Dolliver's Dump as it looked in 1947 and 1983. The dump is considered to be the point of origin of the fire.

The Bar Harbor Fire of 1947, sometimes referred to as the Mount Desert Island Fire, started on Friday, October 17, 1947. The Bar Harbor Fire Department received a call at 1605 reporting a fire at Dolliver's Dump on the Crooked Road. They responded with one pumper truck and four personnel. Arriving at 1618, they found a rapidly spreading one-acre fire on the edge of Fresh Meadow. A direct attack was made, and an additional 16 men arrived. Fire Chief David Sleeper called Acadia National Park for additional resources at 1645; they responded with a fire truck, a dump truck, two portable pumps, and five men. Winds at the time were southwest at 8 to 10 miles per hour. The fire was burning across the bog and into the adjoining forestland. With these additional resources, crews worked through the night, and by noon on October 18 it had been contained at about 100 acres. Mopup and active patrolling continued through the evening of October 20.

Traveling along Crooked Road toward the photo point, turn left onto Betsy's Road to park for Stand 1. The turn to Betsy's Road can be seen off to the right in the center of the photo. Stand 1 is the vista on the north side of the road.

Dolliver's Dump was on the edge of Fresh Meadow. The fire spread from the dump, across the meadow, and into the timber.

The Northwest Regular Crew #6 and the District FMO arrived at the fire just after 0900 and the leaders met with the Entiat Superintendent. The FMO told Northwest Regular's Crew Boss Ellreese Daniels and Crew Boss Trainee Pete Kampen that the spot weather forecast was issued the evening before for the 1,000 acres Libby South Fire (located 50 miles south of Thirtymile Fire) had indicated low relative humidity, high temperatures, a wind event predicted greater than 10 m.p.h., and that the "fuel type was a trigger for fire behavior."

The Entiat Hotshots provided a GPS map of the hotspots. Mostly the fire was still a batch of spots at this time. The hotshots showed the Regulars the log they had used for crossing the river. All overhead present agreed the priority this morning should be given to two spot fires on the east side of the river. The FMO told the Regulars that they could expect support from Helicopter 13N for bucket work.

Crew Boss Daniels took over as IC with Kampen running the crew. The FMO said two local engines could be available and two pumps with plenty of hose and hardware were already delivered to the fire. The Entiat Hotshots departed to get some much-needed rest.

The Crew Boss Trainee directed the crew to set up the pumps and cross the log to the east side of the river. At about 1100 they had water to the fire and were digging line around it. By noon, the crew was having equipment problems. They couldn't keep the two pumps running and had broken four pulaskis during line construction. An increase in fire activity and lack of progress caused the Crew Boss Trainee to reassess his tactics and make some changes. He decided to send the crew to pinch the head of the fire. He called the pump operator away to dig line. Line construction was difficult with a lot of roots. Some crew members realized digging line in front of the fire was a "watch out" situation.

At 1208 the IC requested Helicopter 13N be launched, and 20 minutes later ordered additional crews from dispatch. He considered it unusual for green foliage to be burning as it was this early in the summer. In response to the IC's request for additional crews, the Entiat Hotshots returned to the fire at 1400, after only 2 ½ hours of rest.

At 1400 the IC pulled the crew member who had been serving as lookout off her post. The fire behavior had further intensified and he realized she would have poor access to the escape route. She was reassigned back to her squad. At this time, it was decided Air Attack would become the lookout for the Thirtymile Fire.

At 1427 Air Attack requested two engines. Engines #701 and #704 were dispatched to the fire. The supervisor of Engine #701 informed Engine #704 and three firefighters in a chase vehicle that their assignment was to keep the fire east of the road as per dispatch directions. At 1438 Helicopter 13N departed for the fire and began making water drops on small spots at the south edge of the fire.

At 1500 the Northwest Regular #6 Crew pulled back to the lunch spot. There they joined the Entiat Hotshots, and everyone ate lunch, rested, watered, and sharpened their tools. At about this same time, the District AFMO arrived on scene to speak with the IC about whether or not he was still comfortable with the IC role. Crew Boss Daniels said he was comfortable and remained the IC. At this time, the tanker Air Attack ordered a half-hour earlier showed up over the fire. The IC ordered two more tankers. Between tankers running out of time and the fire growing too large for them to be effective, only a couple loads of retardant were ever dropped.

Air Attack reported at 1520 that the fire had reached about 50 acres, was crowning and headed for the eastern ridge. Within 15 minutes the fire grew to 100 acres and had nearly hit the ridge top.

See the Entiat Hotshot's briefing map showing spot fire locations, above.

Hear interview excerpts from Marshall Brown, the Entiat Hotshot Crew Superintendent:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

The log near the Lunch Spot where crews crossed the Chewuch River. This is also the site where pump operations were set up

Fire behavior on the east side of the Chewuch River during early afternoon hours on July 10, 2001.

Entiat Hotshot Crew at the Lunch Spot after returning to the fire at approximately 1400 hours on July 10, 2001. Note fire behavior on the east side of the Chewuch River.

Around 1530 both engines, #701 and #704 arrived at the fire, and drove past the Entiat Hotshots and the Northwest Regular #6 Crew where they are eating lunch beside the road. Neither engine checked in with the IC (or anyone else) for a briefing.

A few minutes later the IC received a call from the Engine #701 supervisor, asking for help with a spot up ahead on the east side of the road. The engine folks considered the spots to be "rather small at this time." The IC decided, after conferring with his Crew Boss Trainee, to send a squad up to support the engine.

The Crew Boss Trainee for Northwest Regulars dropped the IC and the Northwest Regular Squad 1 (Tom Craven's squad) off at Engine #701. The Crew Boss Trainee then returned to the lunch spot with the van. A few minutes later Thom Taylor, the Squad 2 Boss, was told by the Crew Boss Trainee to drive his squad up to support the engines.

When Squad 2 reached the first engine, Engine #704, they were told their help was not needed. They continued up the road to Engine #701 (where Squad 1 was already working on the spot). Just after Squad 2 arrived, Engine #701 left to work some spots further south (back down) along the road. The two squads remained working spots about 100 feet to the east of the road, and about a quarter of a mile farther up the road from where Engine #704 had been working

Squad 3 was then called to support Engine #704. Within 2 minutes of arriving at the location of Engine #704, they were ordered back in the van. The fire was actively spotting and had moved up to the east side of the road. They quickly drove back down the road to the lunch spot. Crewmembers from the Northwest Regular's Squad 3 had to shield their faces from the intense heat as they drove past the fire.

At 1634, as Squad 3 retreated, The Crew Boss Trainee and others radioed the IC to get people out of the area. The crewmembers from Squads 1 and 2 dropped their gear and nine of them jumped into the van, with the IC driving. The other four begin running down the road. As the IC drove the van down the road, he saw a "wall of flames," and knew he had been cut off from the only escape route they had planned. Four people were still behind them on the road. The IC quickly turned the van around, went back and picked up the other crewmembers and the crew gear. They drove north evaluating their options as they went.

See the fire progression map from the Thirtymile Fire Investigation Report, above.

Hear interview excerpts from Thom Taylor, a Squad Leader for the Northwest Regular #6 Crew:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Fire breaching the road, entrapping Northwest Regular #6 Crew on the other side of the flaming front. This view is looking up the canyon with the Entiat Hotshot Crew vehicles and a Methow Valley Ranger District engine in the foreground.

