monument Headquarters. This location is about 100 yards south of Highway 4 and about ¼ mile east of the parking area.

The Baca Ranch (currently referred to as the Valles Caldera Trust) is located northwest of Cerro Grande Peak with the boundary located in the saddle west of the peak. This first stand is accessed from the parking area by hiking directly up Frijoles Canyon.

After working a regular workday in preparation of the Upper Frijoles Prescribed Burn implementation, Upper Frijoles prescribed fire personnel including a 10-person Type II crew and 10 NPS employees hiked approximately 2½ hours up Cerro Grande Peak to attend a second operational briefing from the Burn Boss at 1900 on May 4, 2000. At 1920, a test fire is ignited near the summit of Cerro Grande Peak. The test fire is successfully completed and the fire behavior is within parameters. The go-decision is made to continue the prescribed fire by the Burn Boss.

Crews began blacklining by burning down the northeast edge of the fire from the test fire area. The holding crew will use backpack pumps, spruce bows, and changes in fuels and terrain to limit fire spread during blackline operations. Progress was slow using the ignition pattern outlined in the plan. The ignition pattern was changed to speed up the progress and the decision made by the burn boss to stop suppressing the fire on the interior side of the ignition lines.

Photo was taken in September 2003 from the west side of Cerro Grande Peak, looking northwest towards Baca Ranch (Valles Caldera).

Photo was taken in September 2003 from the saddle that borders Baca Ranch (Valles Caldera), looking towards Cerro Grande Peak. The fuels consist of primarily clump grass with light brush.

Photo was taken in September 2003 from top of Cerro Grande Peak looking along the east flank toward Los Alamos. Fuels are primarily clump grass with mixed conifer only on the north edge outside the planned burn unit.

The modified blackline operation continues down the east flank and completed about 2200. The Burn Boss walks back to the area of the test fire and discovers that the fire had burned through the blackline and burning southwest into the burn unit faster than anticipated. The decision is made to curtail the fire burning towards the west perimeter (Baca Ranch) by burning out the west flank into the saddle.

At 2300, the ignition crew and holding crew return to the test fire area (via Cerro Grande Peak) to complete this operation, while two additional personnel arrive and are assigned to the east flank. Upon successful completion of this operation, the Burn Boss is becoming concerned about the fatigue levels of his personnel. The hand crew plus six NPS employees hike down to the vehicles to rest. The burn plan calls for the Type II crew to be the holding crew during the night operations and once they are released, the remaining NPS personnel become holding resources for the remainder of the night.

The Burn Boss leaves the burn to return to the Bandelier office to begin requesting additional resources.

Photo was taken in September 2003 from the east flank of Cerro Grande Peak looking southwest. The fuels consist of light grass and more prevalent mixed conifer on the interior portion of the burn.

USGS brass marker on the top of Cerro Grande Peak.

Photo was taken in 2003 from the ridgeline east of Cerro Grande Peak looking towards the location of the slop over. Notice the 'clump grass' and difficulty in walking in this vegetation.

Early on the morning of May 5, additional resources are being ordered through Zone Dispatch. About mid-morning, the Burn Boss is informed that the interior backing fire has burned below the black lining operations. Approximately an hour later, holding personnel on the east flank inform the Holding Boss that they are concerned the fire may "hook" them and they begin black lining operations to stay below the east flank backing fire.

Later that morning, the Burn Boss formally transfers command due to fatigue issues. Shortly thereafter, the east flank holding crew detects a slopover a short distance uphill from their location and mention difficulty holding it. They request a helicopter with a bucket and additional firefighters to assist in their efforts.

At this point, additional resources have been ordered through the dispatch center. An airtanker is also requested for assistance with the slopover. At this point, the Burn Boss decides to convert the prescribed fire to a wildland fire, which then becomes the Cerro Grande Fire. The Burn Boss then assumes responsibility for the fire as the Incident Commander and additional resources are ordered. Efforts then focus on suppressing the wildfire.

Photo was taken in 2003 looking from the meadow towards Cerro Grande Peak.

Photo was taken in 2003 showing the numerous snags that still stand in the meadow as a result of the fire.

This memorial is in honor of Gene Campbell (January 2, 1920 - July 16, 1977), Dwight Emery Hodgkinson (December 10, 1954 - July 16, 1977), and David Kay Noel (June 11, 1941 - July 16, 1977) who lost their lives on the Cart Creek Fire. The memorial was erected by contributions of money and physical effort by friends and families of the three deceased men. It is located at Firefighters Memorial Campground (formerly Bootleg Campground) on Ashley National Forest.

The Cart Creek Fire started at about 1200 on July 16, 1977, from a lightning strike. The fire was burning in low sagebrush and grass with scattered areas of mahogany and bitterbrush, and scattered junipers and ponderosa pine. The point of origin was about 0.4 miles south of the confluence of Cart Creek and Spruce Creek and approximately 2 miles southwest of Flaming Gorge Dam. District FMO Dennis Hatch saw smoke from the fire, drove as close as possible, and walked to the west rim of the Cart Creek Canyon (below the Firefighters Memorial Campground) where he could see the fire. At that time, he estimated the fire to be about ½ an acre. He called the helitack crew based at Dutch John Airport, 3 ½ miles northeast, to initiate suppression action and then went to Cedar Springs Lagoon, about 1 mile north of the fire where he could be picked up by helicopter.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 1 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

The helicopter placed a two-person initial attack crew near the fire about 1235. They were instructed by Helicopter Foreman Don Black to wait until additional help arrived before beginning initial attack. The fire was about 1½ acres in size at this time. The helicopter then went to Cedar Springs Lagoon, picked up Hatch and another firefighter, made an aerial recon of the fire, and placed two additional firefighters at H-1. Hatch recognized the small squad could not control the fire and promptly radioed for retardant and 20 additional firefighters.