View from Winthrop of the Thirtymile Fire column during the entrapment. Note split column and lenticular clouds developing between the two columns.

Aerial view of the fire taken by the Air Attack at the approximate time of entrapment.

As the van drove north the IC talked with Air Attack to identify a good safety zone site. The IC selected the fourth possible site they considered as the best place he thought they could safely watch the fire pass by. It was characterized by extensive rock scree above and west of the road. The Chewuch River and a sand bar were just east of the road. There was relatively sparse forest vegetation in the surrounding area. The scree slope consisted of a jumble of six-inch to six-foot diameter rocks interspersed with woody debris and duff.

The IC and the crew members unloaded and began to congregate on and above the road as they watched the fire. There was no formal briefing given concerning possible deployment. People began to wander around and take pictures of the advancing fire and growing smoke column. Squad Leader Taylor made a few suggestions about possible places to deploy and about having the sawyers cut down some trees, but the IC didn't think it was necessary. So instead Squad Leader Taylor went up onto the rockslide to see what he thought about using it for a deployment site. One of his crew members followed him.

They decided there was too much vegetation among the rocks, and they turned to head back down to the road. They met five other crew members from the same Naches district that had also gone a little ways above the road into the rocks. Several times the IC tried to tell the people on the rocks to come down to the road, but only one person, crew member Rebecca Welch, followed his directions.

At 1700 and Air Attack reported the fire is over 500 acres and moving up the east canyon slope. At about the same time, two civilians arrived at the entrapment site after having driven up the road earlier in the afternoon. At 1724 the behavior of the fire changed dramatically. The crew was completely surprised as suddenly the fire was "coming very fast, roaring," towards them.

Despite the lack of forest vegetation and brush near the crew, the intensity of the fire overwhelmed the area and the crew. They were not in a heightened state of readiness. Shelter deployment was no longer optional. The IC directed the crew members to "get your shelters out and use against the ash" to protect them from falling embers. Very quickly after that, he told the crew members on the road to deploy.

See the Thirtymile Fire Lessons Learned presentation from MTDC.

Hear interview excerpts from Matthew Rutman, a crewmember on the Northwest Regular #6 Crew:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Aerial view looking down the Chewuch River drainage at the entrapment site. Arrows indicate the two different locations where firefighters deployed their fire shelters.

Flame front approaching just below the tree line on the east side of Chewuch River. Note the numerous white exposure dots from the heavy ember shower. Photo was taken by a crewmember on NWR # 6 just before deployment.

Entiat Hotshot Superintendent and Squad Leader (EMT) at the entrapment site during rescue operations. The road bed and the river sand bar below the road (to the left in this view) were the locations where surviving firefighters deployed their fire shelters.

This rock scree slope above the road was the location where the four firefighter fatalities occurred. Two other firefighters who were initially in the rocks moved down toward the road and river during the entrapment. Note the variable size of the rocks and the impact this could have on the ability to move and the ability to get into a fire shelter.

Thirtymile Fire Memorial located at the entrapment site.

Stand 1 is located at the Storm King Mountain Memorial Trailhead. This trail is a tribute to those who lost their lives while battling the South Canyon Fire and a tribute to firefighters everywhere. It also allows us to reflect on the lessons we have learned to help reduce the likelihood of similar tragedies in the future.

The trail was built by a community literally working through the grieving process. It began as a footpath made by families of the firefighters and others as they hiked the mountain to pay their respects to those who had died, and to try to understand what had happened. In response to the community's need, and to increase understanding, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), and volunteers built the trail.

The South Canyon Fire started on July 2, 1994, because of a passing lightning storm. The point of origin was on a ridge which was paralleled by two deep drainages (known as the East & West Drainages). The fire was not reported until July 3rd, it was estimated to be ½ acre in size at that time.

On the afternoon of July 3^rd, a BLM engine crew met with the Garfield County Sheriff at a vantage point below the fire. An initial size-up was completed. There were several higher priority fires in the area, the fire was judged to be inaccessible, and the rate of spread was low. The District Fire Control Officer agreed with initial assessment - the fire would be put in monitor status until the higher priority fires were staffed. Over the next two days, the South Canyon Fire steadily increased in size. On the evening of July 4^th, the fire was estimated at 11 acres by the Aerial Observer.

The Trailhead is located approximately 7 miles west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado on Interstate Highway 70. Take Exit 109 and make an immediate right to follow the frontage road eastward; this road will dead-end at the Trailhead parking lot.
Over 100 volunteers from Glenwood Springs and the surrounding area built the main trail and water bars in October 1994. In April 1995, 60 Cadets from the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs installed wooden and stone steps, hauled mortar to the observation point for stone benches, dug holes for interpretive signs, and developed an area for reflection at the base of the hill where 12 of the firefighters fell. Local businesses donated goods and services throughout the trail's construction.

This photo was taken from the Canyon Creek Estates subdivision on July 4th, 1994 at 12:00. The subdivision is located about 2 miles west of the fire.

The trail up to the ridge takes visitors on the journey of the firefighter. It was left steep and rough allowing visitors to experience something similar to what firefighters encounter. Signs provide visitors with information about why firefighters would choose this job and what they need to be aware of to do their job safely and efficiently.

Early in the morning on July 5^th, an initial attack response consisting of an Incident Commander and a crew of seven from the local BLM District was sent to the South Canyon Fire. They walked to fire up the East Drainage which took approximately 2 ½ hours. The crew cut a helispot (H-1) on the ridge above the fire and began direct line construction downhill along the fire edge below the helispot. The Incident Commander ordered another engine crew, a helicopter, and a 20-person crew. Due to a shortage of hand crews, it was decided that a load of eight smokejumpers would be substituted for the 20-person crew.

Suppression efforts that day consisted of direct hand line and airtanker drops. The drops were deemed ineffective due to high winds and steep terrain. Late in the afternoon, the BLM firefighters left the fire when the eight smokejumpers parachuted onto the main ridgeline. The two crews never made face-to-face contact and the smokejumpers talked with the Incident Commander by radio to get instructions for their assignment.

That evening the fire had crossed the line constructed earlier by the BLM crew and was burning actively. After sizing up the fire, the Jumper-in-Charge called Grand Junction District Dispatch and ordered two Type 1 hand crews. The smokejumpers began building a downhill fireline on the east side of the ridge.

On July 5^th, the fire grew from 29 acres at 0800 to 50 acres by 2200.

This location provides an excellent vantage point of the Double Draws, the Lunch Spot, Petrilli's photo point, and Longanecker's position above the West Drainage. Anywhere along this ridgeline between where the trail first crests the ridge and the Overlook Point can serve as Stand 2. This location is approximately ½ mile from the Trailhead.

The trail follows the ridgeline, there are great vantage points all along the ridgeline.

The trail follows the top of the ridgeline from Stand 2 for approximately 1/3 mile to a spur ridge looking east toward Hell's Gate Ridge below Storm King Mountain where most of the events occurred. At this location, interpretive signs tell the story of the fire. If constrained by time or physical limitations, this stand may serve well as the last stand and the group can conduct Integration discussions at this point.