Many of the District's firefighters were attending a rodeo at Manila, about 30 miles away. The District Office contacted the rodeo and a call was made over the loudspeaker system for all District personnel to report to the gate. They were informed of the fire and the need for firefighters. Other District personnel were also alerted and instructed to report to the Cedar Springs Lagoon for transport to the fire site.

The firefighters' memorial is easily located at the Firefighters Memorial Campground off U.S. Hwy 191. It was dedicated on July 8, 1978. It's found at the end of the campground with a short path leading the way to the overlook point.

View from the monument looking toward the Cart Creek Fire site.

When the first firefighters arrived, the fire was about 1 ½ -acres in size and was centered in Stand 2's general location. The fire was spreading slowly uphill against the wind and moderately in all other directions. The head of the fire was possibly along the north side spreading toward the confluence of Cart and Spruce Creeks. Hatch took two firefighters with him and walked partway up the slope to a point near the origin of the fire and began building a fireline along the edge of the fire uphill to the west. One helitack crewmember was left at H-1 to receive personnel and Helitack Foreman Black set up a helibase at Cedar Springs Lagoon.

Tom Plasky and Dave Strantz were placed on the fire at 1300 and joined Hatch's squad. The strategy at this point was to build a line along the southeast flank of the fire uphill and then swing northwest to cut it off before it reached the ridge top. As the flame lengths were ½- to 1½-foot high, the squad worked a direct line with one foot in the black. The helicopter returned to Dutch John Airport for a load of tools and water. In the meantime, the fire had burned downhill far enough that the original landing area (helispot) had to be moved east. This new landing area is referred to as H-2. The exact location of H-1 and H-2 is not known but must have been between Stand 2 and Spruce Creek. The tools and water were dropped at H-2.

Barry Sheakley and John Uphoff arrived over the fire at 1340, and Sheakley requested a recon of the fire so he could assess the situation. Recognizing the desirability of heading off the fire at the ridge top, Sheakley had the pilot place Uphoff and himself on the ridge above the point where Hatch and his squad were building line. Sheakley established voice contact with Hatch and they discussed the situation. Sheakley and Uphoff began to build a separate indirect and unanchored section line along the ridge line to the west. Hatch sent Plasky and Strantz up to assist Sheakley in building this line. Karen Coleman, Yolanda Jenkins, and Dwight Hodgkinson were delivered to H-2 at 1350. These three firefighters left H-2 and began walking uphill to join Hatch's squad.

This is the locked gate at the dirt road turnoff from Highway 191. Travel down the dirt road to the footbridge across Cart Creek to get to Stand 2.

View of the site from near the point of origin.

At 1400, Hodgkinson, Jenkins, and Coleman arrived at the fireline to tie in with Hatch's squad while retardant was being placed on the fire. Hatch felt they were needed in Sheakley's squad; so, he sent them up to tie in with Sheakley, who now had a total of six personnel plus himself. During this time, Dave Noel was organizing crews at Cedar Springs Lagoon. Noel, Ray Purdy, Geary Searfoss, and Darrell Parks were all shuttled in on the first load into H-2, followed by Dave Simpsom, J. Martin, Pat Crevelt, and Carel Jackson.

Martin drew a four-person squad from this group consisting of Crevelt, Searfoss, Simpson, and himself. At Noel's direction, the squad proceeded from H-2 up the slope to tie in with Hatch. Noel had radio contact with Hatch and picked a point where Martin's squad was to build the third section of unanchored line. A second squad was formed but had to wait for one more load of firefighters to be delivered. The next load was delivered to a new Helispot (H-3). At the time, some squad members were unaware of the change from H-2 to H-3, which was moved 65 yards to the southeast. The load consisted of Ray Ruble, Val Norman, Gene Campbell, and Annette Rogers. Purdy was designated as the squad leader of the second squad and was instructed by Noel to begin at the bottom of Martin's line and build line downhill. Purdy's squad headed out, picked up their tools at H-2, and walked across the relatively flat terrain of sagebrush and grass as Noel and Campbell followed about 20 yards behind the last member of the squad.

At 1450, Purdy's squad walked upslope toward the fire and were essentially parallel to the burning edge of the fire. During this time, the helicopter returned to H-3 and dropped off another firefighter, who was to tie in with one of the squads. The helicopter was running low on fuel and lifted off with Helicopter Foreman Black on board to return for fuel.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 3 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

View from H3 looking toward Noel and Campbell fatality sites.

As the helicopter lifted off at 1450, the fire suddenly intensified along the entire length of the line. Helicopter Foreman Black, recognized the change in fire behavior and notified those with radios.

Hatch had also noted the change in fire behavior as he saw it moving into heavier fuels near the ridge top. He radioed to Sheakley, but his message was not understood, so Sheakley came off the ridge where he could talk directly to Hatch. The two felt they could be successful in tying their two lines together to cut off the head of the fire.

Martin's squad also recognized this change and began backing off from their line. However, after observing that they had fire coming from below, Martin instructed his squad to move across the line to the safety of the black.

Purdy and his squad were just arriving at the lower end of Martin's line and were deciding where to begin building line downhill. When Purdy looked toward the fire area, all he could see was a wall of fire. He yelled for his squad to move into the burned area in front of them; this was passed along to the rest of the squad.

Campbell and Noel were last seen about 20 yards behind Annette Rogers, the last member of Purdy's squad. None of the squad members that looked back after the fire's intensity increased saw Campbell or Noel; all they could see was smoke. Campbell and Noel were cut off from Purdy's escape route and turned south and up a low stony ridge, attempting to outrun the fire. The best estimate on their attempted escape is that after they reached about 50 yards up the stony ridge, they turned east toward H-3 and continued running. After turning toward H-3, Campbell moved about 35 yards and Noel about 20 yards. The location of tools, canteens, and radio established their route.

Dumas, the Assistant Helitack Foreman, and another firefighter heard Black's radio alert and moved from H-3 to H-2 where they were able to see what was happening. Martin observed Campbell and Noel running toward the helispot and saw them fall at about the same time. After falling, Noel did not move. Campbell however, struggled to get up and was seen pouring water over himself moments before the fire overtook him. Dumas and another firefighter realized the fire was moving toward them but managed to outrun the east flank of the fire and were picked up by the helicopter along the edge of Spruce Creek.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 4 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Photo from the original investigation report showing the final escape route of Noel and Campbell.

Looking from the area of Stand 4 toward Noel and Campbell’s memorial sites.

Another view from Stand 4 (Noel's memorial) looking toward Hodgkinson's memorial.

Just as with Purdy's squad below, the situation with Sheakley's squad changed dramatically with the increased fire intensity. Sheakley instructed his squad to drop back off their line. They moved a short distance down the ridge to the east with Sheakley calling out instructions. They were separated briefly, but Sheakley was able to gather them back together and line them out in an orderly fashion. They ran along in a single file along the ridge for about 330 feet to a point where they could come down off the rocks. Sheakley was below them and in voice contact with the squad.

Hear Val Norman at Stand 5 describing his experience as a firefighter on the Cart Creek Fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

As they retreated, the order in line was Uphoff, Coleman, Hodgkinson, and Jenkins. When they came down the rock face, Hodgkinson stepped aside and told Jenkins to go ahead of him. He then came down the rocky slope immediately behind her. Word was passed to drop their tools and run. As they came down the rocky slope, each crew member dropped his/her tool in an orderly fashion and ran toward an opening in the fire created by Hatch's line and into the black. Hodgkinson was the last person in line and did not come through behind the other crew members. Immediately they called to him but got no response.

While overhead, the helicopter pilot and foreman observed Hodgkinson running a few yards behind Jenkins when a Juniper flared in front of Hodgkinson. Hodgkinson stopped and turned around and began to run toward the opening in the bluff where the squad had come down. The helicopter dropped low over him and tried to get his attention to turn him back around and follow his squad but to no avail. Hodgkinson continued struggling up the slope and became disoriented in the smoke. He was last seen falling among the rocks.

Looking downhill toward Hodgkinson’s memorial.

Photo from the original investigation report showing the final escape route of Hodgkinson.

Stand 5 looking toward Stand 4.

Rock bluff above Hodgkinson’s memorial.

This memorial is dedicated to the brave men who perished during the Blackwater Fire of 1937.

The fire started on August 18, 1937, as the result of a passing lightning storm during the late afternoon. The point of origin was traced to a sub-alpine fir located on the west bank of Blackwater Creek approximately four miles from this point.  The Blackwater Canyon is a tributary to the North Fork of the Shoshone River. The canyon is mostly oriented north/south, with the high country at the southern end of the range. The elevation ranges from 6,200 to 11,096 feet with canyon walls rising to rims of decomposing granite. The local winds are out of the southwest; any frontal passages would produce typical wind shift patterns. 

The fire slept through August 19 and came to life the afternoon of August 20, 1937. Men of the Bureau of Public Roads Crew (BPR), the Wapiti Civilian Conservation Corps Crew.

Note: To relieve economic hardships during the great depression in the 1930s the U.S. Government created the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The CCC employed out-of-work young men to help battle the destruction and erosion of our natural resources. These crews were involved in firefighting around the country. Training for firefighting was "very basic" at best. National Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni.

(CCC - Company 1852), and the Lake (Yellowstone NPS) CCC Company arrived at the fire that afternoon and evening. Forest Supervisor Sieker and District Ranger Charlie Fifield, were the men in charge of the fire. They used direct attack tactics, as the strategy was to anchor and flank the fire. The expectation was that the fire would not grow appreciably during the night. However, about midnight the winds increased causing the fire behavior to increase and run up the drainage to the southeast of Trail Ridge. This was a short-lived run, but the fire continued to burn throughout the night. By next morning, the aerial reconnaissance observed the entire drainage was consumed by crown fire behavior with two spot fires between Blind Creek and the drainage to the east. See Map A above.