The Overlook Point is approximately one mile from the Trailhead (Stand 1). This stand provides an observation point offering an excellent view of the memorial sites along with interpretive signs explaining what happened during the South Canyon Fire. The signs also describe the fire season of 1994, different types of firefighting crews, and how the mountain is coming back to life. This stand may serve as a final destination for individuals who are constrained by time or may have physical limitations. This is a good location to conduct a terrain orientation and describe the locations of the various resources working on the South Canyon Fire.

On the morning of July 6^th, the Jumper-in-Charge ordered a helicopter for gear removal and requested a fixed-wing aircraft with an Aerial Observer. After discussions with Dispatch, it was agreed upon to use the helicopter for reconnaissance instead of the fixed-wing aircraft with Aerial Observer.

The local hand crew, now consisting of 11 firefighters walked back up to the fire that morning. Helicopter 93R arrived at 0930 with a limit of 4 hours of flight time. Eight additional smokejumpers parachuted into the top of the fire at 1030. The Prineville Interagency Hotshot Crew arrived at Canyon Creek Estates subdivision at 1200.

When the Prineville Hotshot Crew arrived, the Jumper-in-Charge requested they be ferried into the fire by helicopter and then resume using the helicopter for reconnaissance. By mid-afternoon, the local hand crew was working between H-1 and H-2 improving line and the smokejumpers were working on the west flank of the fire along with nine Prineville Hotshots.

These plaques describe the fires of 1994, the various types of firefighting crews, the role of fire in the ecosystem, and the events of July 6, 1994.

The illustration on this plaque provides the observer with good terrain orientation and description of where the firefighters were located.

While standing on the West Flank Fireline your vision is obscured by the dense Gamble Oak beginning to grow back to pre-1994 conditions.

The arrival of the second half of the Prineville Hotshot Crew was delayed due to competing priorities for bucket drops from the helicopter. Visibility during line construction was limited due to the tall Gamble Oak brush.

On July 6th between 1130 and 1300, two flare-ups occurred on the west flank which forced the group of smokejumpers to momentarily retreat up the fireline toward the top of the ridge. Several of the smokejumpers discussed their concerns about the safety of building the fireline downhill. After a water drop from the helicopter cooled the flare-up, the smokejumpers proceeded back down the fireline; the tree that flared up was cut down leaving the stump as identified as Stand 4.

The second half of the Prineville Hotshot Crew remained on the ridge to work spot fires along the ridge. The Incident Commander, Jumper-in-Charge, and Hotshot Superintendent discussed strategy and fire behavior. At mid-day, the winds were observed to be about 6 to 10 m.p.h. out of the southwest. Helicopter bucket drops were being used below the fireline on the west flank to help contain some areas that were heating up. The decision was made to continue building line down the west flank.

From Stand 3 the trail drops down into West Drainage and climbs up the opposite side to Zero Point Ridge. Going south from Zero Point the trail is the West Flank Fireline, follow the trail down through fatality sites until you see the marker for The Stump.

Smokejumpers and part of the Prineville Hotshot Crew on the West Flank Fireline, surrounded by thick Gamble Oak on the slope of Storm King Mountain. Photo by Tony Petrilli, U.S. Forest Service.

When you stand at the Lunch Spot you can see the double draws and the large drainage off to the west between you and the Overlook Point. It is here, after a lunch break, that a few of the smokejumpers and hotshots were instructed to work back up the west flank looking for hotspots and improving the line. Several individuals at different locations saw that the wind speed was beginning to increase. A Line Scout was working south from the Lunch Spot, down the hill past the end of the fireline and requested some help. The decision was made to focus on holding the existing line that was constructed while three smokejumpers tried to assist the Line Scout. Soon after that, the fire made several rapid runs within a previously under burned area just above the Line Scout. The three smokejumpers decided it was not a good idea to commit to the area where the Line Scout was located. At 1600 the fire blew up. It crossed the West Drainage at the base of the gully below the Line Scout. Within minutes a wall of flame was racing up the opposite slope. The Incident Commander directed the Jumper-in-Charge to bring the firefighters up from the bottom of the fireline. A smokejumper with the view of the blowup called the Jumper-in-Charge to tell him that the fire had crossed the main drainage and was "rolling." The fire was now being pushed by 30 m.p.h. winds.

The West Flank Fireline stops here at the Lunch Spot. The top of the Double Draws, Longanecker's location, and Petrilli's photo point are accessible from this location.

Longanecker working as Line Scout well below the Lunch Spot and on a spur ridge to the south. When the fire blew up, he worked his way back to the area designated as the Lunch Spot and stayed there throughout the entrapment without deploying a fire shelter.

At 1611 the Incident Commander called Dispatch to report that he was losing the fire on the side where the homes were and that he needed airtankers. At 1620 an airtanker was dispatched.

Between 1614 and 1618 the fire was observed to spot back to the east side of the drainage below the crew that was walking up the fireline on the west flank. As the fire raced up the slope, it was influenced by increasingly stronger winds estimated to be 40 m.p.h. The spot fire grew rapidly and reached the ridgeline in less than 10 minutes, overrunning 14 firefighters.

On the afternoon of July 6, 1994, there were 16 smokejumpers, 20 hotshots, a 6-person helitack crew (two on the fire and four at the helibase), and 12 local firefighters (11 on the fire and one at the helibase) assigned to the fire, for a total of 54 firefighters.

The trip from the Trailhead (Stand 1) to Zero Point (Stand 6) and back is about four miles. It climbs 700 vertical feet to the Overlook Point (Stand 3), and another 450 feet to the top of the ridge leading to Zero Point. Visitors making the entire trip should plan on spending between three and four hours and should bring food, plenty of water, and wear sturdy hiking shoes and clothing appropriate to the weather.

At Zero Point, you get a feel for the gravity of the situation, this is where the last survivors from the west flank were literally "blown" over the ridge into the East Drainage. All the other survivors from the ridge also used the East Drainage to escape imminent death. This location serves as an excellent place to conduct an Integration session of the Staff Ride. Facilitators can build a terrain model for individuals to discuss their perceptions of how events unfolded that fateful day.

From Stand 5 participants can hike back the West Flank Fireline approximately a ½ mile to Zero Point. Another option is for participants to hike up Lunch Spot Ridge to H-1 and walk due north to Zero Point.

The junction of the Main Ridge and the top of the West Flank Fireline is an important geographical location regarding firefighter location and movement. This point was identified in the Research Paper RMRS-RP-9, Fire Behavior Associated with the 1994 South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain, Colorado, and was used as a reference for distances along the Main Ridge and the West Flank Fireline.

A group called the Storm King 14 Committee raised over $165,000 and erected a statue and individual memorials at Two Rivers Park in Glenwood Springs.

If there are time constraints or physical limitations, this location may serve well as the first stand or the last stand. In addition, this area provides a good initial meeting point for conducting a staff ride with a large group.

Two Rivers Park covers 22 acres and has plenty of parking. In addition to the memorial site, the park includes restrooms, picnic areas, and two park shelters.

This plaque is a duplicate of the one located at the Overlook Point (Stand 3). The memorial honors those who fell on this day describing the events of July 6, 1994.

Map of the Two Rivers Park Memorial located in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, at the confluence of the Colorado River and the Roaring Fork River.

The memorial site was established by the Civilian Conservation Corps and the U.S. Forest Service in honor of the crewmembers of Company 1212 that were entrapped on the 1939 Rock Creek Fire. This is a good location to begin the staff ride, as it is easy to find, has good parking capacity, and provides an excellent perspective of the site from the monument.