The firefighter memorial is easily located alongside Highway 14/16/20. It was built by the CCCs and dedicated in 1938. There is a large paved turnout here and a Forest Service parking area below the roadside turnout. The road turn-off to Blackwater Canyon is just east of the memorial site.

The plaque on the firefighter memorial.

This sign along Highway 14/16/20 shows the turnoff to the Blackwater Lodge. This is also the turnoff for FS Road 435 that goes to the upper trailhead in Blackwater Canyon.

FS Road 435 goes south from Highway 14/16/20 and crosses the North Fork of the Shoshone River.

FS Road 435 ends two miles from Highway 14/16/20. This is the upper trailhead, sometimes referred to as Lower Camp. Note the limited parking.

Trailhead footbridge near Lower Camp at the end of FS Road 435.

The shift change began along this ridge during the late morning of August 21st. Smoke was hanging in the drainage, and the fire was backing down the north side of Trail Ridge. The Ten Sleep CCC relieved the Wapiti CCC Crew. The Ten Sleep CCC crew had been expected to arrive about 0800 to the base camp but didn't arrive until 1200. The BPR crew and Yellowstone CCC continued to work. Supervision of the suppression activities was transferred from Forest Supervisor Sieker and District Ranger Fifield to District Rangers Urban J. Post and Alfred G. Clayton. Deputy Forest Supervisor Carl Krueger continued to fly air patrol and report the fire's status.

Mr. Krueger reported several spot fires near the fireline at 1240. The spot fires were suppressed as the line was constructed. Krueger didn't identify any spots in the vicinity where the blowup originated. The strategy and tactics were that Ranger Post would take the lead with assistance from Jr. Forester Paul Tyrrell. Ranger Clayton followed to improve the line and catch any new spot fires. As Post and crew hiked the ridge to start work, he was on the lookout for spots over the line and into the next basin. At that time, no spot fires were seen below [see map B]. They were unaware that the relative humidity dropped to 6% with a temperature of 90° down at camp or that a spot was in the bottom one-third of a mile below them; they didn't anticipate afternoon winds. See Map B above.

Note: During the 2003 fire season, the Shoshone National Forest experienced the worst fire season on record with five large fires and 50 total starts. See Map C above.

Looking down from the trail into the area where the Blackwater Fire originated from a lightning struck tree.

First distinct switchback in the trail is the suggested location established for Stand 2.

Areas of overlap between the 1937 and 2003 fires can be seen. Notice the older snags evident in the foreground and the recently burned terrain in the background.

In 1937, this area was a stand of mature trees. If you look uphill from where you are standing and visualize the fire creeping downhill, you can see that the fire was out of alignment. During the morning of August 21, the fire had a slight southwest wind. This wind pattern is a typical airflow over Wyoming's Wind River and Absaroka Mountains. At this time, the BPR and Ten Sleep CCC crews were cutting underslung line across the drainage. Firefighters didn't think about using lookouts. Foreman Saban and Junior Assistant Hale from the Wapiti CCC with five or six men from the Ten Sleep CCC enrollees stopped and dammed up the creek to fill backpack pumps. See Map D above.

As Post and his group gained the ridge to the north, they noticed the smoke below Clayton and his group. Clayton also noticed it and prepared to abandon line construction and attack the new smoke. Clayton directed his crew to the gulch to fill their backpack pumps while he headed down hill to scout out the spot in the hole. The last word received from Ranger Clayton was a written note to Ranger Post.

Post,
We are on the ridge in back of you, and I am going across to "spot" in the hole. It looks like it can carry on over ridge east and south of you. If you can send any men please do so since there are only 8 of us here. 
Clayton

Around 1530, the wind increased to 30 miles per hour from the northeast, blowing embers over the line. Then the wind subsided for a brief time. When the wind began again, it was associated with the frontal passage and blew strongly out of the northwest. The spot fires below the main fire were in direct alignment with topography, slope, and wind.

The spot fire rapidly ran up the drainage. With no escape routes or safety zones, the fire trapped Clayton and his men at the dam in the drainage. Whether Clayton and his men actually started down to the spot or not was never determined.

As you walk up the ridge from Stand 2, you will come to this point with a vantage of both Clayton Gulch and Post Point. If time is limited, you can use this as an alternate location to conduct discussions for both Stand 3 and Stand 4. This location is identified as Stand 2A on the maps and in the Facilitator's Field Reference.

The distinctive vegetation pattern below Clayton Gulch shows the old burn scar and the location of the spot that would initiate the firestorm.

The gulch as it appeared in 1937.

The gulch as it appeared in 2004.

The Clayton Gulch memorial is on the ridge to the north and just above the gulch where the actual fatality site is located. This is the second memorial built in 1938 by the CCCs.

The plaque on the Clayton Gulch memorial.

Post received Clayton's note but could not help. The Ranger withdrew up the hill to the timberline and safety. Bert Sullivan took the lead while Post and Tyrrell brought up the rear.

The spot fire consumed the fuels above Post's crew cutting off their escape to timberline, thus making Post Point the men's best chance for survival. Five men panicked and ran downhill through the fire. Of these five, only one would survive. Post, Tyrrell, and Sullivan made every attempt possible to keep the men in place.  Of the 37 who stayed at Post Point, only 3 would perish.

Paul Tyrrell knocked down some of the panicked men and lay down on top of them as a human shield to protect them from the fire behavior. A few days later, Paul's severe burns take his life; he passed away at 1300 on August 26, 1937.

The fire rushed uphill from the spot in two waves. The group on the ridge top tried to move around to avoid the flame fronts (see Map D above), but there was little room on the ridge. One of the survivors was quoted as saying, "Anywhere you moved, the flames and heat could get to you."

Fire behavior specialist A.A. Brown completed the fire behavior report for the Blackwater Fire. Mr. Brown identified the following factors as key to the blowup:

1. The ragged edge of the fire.
2. Underburning of surface fuels that pre-heated the canopy crown.
3. The heavy fuel model that the fire burned in - today's fuel model 10.
4. Undetected spot fires.

Interview excepts from Johnny J Levine, Civilian Conservation Crewmember who helped fight the Blackwater Fire and was trapped at Post Point: transcript.

Looking up the ridge at the approach to Post Point.

The view looking back down from Post Point. This is where the majority of firefighters were trapped by the firestorm.

The plaque for the Post Point memorial. This is at the location where the firefighters with Post sought refuge. This is the third memorial built by the CCCs in 1938.

From Stand 1, you can look up at the crash site of air tanker T56. From this location, you can see the road to the Rulison blast site. This was the site of a 43-kilo ton atomic blast 8,426 feet below the surface, which was conducted as part of the Operation Plowshare project on September 10, 1969. The blast was part of a program to convert the government's 27 nuclear programs into one of various peacetime uses of atomic power. At the time of the fire, there were still large amounts of equipment and two aboveground storage tanks on site. Each tank contained explosive vapors and low-level radioactive materials. Additionally, the well had been plugged at the top and bottom but had not yet been cemented.

T56 was a converted military B-26, adapted to fire suppression activities. It was flown from Denver to Grand Junction on July 15, 1976, and assigned to work with two other air tankers on the Battlement Creek Fire. On Friday morning, July 16, 1976, all three planes were assigned to continue working on the Battlement Creek Fire. The first plane arrived to the fire at approximately 0735. T56 was the third plane to arrive at about 0840. T56 circled the fire as the lead plane flew the desired flight path. Both the lead plane and T56 flew south into the large bowl. It was determined that T56 never completed its turn prior to impacting the ridge. The pilot did jettison the retardant load just prior to impact.

At 0855, pilot Donald Goodman of Missoula, Montana, was killed.

As a result of the impact, a fire was started and involved approximately 1 acre of scrub oak. The Line Boss and the Sawtooth Interregional Crew worked the resulting fire.

Tanker operations were halted after the accident and not resumed until the following day.

The main fire camp was located up toward the flag and down among the aspens. There were several hotshot and Snake River Valley crews that had just come off the July 15th night shift that must have been filtering into camp at the time of this accident.

View looking upslope from Stand 1. The Memorial Flag is located to the left and above the band of bare shale at the top of the ridge. This area is on private property and there is no public access to the site.

Memorial presentation photo presented to Donald Goodman's family at the July 21, 2001, memorial service. The flag and plaque serve as the location marker for the impact site. The plane's control levers are entwined in the brush at the base of the flagpole.

Memorial placed at the Grand Junction Interagency Air Center, Walker Field Airport, Grand Junction, Colorado.

Close-up of memorial.

Stand 2 is located at the BLM land ownership boundary. The mixed mountain shrub fuel type you see is representative of what the area looked like in 1976. The dominate brush was Gambel's oak, mountain mahogany, serviceberry, and snowberry. The Gambel's oak was 10 to 12 feet tall.

The remnant dozer line you see was constructed on Friday, July 16th, as part of the overall strategy to impede the fire's southerly progress and protect the Rulison blast site. The dozer operations were completed around 1600. At this time, fire activity in the bowl to the north (16th Bowl) was extreme. The fire made a run from Battlement Creek Road to the ridgeline, generating two large fire whirls.

The Mormon Lake Hotshot Crew and Happy Jack Hotshot Crew began burning out the dozer line around 1615 and reached the road about 2030. The burnout was 60 feet wide with some deeper pockets and continued downhill. There were no spot fires south of the line.

As night fell, crews attempted to continue the firing along the road to the north; it did not carry as well. The burnout on the road was primarily a ground fire and left a considerable amount of unburned fuel in the Gambel's oak. Both crews reached fire camp around 0100 to get some sleep prior to the morning briefing to be held a few hours later.

Looking upslope from the cattle guard. Note how much of the old dozer line is still visible.

View of the fatality sites, 17th bowl, saddle, and ridgeline from the dozer line. Note the steepness of the terrain across the face of the bowl. The bare area in the center was caused by erosion after the fire.

Stand 3 is located up the ridge from a prominent juniper tree in between the 16th and 17th Bowls. The two bowls have been named as to reference the fire behavior which occurred on those days in each bowl.  The bowl to the north is referred to as the 16th Bowl and the bowl to the south is referred to as the 17th Bowl.

Fire behavior in the 16th Bowl was extreme, characterized by intense surface and crown fire, hooking uphill runs, and fire whirls late in the day. Most of the 16th Bowl was burned by night fall.