The Rock Creek Fire started at 1115 on July 28th, 1939 from lightning. The point of origin is located approximately five miles southeast of Orovada, Nevada and four miles due east of the Highway 95 monument. Between 1530 to 1600 the fire burned explosively downhill in a westerly direction, under the influence of a thunderstorm directly over the fire that produced 40 to 60 mile per hour downdraft winds. At the time the wind event occurred, six local residents were suppressing the fire and 23 CCC firefighters were hiking to the fire from Rock Creek. The CCC crew was divided into two squads. One squad hiked in from the north toward the left flank of the fire and the other traversed from the west to the bottom of the fire.

See the travel map, above.

See the Orthophoto map with the final fire perimeter and NAD 83 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

Click to link to National Civilian Conservation Corps Alumni. Interview excerpts from Kirk Studebaker, the store owner who reported the fire and helped with the initial attack of the fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

The Monument is located in the center of the Rest Area ½ mile South of Orovada, Nevada on Highway 95.

Looking to the east from the Rest Area on Highway 95 at significant area landmarks. Sawtooth Mountain is the predominant mountain on the left.

Looking to the east from the Rest Area on Highway 95 at the other Stand locations.

Approximately 1400 hours the CCC crew arrived at Rock Creek. They drove to the end of the two-track road leading into the creek. At this point, the Crew Foreman, Wilbur Timmons, divided the 23 person crew into two squads. He would take his squad and approach the fire along the ridge to the north of the fire. He placed Earnest Tippin in charge of the second squad. Tippin's group was directed to approach from the west to the bottom of the fire. Foreman Timmons believed the bottom of the fire would be safer for the less experienced squad boss Tippin. Timmons had briefed Tippin in the truck as they drove into the fire. Timmons gave a direct order to "keep the men in safety". The squads rapidly assembled and departed the truck heading to the fire. Tippin's route took him a short distance up Rock Canyon then south, crossing over a saddle, and following the McConnell Trail. The McConnell Trail followed a dry drainage west toward the fire. Timmons continued up Rock Creek ½ mile then started hiking a ridgeline heading to the north of the fire. Almost 300 yards due east of Stand 2, on the south facing slope above Rock Creek is the Vitale fatality site. This is a good time to point this out, however, Stand 4 will provide the greatest vantage point for discussion regarding Vitale's escape route.

See the orthophoto map with the final fire perimeter and NAD 83 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

The two squads hiked together up Rock Creek to the point were Tippin's crew turned to the south and crossed over the saddle you can see on the right side of the photo.

Looking back down the two-track road from the crew parking area toward the Gabica Ranch.

Interview excerpts from Raymond Gabica, ranch hand that helped initial attack the fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Tippin's squad crossed the saddle from Rock Creek heading east up a dry drainage. The McConnell Trail parallels this drainage leading up to the fire. They stopped and took short breaks several times as they hiked up toward the fire. They left one person at Rock Creek as a water boy. As they progressed up the trail, four squad members fell behind. Sometime between 1515 and 1530, Tippin and five of his squad reached the ridge at the head of the dry drainage. The fire was backing down the ridge to the north of this location. It is here that Tippin gave his tactical briefing, described by survivors as the "Pep Talk". He delivered his briefing before the four other squad members reached his location. Within seconds of finishing or during his briefing the wind abruptly shifted from the west to the east and increased to more than 40 miles per hour. They were now directly in the path of the oncoming head fire. He gave the order to begin walking back to the truck. The four squad members who were still hiking up saw Tippin and party hiking back toward them. They immediately turned around and began running back toward the truck. Tippin gives an order not to run and "save your breath for the fatal moment." Tippin then hears the roar of the fire, turns and looks again; he then gives the order to run. As they dropped down into the drainage the fire outflanks them on the ridgetops and heavy smoke hinders their orientation.

See the topo map with fire progression and stand locations, above.

Above Stand 3, looking west down the dry drainage that Tippin's squad hiked up.

Typical of the fuel conditions that were present in the area before 1939.

Interview excerpts from Kirk Studebaker, the store owner who reported the fire and helped with the initial attack of the fire:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Shortly after 1530 Tippins squad was in an urgent retreat back to Rock Creek where the truck was parked. All of the four squad members who did not make it to the Pep Talk on the ridge were running over the ridge into Rock Creek and down to the truck. These men did not follow the McConnell Trail through the saddle. They crossed the ridgetop well above the saddle. Tippin and the remaining squad members were steadily being driven deeper into the drainage. The fire was closing in from behind and on their flanks. In haste, Kennedy broke his ankle jumping into the drainage bottom only 50 yards downhill from Stand 3 and called for help as the fire rapidly approached. Tippin and James immediately turned back to help Kennedy "arm in arm" continue his way downhill. Meanwhile, Barker and Powers collided with each other. Powers jumped up and continued running to the saddle. At about this point, Tippin and James realized that they cannot outrun the fire while helping Kennedy. They left Kennedy behind and ran ahead to help Barker, who was now limping after his collision with Powers. The fire overran Kennedy and then caught Barker, Tippin, and James about ¼ mile down the drainage.

Squad member Vitale ran north into Rock Creek toward the truck. His vision was very poor and a later report indicated his eyeglasses were broken and he did not have them on this fire. This may explain why he did not run directly to the truck. Instead, his body was found approximately 300 yards north of the saddle on the south facing slope above Rock Creek. The remaining six squad members ran down the Rock Creek road until they were picked up and taken to Gabica Ranch. They assisted in the evacuation of the Ranch. From the time of the initial wind shift to the time the survivors reached the truck was estimated to be less than 45 minutes.

See the topo map with fire progression and stand locations, above.

See the Investigation Report Map with firefighter retreat routes, above.

Looking at Stand 4, which is in the area where the two un-named drainages converge and are south of Rock Creek.

Looking north through Rock Creek Saddle at the Vitale fatality site.

The Mendocino National Forest boundary sign is located at the mouth of Powder House Canyon and is a good location to begin the Staff Ride. It offers a good view of the point of origin and terrain layout. This site also has suitable parking and is easy to find.

The Rattlesnake Fire was started at approximately 14:30 on July 9, 1953. It was the second of two arson fires started by the same individual. The first fire was called the Hull Fire and was set near Chrome, about 10 miles north of this location on County Road 306. The Hull Fire was suppressed at 11 acres on State land.

The Rattlesnake Fire was started on Mendocino National Forest land, along Alder Springs Road, at Oleta Point approximately 2 miles from this location. It was discovered by Mr. A. B. Miller while he was returning to Alder Springs from the Hull Fire. Mr. Miller had to drive past the fire to a point near Powder House Turn to verify that the lookout at Elk Creek Butte had seen and reported the fire to central dispatch at Willows. He reported that the fire was 25' by 30' when he passed it.

See the travel map above.

See the Orthophoto with fire edge and NAD 27 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

The beginning point, Stand 1, of the Rattlesnake Fire Staff Ride is easily identified by the Mendocino National Forest Boundary sign at the junction of Highway 162 and Alder Springs Road.

Looking west from Stand 1 at the mouth of Powder House Canyon you can identify Oleta Point (to the right of the telephone pole), which was the Point of Origin for the Rattlesnake Fire.

Looking east from Stand 2 towards the Sacramento Valley. The valley is the source of very strong diurnal temperature changes, which can have a significant effect on fire behavior in this area.

The Point of Origin is located approximately 100' up the Alder Springs Road from this spot at Oleta Point. Initial Attack was made on the fire at 1515 by Miller and a suppression crew consisting of five men, a tanker truck, and hand tools. The head of the fire was beyond the reach of the hose, so they anchored handline to Alder Springs Road, near the origin, and began flanking the south side of the fire. Shortly after they began a State crew of eight men under Assistant State Ranger Casaurang arrived and began helping construct handline along the south flank. The flank soon became too active to continue direct attack. Charles Lafferty soon arrived and at about 1600, instructed Silva and his forces to abandon direct attack. J.M. Ewing also arrived at approximately 1600 and was appointed Fire Boss (IC) by Forest Supervisor Leon Thomas.

The fire at this time was spreading, primarily in a westerly direction, on both sides of the ridge from Oleta Point. The fire was moving toward Rattlesnake Ridge, which is approximately 1 mile from the Point of Origin. There were a total of 15 men at the time and they moved further west along Alder Springs Road towards Powder House Turn with a new plan.

See the Investigation Report Figure 1, above.

See the Feature Orientation Map, above.

The Point of Origin is located west from Stand 2 about 100'. The fire was estimated to be 25' by 30' when Miller first arrived.

Looking up the Alder Springs Road from Stand 2. Rattlesnake Ridge is on the horizon.

After failing to control the fire through direct attack near Oleta Point, Fire Boss Ewing made a new plan in consultation with Lafferty. The plan consisted of:

1. Control the head of the fire along Rattlesnake Ridge.
2. Construct line and burn where needed along Rattlesnake Ridge to the west to High Point (there was an existing old fuel break along Rattlesnake Ridge).
3. Construct line and burn from High Point down a ridge in a northeasterly direction to a point on Alder Springs Road near Powder House Turn.
4. Use Alder Springs Road and burnout going west until meeting up with the burnout coming from Powder House Turn.

Almost directly across from Stand 3 is the white cross that was placed in 1993 near the spot that the majority of the firefighters were overtaken by the fire.

Although two attempts were made to construct line down to Alder Springs Road (Figure 1 - Points 22 & 23) neither were successful. At around 1840 a handline was completed between High Point and Powder House Turn. Burning up the road from Oleta Point and firing out from High Point down to Powder House Turn both began around 1920. Casaurang with his crew, supported by tanker equipment, were bringing the burning operation up the road, while a crew was burning down from High Point was under the direction of Robert Werner. When burning operations began on the ridge winds were upslope, out of the east-southeast and the crew was having a tough time getting the brush to burn. Just before 2000 "a local wind of considerable turbulence developed for a brief period" caused seven or eight spot fires below Alder Springs Road near the old car (Figure 1 - Point 11), just west of this location. At 2015 burning was suspended along Alder Springs Road to take action on the spot fires. It is at this time that Forest Supervisor Thomas discovered the Missionary Spot Fire across Powder House Canyon from the old car.

See the Fire Progression Map, above.

See the Investigation Report Figure 3, above.

Hear an excerpt from New Tribes Mission Crew Boss Paul Turner's interview:  audio file (mp3); transcript.

Looking west from this location you can see the head of Powder House Canyon.

A new memorial was dedicated in July 2005 at the Overlook. The monument portrays the 15 firefighters who died on the Rattlesnake Fire. In the background across the drainage, crosses can be seen at the location where the firefighters were overtaken by the fast-moving fire.

From this location, you can see Powder House Canyon from top to bottom.

This point is located at the head of the Powder House drainage, along Alder Springs Road and offers personnel involved in the incident their best vantage of the overall fire and the Powder House drainage. It logically became the incident command post (ICP) for the incident. It is from this point that 21 Missionary crewmembers and three Forest Service overhead, in three different groups, were dispatched to attack and control the Missionary Spot Fire.

At approximately 2203 spot fires developed below the road at Powder House Turn (Figure 3 - Points 22,30,24,23,26, & 27) due to a wind shift shortly after 2145 from the west, down slope. Personnel at Powder House Turn took action on the spot fires. All the detected spot fires were either quickly controlled or burning upslope towards the road. While devising a plan to contain the rest of the spots a glow was observed further down the slope near the bottom (Figure 3 - Point 28). All focus was then directed to this new spot that was burning in a northeasterly direction. Lafferty soon realized that escape route for the men at the Missionary Spot Fire might become compromised. At 2215 Lafferty left Powder House Turn to warn the men working on the Missionary Spot Fire.

View the Fire Weather Summary above under "Research and Pre-study Resources".

See the Investigation Report Figure 2, above.

Looking from Stand 4 across to the Alder Springs Road. One of the spot fires started near the bottom of the drainage at this location. It was this spot that overtook the firefighters working on the Missionary Spot Fire.

Stand 4 looking east offers the best overall view of Powder House Canyon. This point also offers a good view of, and illustrates the importance of, the location of the Sacramento Valley in relation to the events that took place. This location, known as Powder House Turn, is where the Fire Boss and other overhead positioned themselves.

Looking west from Stand 4 shows the expansive Grindstone Canyon. This canyon offers an easy, natural funnel for heavier, cooler, marine air from the Pacific Ocean to rush down-slope and replace the condensing air of the Sacramento Valley in the evenings.

There is an interpretive site for the Rattlesnake Fire located at a rest area on State Highway 162. To reach this memorial continue west from Stand 4 on the Alder Springs Road for 2 miles until it reaches its junction with Highway 162.

This is identified in the Investigation Report Figure 1 as Point 10 and in Figure 2 as Point 4. The Missionary Spot Fire was originally detected at about 2015 by Forest Supervisor Thomas from Powder House Turn. The spot is believed to have originated sometime around 2005 when "a local wind of considerable turbulence developed for a brief period." Other spots were detected and extinguished just below Alder Springs Road and near the old car around this time.

Thomas, accompanied by dozer operator C.W. Randrup and a reporter Charles Gleeson, made a reconnaissance of the spot fire and it was determined by Thomas that it would probably burn to the top of Powder House Ridge and that they would attack it after it made its run. Shortly after 2035, when that decision was made, the upslope flow of air subsided. It was then apparent that the spot fire would not run to the top of Powder House Ridge.

At about 2100 Missionary Straw Boss Dave Johnson and three New Tribes Mission crewmembers were assigned by Lafferty to make initial attack on the spot fire. They were instructed to "not take chances and to start work at the head of the fire." This group walked directly from Powder House Turn, contour, to the fire, which is represented by Line 1 in Figure 2. At approximately 2115 Crew Boss Stanley Vote led 14 more New Tribes Mission crewmembers, including three more Straw Bosses, from Powder House Turn to join Johnson's group. Vote took his crew partway up the cat trail that had been constructed up Powder House Ridge and then down to the spot, which is represented by Line 2 in Figure 2. Lunches arrived at Powder House Turn shortly after Votes departure and at about 2145 Assistant Ranger Robert Powers and four additional New Tribes Mission crewmembers left Powder House Turn to take lunches to the people working on the spot fire. This group proceeded along Powder House Ridge to a point beyond the spot fire, down a ridge, and then back to the spot fire represented by Line 3 in Figure 2.