View looking north into the base of the 16th Bowl. County Road 302 can be seen along the bottom of the slope. In the distance is Morrisania Mesa and the community of Parachute, Colorado.

Looking east from Stand 3, up the 16th Bowl. Re-growth vegetation is 3-4 feet high in most places, with some unburned pockets still almost 10 feet high. Vegetation is primarily a mix of Gambel's oak, mountain mahogany, and serviceberry.

From Stand 4, you can see the bowl to the south which is referred to as the 17th Bowl. You can also see the flagpole at the site of the T56 crash on the southern-most horizon ridge.

View from the Observation Point looking up towards the cliffs at the top of the draw. The north draw is in the foreground and the south draw is in the background. The Ponderosa Pine trees in the center of the photo are located on a small spur ridge which was spared during the July 17th blowup. The area that has slid below the cliff face occurred after the fire and was due to erosion. The Mormon Lake Hotshots' fatality site is near the top left of this photo.

Directly up this spur ridge, just below the main north-south ridge, are the Mormon Lake Hotshot fatality sites (look for the flagpole and drip torch memorials).

From Stand 4, you can see the three key control lines which were used as part of the suppression strategy:

1. The road which is downhill to the west.
2. The dozer line which is located directly south on the southern ridge of the 17th Bowl.
3. The handline which was located uphill along the main ridge from the rock outcropping to the helispot.

Strategy and tactics for July 17th were to work on the critical spot on the ridgeline to the southeast. The Mormon Lake Hotshots were assigned to this ridgeline and would be flown in by helicopter. The Happy Jack Hotshots were assigned to the burned out section of the south dozer line and Battlement Creek Road with instructions to continue burning out inside of Friday's blackline and also mopup along the outer edge of the burn. Other crews were assigned to secure completed sections of the fire, which were now in the mopup stage.

Looking downslope from the Observation Point, portions of the old fireline can be seen on the top of the ridge between the 16th and 17th Bowl; (right side of photo). County Road 302 is visible at the bottom of the drainage. Jack's Pocket is in the next drainage west. This was the furthest east area that was burned during the Battlement Mesa Fire of 1987. That fire was 3,600 acres in size and was started by children playing with a magnifying glass.

Dozer line as seen from the Observation Point.

At the morning briefing on July 17th, the Mormon Lake Hotshots were assigned to improve the line on top, the ridge which was previously worked by the night shift. Line construction was just to the lee side of the slope. Fire shelters were not mandatory equipment for BLM personnel at the time of the fire. The Mormon Lake Hotshots had fire shelters but left them in camp that morning because of their weight - a common practice at the time.

The Mormon Lake Hotshots arrived at the helibase at 0730; due to a series of other priorities, they never reached the upper helispot until about 1100. At this time they began improving the line from the rock bluff back down to the upper helispot.

From their position along the top of the ridge, Mormon Lake Hotshot crewmembers would have seen residual smoke in the 16th Bowl and few smokes along the dozer line from the burnout operation on July 16th.

Fire activity was established in the bottom of the 17th Bowl from the Happy Jack Hotshots' burnout operation. The 17th Bowl mirrors the 16th Bowl in fuel and topography. Suppression actions on July 17th were based on the previous days' fire behavior in the 16th Bowl.

Radios at the time were typically single-channel or had only a few channels. Radios had "crystals" in them and could not be field programmed like today. They were also very expensive and only issued to key personnel. Crew Boss Tony Czak had to carry two radios: one to talk to his crew and a second to talk to overhead.

From the upper helispot looking south, up the slope, evidence of the old fireline can be seen, tying the lee side of the slope to the cliff face. Note the vegetation change of the northeast aspect slopes to large thick stands of aspen.

To the east of the upper helispot, you can see the edge of the Roan Plateau, and in the far distance, the Flat Tops Wilderness and Storm King Mountain. Storm King Mountain was the site of the fatalities which occurred during the South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain in 1994.

At approximately 1315, the Happy Jack Hotshots had completed the lower burnout along the road. Unbeknownst to the Mormon Lake Hotshots, the fire was starting to work its way up into the 17th Bowl.

At about 1330, the Mormon Lake burnout crew was to burn out a 60 to 80 foot strip along the improved line on the main ridge. The burnout progressed slowly and was difficult to keep burning. The Crew Boss sent a burnout squad up the ridge to watch for spot fires. This left Crew Boss Tony Czak, Squad Boss John Gibson, and crewmembers Stephen Furey and Scott Nelson to finish the burn.

At 1400, the burn squad encountered dense oak brush which produced erratic fire behavior. During this same time period, the fire behavior in the 17th Bowl was increasing. Steepness of the slope ranged from 10% at the bottom near the road to 75% near the ridgeline.

At this time, the Sector Boss called Czak to move the Mormon Lake line improvement crew to the safety zone because of incoming air tankers. The crew moved off the ridgeline to the safety zone. The conditions became smokey. The two Squad Bosses had only the crew radio frequency. When the order to leave was made by the Sector Boss, only Czak heard it and had to relay the message to the Squad Bosses. The Sector Boss heard the report that all had made it to the safety zone and assumed that included the members of the burnout squad.