Upon arriving at the spot fire, the last group placed the lunches in the draw at the northeast corner of the spot fire. They were then told by Vote that the line construction was finished. It was there, in the draw that the lunches were counted and distributed. While that was taking place Vote and Powers discussed the fact that the main fire at the head of Powder House Canyon was flaring up and they walked a short distance up the ridge that the Missionary Spot Fire was on to observe the main fire. After returning to the draw Vote and Powers discussed whether the Missionary Spot would provide protection (safety zone). They decided to eat the lunches there, at the spot fire. They were all located in or near the draw on the east side of the spot fire. They had sat down for only a very few minutes when the warning came from Lafferty to get out, and hurry.

Read articles from the Willows Journal in 1953, above under "Research and Pre-study Resources".

Read the New Tribes Mission notification of the tragedy, above under "Research and Pre-study Resources".​

Click to see the 1957 Fire Task Force Report.

Looking at Stand 5 from across the canyon you can see the location of the spot fire, and distances traveled by the survivors and those who were caught by the fire at the cross.

From Stand 5 you can see where Vote and Powers walked to the ridge on the western flank of the spot fire and observed increased fire behavior at the head of Powder House Canyon before returning to the lunch spot to eat.

Stand 1 gives an overview of agency, firefighter/smokejumper training, policy, culture and values, as well as fuels and weather in August of 1949. How did the culture, attitudes, training and environmental conditions set the stage for the events of Mann Gulch on August 5, 1949?

At the time of the Mann Gulch Fire, the U.S. Forest Service was 44 years into its existence, and the smokejumper program was a 10 year old project with a strong reputation for performance and ability. The culture regarding fire suppression was one of aggressive initial attack and protection of valuable natural resources. The 10 am Policy, established in 1936, stated that upon the report of a fire, containment and/or control should be accomplished by 10 am the following day. Long duration fires on the land could often reflect poorly on the record of a District Ranger.

On a broader scope, the work ethic in the U.S. Forest Service and the firefighting community, stressed unquestioning compliance with a supervisors orders. Many of the firefighters were veterans of WWII and brought much in the way of attitudes and culture toward authority from their military experiences. Official training on areas such as Fire Behavior and Risk Management (LCES, 10 & 18, etc…) did not yet exist.

On August 4th a lightning storm moved through western Montana and on to the east side of the continental divide, starting numerous fires. August brought with it record high temperatures in an area of abundant light fuel build up. The Mann Gulch Fire was reported by the Colorado Mountain Lookout at 12:25 PM, August 5th. District Ranger Robert Jansson also spotted the fire from a patrol airplane, and when he got back to Helena at 1:30 PM he and his supervisor decided to order smokejumpers from Missoula due to the difficulty of getting ground forces to the fire rapidly. They also ordered 50 local firefighters to be sent to the fire. Because only one airplane (a C47) was available, 16 jumpers flew to Mann Gulch. The best overhead available was selected for the mission due to the extremely rough topography of the general area and the seriousness of the fire weather. The airplane departed Missoula at 2:30 PM.

This background discussion is best held at the mouth of Mann Gulch after getting off the boat. Logistically, the mouth of Mann Gulch offers a good place to stash contingency medical supplies, break into groups and provide a visual overview of the area being discussed.

Sign currently located at the mouth of Mann Gulch

Men at the mouth of Mann Gulch just after the fire.

About 1 mile from the mouth of Mann Gulch, this open bench where Dodge and Harrison rejoined the crew provides a view which includes most of Mann Gulch, the jump spot, the cargo spot, and the main fire. It is also a good location to discuss fuel type and arrangement on this terrain in 1949, as compared to today.

The jump ship arrived over the fire at 3:10 PM. Spotter Cooley and Foreman Dodge estimated the fire to be 60 acres and noted that it had burned to the top of the ridge between Mann and Meriwether Gulches, with considerable backing down slope into Mann Gulch. They picked a jump spot across the gulch and streamers indicated the wind was about 10 mph straight up canyon, from the northeast. The air was so turbulent that several jumpers got sick, most landed hard (Dodge actually injured his elbow on landing), the cargo got scattered, and the crew's only radio was broken on impact.

Around 5:00 PM, while the crew got a bite to eat, Dodge went across the gulch for a meeting with Meriwether Guard Harrison, who had yelled down to them. James Harrison, a smokejumper the previous season, was the first to attack the Mann Gulch fire, having hiked back and forth between the guard station to the ridge top twice during the day. Dodge instructed Hellman to follow him with the men after they had collected their cargo.

When Hellman brought the crew across, Dodge and Harrison came down and met them at a point about 100 yards up from the gulch bottom. Dodge decided that this flank was not safe. Around 5:20 PM he told Hellman to take the crew back across the drainage to this stand’s north side location, and on towards the Missouri River. Dodge and Harrison hiked back to the cargo spot to get food and water.

Route Hellman leads smokejumpers on between Stand 2 (Briefing and Overlook) and Stand 3 (Crew Turnaround Point).

Highly detailed photo from smokejumper cargo spot Aug. 16, 1949 Notice the difference between fuels then and now.

From mid-slope and contouring on this spur ridge, a half mile southwest from Stand 2, people can note the main fire’s progress, the development of a spot fire below and the steepness of this northern canyon side.

While at the cargo spot Dodge and Harrison saw the fire “boil up,” and determined to get the crew out of the canyon as soon as possible. They caught up to the crew - which had strung into smaller groups - around 5:40 PM; Dodge took over the lead, pushing the pace towards the river.

Within five minutes Dodge noticed that the wind had picked up. The fire had crossed the gulch, cutting off access to the Missouri River and a safe anchor point, and was burning up the ridge towards them through light grass and brush. He turned the men around and told them to head back up Mann Gulch at approximately this stand’s location. Flames were still not visible from the crew’s rear, but the smoke and noise had become significant. It is at around this time that Ranger Jansson got turned back by flames below them and retreated back to the river.

Even after turning around and heading away from the flames below, the fire blowing up across the canyon still preoccupied some of the firefighters’ attention. Navon and another jumper took pictures of the main fire from here.

Turnaround point with facilitator pointing out location where Dodge first sees spots in the bottom of Mann Gulch, cutting off the crew's access to the river.

View toward the bottom of Mann Gulch with historic terrain and fuels.

300-500 yards back to the northeast from Stand 3, on this slight bench on the upper third of the slope, people can notice how fire was likely to have behaved as well as how difficult it is to negotiate this top part of the ridge, where there are rockslides and where several outcroppings block escape.

At this point the fire was about 100 yards behind the crew, and seemed to be getting ahead of them both above and below on the slope. Flames are estimated to have been spreading at just less than 100 yards per minute. The men seemed to have finally become nervous about their situation. Rumsey recalled Dodge saying something about "getting out of this firetrap".

At this location, about 5:53 PM, Dodge ordered the men to drop their gear. Whether or not they all heard their foreman, they did not all respond. As the timber thinned, the fuels became flashier, and the winds pushed the fire to spread even faster, up to an estimated 600 feet per minute.

Location near tool drop looking upslope from rock slide area. Notice footing and steepness of slope encountered during crew’s retreat.

Investigators find dropped tools following the Mann Gulch Fire

Approximately 400 feet higher and .4 miles northeast of Stand 3 is where Dodge lit his escape fire at 5:55 PM. At this time no fewer than eight members of the crew were close to him. Dodge thought he tried to explain to the crew that he intended to wait a few seconds to let his fire burn down before entering the blackened area, and that he wanted them to follow. About 100 square feet had burned when a crewmember said: “To hell with this, I am getting out of here,” and everyone except Dodge continued up the gulch. Dodge kept trying to convince the men as they passed him to get into the ashes with him, but nobody did. These events took seconds to occur.

The rookie smokejumpers had gone through weeks of intensive conditioning and had been working in the field ever since. They reached speeds estimated at 4 to 6 mph on these steep slopes.

Staff Ride facilitator near the Dodge escape fire marker, utilizing a photo in conducting a strategic discussion regarding Dodge's actions.

Marker near the location where Dodge ignites his escape fire.

Here at the top of the ridge separating Mann Gulch from Rescue Gulch is a flat area large enough to gather a group for discussion. People can see much of Rumsey and Sallee’s escape route, some of Rescue Gulch, and many of the monuments placed where bodies were found.

Jumpers Sallee and Rumsey followed the north edge of Dodge’s fire to the ridge top where they escaped the flames. After the blowup had subsided, they found Hellman, who had followed the south edge of Dodge’s escape fire toward the ridge, badly burned but alive. Foreman Dodge, who had survived inside the fire he lit, joined Sallee and Rumsey and reported that he had found Sylvia alive, but badly burned. Dodge and Sallee proceeded down Rescue Gulch to the Missouri River to find help while Rumsey stayed with Hellman.

A rescue crew arrived on the scene at 12:30 AM on August 6th, and began to assist Dodge in the search and recovery of the men. At 1:30 AM, they came upon and tended Sylvia and Hellman. The two injured men were evacuated at 5:00 AM, but both died in a Helena hospital later in the morning. Before the day was over the other 11 bodies of those who died were found within 300 yards of each other.

During the blow up stage, the Mann Gulch fire covered an estimated 3,000 acres in 10 minutes and eventually burned 4,300 acres. 611 firefighters helped bring the fire under control.

Largely as a result of the Mann Gulch Fire’s tragic ending, a program was developed to study fire behavior, and the Fire Laboratory in Missoula was finally built in 1960. Today firefighters nationwide analyze fire behavior from investigative conclusions and follow the Ten Standard Fire Orders that were influenced in part by the events that occurred in Mann Gulch in 1949.

Looking down into Rescue Gulch from ridge top. Notice Hellman’s cross has been relocated to the rock slide, well below the ridge top (lower right of photo)

Looking down into Rescue Gulch from ridge top. Notice initial placement of Hellman's cross.

This optional stand is located .5 miles up from the mouth of Mann Gulch, near Gisborne’s Memorial Plaque. This stand is particularly pertinent if the Staff Ride is for fire managers, since that was Jansson’s job. From here you can note the fire origin and the spot fires that Jansson could see in the bottom and on the north side of Mann Gulch.

Ranger Jansson preformed multiple fire duties during August 4th and 5th, including making patrol flights, mobilizing and supporting firefighters, and dispatching.

At 5:02 PM on August 5th Jansson started hiking up Mann Gulch to scout the fire and ascertain if the jumpers had made it into Mann Gulch. He estimated the wind to be between 20 and 30 mph. After traveling about 40 chains he noticed the fire had crossed the bottom of the gulch in two places. He thought he heard voices and proceeded another 100 yards to investigate. Somewhere between 5:18 and 5:20 PM he turned around, ran back through flames, and passed out. When he revived the fire was only a few feet away and backing towards him. At 5:45 PM he headed back to Meriwether in the boat.

At 9:20 PM Smokejumper Foreman Dodge made contact with Jansson in the Meriwether camp and confirmed the jump and location. This was the first time Jansson learned that an accident had occurred, and from then he lead the rescue effort through Sunday afternoon the 7th.

Staff ride participants at optional Stand 6 near the Harry T. Gisborne memorial marker. He became the 14th victim of the Mann Gulch Fire, when in September of 1949, he suffered a heart attack while studying the fire behavior and effects of the Mann Gulch Fire.

Historic photo of Canyon Ferry District Ranger, Robert Jansson. Stand 6 focuses heavily on the aftermath of the Mann Gulch Fire and it's impacts on the survivors and our culture.

On May 5, 1980 employees of the Mio Ranger District, Huron-Manistee National Forests ignited the Crane Lake Prescribed Fire. They intended to burn a 28 acre unit, along side State Highway M-33. The goal was to reduce the slash fuel load to prepare the site for planting jack pine to create habitat for the endangered Kirtland’s Warbler. Fuels on the site included grass, shrubs and scattered discontinuous logging slash. Resources on hand were 11 personnel, 1 John Deere 450 tractor plow, a 125 gallon engine, and a 6x6 1000 gallon engine. Several of the personnel were inexperienced or were not very familiar with this fuel type. The tractor plow operator was also inexperienced and planned to have his final certification on the plow later in the week. The primary operator of the tractor was not available along with several other firefighters due to a training class being held that day. The burn was surrounded by tractor plow line. The Burn Boss planned to ignite the fire around 0900 and complete the burn before 1200. The afternoon weather conditions were predicted to have temperatures in the 80’s, humidity in the 20’s with gusty southwest winds changing to northwest due to the predicted passage of a cold front during the mid-afternoon.

Due to wildfires the previous day, they were not ready to ignite the burn until 1026. During the initial stages of the fire it spotted 4 times along the east control line. These spots were quickly suppressed. However, the fire continued to cause control problems and the 125 gallon engine became stuck on a stump and then later broke down. These problems complicated the suppression of 3 more spot fires. The seventh spot fire on the north flank escaped containment. The 1000 gallon engine radioed that the seventh spot fire was moving east towards the highway.

Located just south of Stand 1, the best parking option for Stands 1 through 4 is this opening along State Highway M-33.

Panorama of the Crane Lake Prescribed Fire. The right side of the photo is the area labeled “standing timber” next to the “M-33” shield on the hand drawn map (Appendix B4) from the Investigation Report.

The walk from Stand 1 to Stand 2 passes one of the visual buffer islands of larger trees that are still standing.

Fire behavior in fine grass fuels with pockets of light logging slash.

Initial ignition operations along east fireline in grass and light slash fuels.

Kirtlands Warbler.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake staff Ride.

This 1000 gallon tanker (engine) was on the Mack Lake Fire in 1980. It was a brand new piece of equipment on the district at that time. Photo was taken in 2009 when the engine was still in service.

At approximately 12:06 the seventh spot escaped initial control efforts and began to move east towards the highway. This forced the personnel on the fire to use M-33 as the next logical control feature. The Burn Boss requested another Sheriff’s patrol at 1208 for M-33 due to continued heavy smoke. At approximately the same time the escaped fire was burning downslope towards M-33 on the west side of the highway. The tractor plow had constructed a line along the north side of the spot fire and connected it to M-33. However, the line did not hold.

The first spot fire was detected on the east side of the highway during this time period. The 1000 gallon engine attacked the spot but was delayed as it tried to climb the cut-slope due to the steepness of the grade. The Burn Boss then directed the tractor plow to contain the spot across the highway. The tractor plow put in two lines around the spot, successfully containing it with crewmembers patrolling the plow lines.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake Staff Ride

The 1000 gallon tanker (engine) that was on the Mack Lake Fire in 1980. This was a brand new piece of equipment on the district at that time. This photo was taken in 2009 and the engine was still in service at that time.