However, the Mormon Lake burnout squad was separated from the rest of the crew by 100 to 200 yards, with a wall of fire between them. The time was between 1425 and 1430. Unable to reach the safety zone, Crew Boss Czak radioed his Squad Boss who was in the safety zone and told him that they were trapped and unable to make it to the safety zone. Czak also radioed the Sector Boss with the same information and told him that the burnout squad would be moving back up the ridgeline toward the rock bluff. The time was now between 1430 and 1435.

At approximately 1440, the burnout squad was unable to go any further up the slope toward the rock bluff. After being given orders by the Crew Boss, the crew took off their canvas vests, wet down their vests, shirts and trousers and laid down on the fireline. At approximately 1440-1445, the fire roared over the burnout squad. During the burn over, at approximately 1448, crewmember Scott Nelson got up and ran downhill. Shortly after Nelson got up, Crew Boss Tony Czak got up and ran down the ridgeline in the direction of the safety zone and died approximately 1,000 feet away. At 1510, the Sector Boss arrived at the original burnover site and found Gibson and Furey still alive. Shortly after that, Stephen Furey passed away. John Gibson was airlifted to St. Mary's Hospital in Grand Junction and then on to a burn center in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Gibson survived the burnovers.

In the foreground is the fireline where the four firefighters laid while the fire roared over the top of them.

This was a rock cairn that was discovered while preparing for the 2001 memorial. This was the site where Tony Czak's body was found.

Tony Czak's memorial torch and presentation photo presented to his family during the July 21, 2001, memorial service.

Scott Nelson's memorial torch and presentation photo. Nelson's family was unable to attend the memorial service.

Steve Furey's memorial torch and presentation photo presented to his family during the July 21, 2001, memorial service.

The Mormon Lake Crew's first season photo taken early in the 1976 fire season.

During the winter of 1997, the Parachute/Battlement Mesa Volunteer Fire Department decided to develop a memorial for those killed during the Battlement Creek Fire. The project started by placing memorial markers at the locations where the pilot and firefighters died. Not knowing whether the people who died were religious, it was decided that drip torch cans would make the perfect markers for those that died while performing the burnout operation and a simple flagpole and plaque at the location of the T56 air tanker crash would be appropriate. A flagpole was also erected at the site of the burnover to mark the site and make the location more visible to those who could only view the area from the county road below.

During the summer of 2000, it was decided to have a formal memorial placed where more people could learn what happened during the summer of 1976. Working with the State of Colorado Department of Transportation and the town of Parachute, permission was granted to erect the memorial at the Parachute Rest Area off Interstate 70.  Working with a company in Arizona, the memorial sign board was created and built using both words and drawings. An area artist developed the concept of the memorial using plants native to the area of the burn with a snag from the fire area serving as the centerpiece. Tools were placed at the memorial similar to what would have been used at the time.  The propeller hub from T56 that was recovered at the base of the impact slope in dense brush was also placed at the memorial site.

Battlement Creek Fire Memorial in the Parachute, Colorado, Interstate 70 rest area. The actual fatality site is in the distant background.

The families of those who were killed were contacted early into the project. They helped with information regarding their loved ones. Three families were able to attend the memorial; two of the three families were escorted up to the actual sites. With this memorial, it is hoped that those who were killed on those two days will never be forgotten.  For years to come it will serve as a reminder to those that visit this memorial to be ever vigilant in their training and watchful in their situational awareness as firefighters continue to fight wildland fires into the future.

Dolliver's Dump as it looked in 1947 and 1983. The dump is considered to be the point of origin of the fire.

The Bar Harbor Fire of 1947, sometimes referred to as the Mount Desert Island Fire, started on Friday, October 17, 1947. The Bar Harbor Fire Department received a call at 1605 reporting a fire at Dolliver's Dump on the Crooked Road. They responded with one pumper truck and four personnel. Arriving at 1618, they found a rapidly spreading one-acre fire on the edge of Fresh Meadow. A direct attack was made, and an additional 16 men arrived. Fire Chief David Sleeper called Acadia National Park for additional resources at 1645; they responded with a fire truck, a dump truck, two portable pumps, and five men. Winds at the time were southwest at 8 to 10 miles per hour. The fire was burning across the bog and into the adjoining forestland. With these additional resources, crews worked through the night, and by noon on October 18 it had been contained at about 100 acres. Mopup and active patrolling continued through the evening of October 20.

Traveling along Crooked Road toward the photo point, turn left onto Betsy's Road to park for Stand 1. The turn to Betsy's Road can be seen off to the right in the center of the photo. Stand 1 is the vista on the north side of the road.

Dolliver's Dump was on the edge of Fresh Meadow. The fire spread from the dump, across the meadow, and into the timber.

A strong northeast wind picked up early in the morning of October 21. The fire, which was still under patrol, escaped its control lines, crossing the Crooked Road at about 0745. A general alarm was sounded at 0800 for resources to fight the rapidly spreading flames. By 1000 Chief Sleeper called Dow Army Air Base requesting manpower; they were able to send 225 officers and soldiers to the efforts. By 1600 the fire had swept southeasterly, crossing the Eagle Lake Road to the shore of Eagle Lake, and was burning on the National Park lands. By the evening, when the winds abated somewhat, an additional 1,000 acres burned.

Resource reinforcement and adjustments were made and line construction efforts were progressing reasonably well on October 22 when northwest winds increased around noon. The fire again escaped control lines, crowning through an additional 800 acres before the winds switched to the southwest and the fire spread slowed.

The National Park Service interpretive sign at the 1947 fire overlook off of Paradise Hill Road. This is Stand 2.

Regeneration seen looking out (from left to right)  Champlain, Dorr, and Cadillac Mountains. Notice the smoke from hazard fuel reduction burning in the left foreground.

By the morning of October 23, personnel and equipment from all over the northeastern United States were being brought in to fight this fire. During the morning hours, a stiff southwesterly wind pushed the fire toward the community of Hulls Cove and northern portions of Bar Harbor. Structures were already being lost and major evacuation efforts were underway when, at about 1500, a frontal passage arrived earlier than predicted, bringing 40 to 50 mile per hour winds from the northwest.

Despite large numbers of firefighters, soldiers from Dow Airfield, and volunteers from neighboring towns, the University of Maine, and even Bangor Theological Seminary, the strong winds and the extremely dry fuels resulted in extreme fire behavior which defied all containment efforts. Once the winds shifted and reached gale force, the evacuation of civilians and firefighters became the only priority. On the southwest side of the fire, located in the National Park, containment efforts were progressing well through the early part of the day until the major wind shift caused the fire to blow up.  The priority there also shifted to firefighter safety and evacuation.

The fire escaped control in all sectors. The community of Hulls Cove was spared the worst but flames swept towards the village of Bar Harbor. Roaring from the northwest, it rolled over the low shoulder hills and the western residential areas where numerous million-dollar hotels and mansions had been built. These summer homes and recreational facilities built by and for the wealthy families of the northeast were almost exclusively built of wood and would be almost impossible to protect even with today's equipment. Surprisingly, the town center and waterfront were spared destruction. The fire swept through and past the village, consuming the Jackson Laboratory, and ran unchecked to the sea along the area called Ocean Drive. Three hundred dwellings were lost in Bar Harbor that day.

Evacuation efforts began early when the control lines failed. About 2,000 residents of Bar Harbor had been collected at the town's athletic field by noon but were moved to the town dock once the fire advanced to the edge of town. However, evacuation by boat would prove to be very limited due to a small number of boats available because of high wind and rough seas. Fortunately, as the fire swept past and spared the downtown and dock area, evacuation by sea became unnecessary. Vehicle convoys were able to move evacuees to the mainland once the main threat passed. Despite all the structures destroyed and all the panic and displacement, only two lives were lost in the fire.

This photo was taken from Stand 3 which is an overlook approximately halfway up the Cadillac Mountain Road. Fuels seen in the foreground are similar to those found on Cadillac Mountain in 1947.

View of Bar Harbor and Frenchman's Bay beyond. The fire burned to the edge of town, moving from the left to the right, continued past Bar Harbor, and was eventually pushed to the water's edge.

Because this area did not burn in 1947, one can see the loading and type of fuels that existed on much of the island prior to the fire. Low areas tend to be dominated by large spruce, cedar, fir, and white pine. Where soil and weather conditions permit, hardwood trees figure into the mix. At higher elevations, the trees show weather stress as sub-alpine conditions are reached. In most of the area, especially where the softwoods are dominant, a duff layer exists which can extend deep into the ground in the gaps and cracks between rocks and ledges. This figured heavily in the extensive mopup required after a fire moved through an area.

The north parking lot for Jordan Pond is a large parking area but can be busy. There are visitor services available at Jordan Pond.

Jordan Pond looking north with The Bubbles in the background. The area south of Jordan Pond did not burn in 1947 and gives an indication of the fuel loading that was present prior to the fire.

Mature red spruce and balsam fir near Stand 4 give an indication of the ground and ladder fuels present during the 1947 fire.

The tight canopy seen in this photo is similar to that found in 1947. Much of the fire's spread was from crown fire.

 

By October 24 the gale force winds had subsided. The fire managers of the National Park Service met to collect, assess, and reorganize their equipment and personnel. Wilbur Savage was designated as Fire Boss, and subsequent organizational and tactical assignments were made. Supplies and personnel poured in from all over the United States as the evacuation of residents continued.

Control lines in the form of hose line, dozer lines, and hand lines were established and defended. The fire made no rapid advances after the morning of October 24. On October 27, the fire was declared contained. As rains moved into the area and reinforcement of control lines and mopup operations continued, the fire was declared out at 1600 on November 14. The fire had burned a total of 17,333 acres, 8,750 of which was on Acadia National Park lands.

The Mount Desert Island Fire, along with the other wildfires which burned over 200,000 acres across the state of Maine that fall, resulted in a major reassessment of the needs, threats, hazards, and costs of fighting wildfires locally, statewide, and nationally. Locally, recovery from fire would take years; however, it became the number one priority. Fire departments quickly replaced lost or destroyed equipment and immediately began upgrading their ability to tackle wildland fires so that the 1947 fire situation would never be repeated. Policies, standards, and cooperative agreements were developed at all levels and are still in force today in order to coordinate a rapid, effective response to any wildland emergency.

The town of Seal Harbor was threatened but not burned as the fire stopped about a mile inland.

The parking area near the intersection of Stanley Brook Road and Route 3 is a good place for the integration summary phase of the staff ride.