Tractor with plowline.

Mack Lake Stand 2 with plaque.

Between 1215 and 1230 a second spot fire was detected on the east side of M-33 just north of the original spot fire which had been contained by the tractor-plow and other personnel. This spot was in grass on the highway shoulder and was pushed by wind. The fire torched and then crowned within 100 feet of the origin in a stand of sapling sized jack pine. Surface fuel was primarily sedge, pine litter and duff at this point.

The tractor plow and 1000 gallon engine quickly attacked this second spot. However, they were not able to contain it as it spotted across their line and continued to move east gaining in intensity. The crews still felt they could catch the fire with the tractor and 1000 gallon engine. However, the District Ranger who also was serving as the tractor’s spotter conferred with the Burn Boss and decided to leave the scene and serve as an aerial spotter as they felt the fire had escaped. During this time a reporter briefly talked with the District Ranger along the powerline in regards to the fire’s status. The tractor plow operator was now without a spotter. The District Ranger stopped a passing motorist to get back to the nearby airport as a truck was not available. The 1000 gallon engine and the tractor continued flanking the fire to the east after failing to contain the spot fire. There was no radio communication between the two pieces of equipment after they left the powerline.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake staff Ride

Old plow lines can be identified by the rows of jack pine growing in them. Plow lines make a perfect seed bed after a crown fire in jack pine.

Mack Lake Stand 3 with plaque.

Mack Lake Stand 3 with sign and engine.

The tractor plow operator continued to plow fireline to the east, creating a slightly indirect line on the north flank of the fire. It was approximately 1230 and he was working alone initially. The fuel type was dense sapling and pole size jack pine. The 6x6 followed behind the plow using a wetline sprayed at the base of the fire which was about 30 feet away from the engine as they progressed.

Both the 1000 gallon 6x6 engine and tractor plow were forced to stay away from the flamefront and not use direct suppression tactics. The tractor plow was slower than the 6x6 engine and was passed by the engine. The tractor plow operator and engine operator did not speak face to face or use the radio when this pass was made. They did make eye contact. From that point on the engine remained in front of the tractor plow with no communication between them. The fire then began to make a push to the north. The 6x6 engine radioed that they were being forced to disengage the fire and retreated to the north and to safety. No communication was heard from the tractor. The tractor plow operator realized at approximately the same time he was in trouble. He raised his plow and began to move north away from the fire. After only 110 feet he abandoned the tractor and ran to the northeast. The fire burned over him 276 feet from his tractor.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake staff Ride

Looking north along the southwest flank during the Mack Lake Fire. Although the main fire spread was to the southeast when this photo was taken (left to right), the flames at this location are being driven to the southwest (right to left in the photo). The action of a horizontal roll vortex could account for this apparent anomaly.

Mack Lake Stand 4 with north symbol and plaque.

Photo of burnt over tractor taken during fire investigation in 1980.

James Lee Swiderski fishing.

James Lee Swiderski’s memorial stone at the NIFC Wildland Firefighters Monument.

The fire continued to advance on the Mack Lake Subdivision at a spread rate of almost 3 miles per hour with spotting ¼ of a mile in advance of the head. The fire hit the edge of the subdivision at approximately 1310 and had burned through the whole subdivision by approximately 1325. Forty-four structures where lost, many more survived the fire and were saved or spared for one reason or another.

The rapid spread of the fire and high intensity did not allow for effective structure protection. However, evacuations were effective and no civilian lives were lost. One civilian was injured trying to get a closer look at the fire. After the fire passed, firefighters were able to quickly return to the subdivision and prevent further structure loss from residual burning and smoldering.

The Fire continued to advance to the south and east, consuming a total of almost 24,000 acres.  By 1830, two factors changed: vegetation and weather.  The fire reached a hardwood forest type and relative humidity increased significantly reducing fire intensity.  Crews were able to create control lines and engage in mop-up activities.  By 1800 on May 6, 35 miles of control line contained the fire, there were no further significant runs.

History attempted to repeat itself on April 25, 2012.  Swift action by firefighting resources stopped the 820-acre Little Mack Lake fire from taking any lives or homes.  Firefighters were aided by the extensive fuel breaks around the subdivision.  These fuel breaks did not exist in 1980.

In 2014, The Maple Ridge prescribed burn was ignited adjacent to the subdivision to remove hazardous fuel.  This 50-acre fire burned with similar intensity and rate of spread as previous wildfires.  The prescribed burn was designed with emphasis on using the lessons learned from the 1980 Mack Lake Tragedy.

Interpretive Tile: Mack Lake Staff Ride

This is the Perma-Log house that survived the Mack Lake Fire and is pictured on the cover of the General Technical Report NC-83. The house next to it did not survive. The siding of this house is a concrete mixture making it very fire resistant.

This property was private in 1980. It has since been acquired by the Forest Service and this fuelbreak constructed. The fuelbreak is approximately 200 feet wide with all jack pine removed.

Crown fire advancing north towards the Mack Lake Subdivision.

Maple Ridge RX “Crown fire consumes the 50-acre unit. 300’ Fuelbreak in foreground was burned in September of 2013.

Hear excerpts from Bear Divide Foreman Cliff Johnson's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

El Cariso Regional Park was established by the County of Los Angeles in honor of the hotshot crewmembers who were entrapped on the 1966 Loop Fire. This is a good location to begin a Staff Ride as it is easy to find, has good parking capacity, and provides an excellent perspective of the site from the monument.

The Loop Fire started at 0519 on November 1, 1966, from a faulty electrical line at the U.S. Army's Los Pinetos Nike Missile Site. This facility is approximately 1 mile north of Contractors Point. The fire burned downhill in a southwesterly direction under the influence of 40 to 60 mile per hour Santa Ana winds. Contractors Point was a key anchor point on this east flank of the fire, which was designated as Division A. Suppression efforts in Division A on the morning of November 1st were focused on protecting the missile facility and establishing a control line south from that facility toward Contractors Point.

See travel map above.

See fire perimeter map above.

The entrance to the park is well marked. It will be a right turn if traveling north on Hubbard Street. The actual monument is to the back of the parking area.

When viewing the San Gabriel Mountains from the park, one gains an appreciation for the extreme terrain over which the Loop Fire burned.
Contractors Point is the high point of the ridge just behind the tree on the left. The south point of the ridge is clearly visible in the center.

El Cariso Hotshots: Photo of crew 1 taken in October 1966.

El Cariso Hotshots: Photo of crew 2 taken in October 1966.

By mid day, the north flank of the fire had been contained along the Santa Clara Fuelbreak up to Contractors Point. With the exception of a few minor slopovers, the east flank of the fire was holding along the ridge to a point 40 chains south of Contractors Point (Stand 3). The Chilao Hotshot crew, two Los Angeles County crews, and several tankers (engines) were working a large slopover near Contractors Point. At 1200 the Dalton Hotshot crew on-scene at Contractors Point and were assigned by Division Boss William Westmoreland to build direct handline south from the Chilao crew along this east flank of the fire. At about 1300 the Del Rosa Hotshot Crew arrived, and Westmoreland directed them to work down the ridge ahead of the Dalton crew. At 1430 the El Cariso Hotshot crew arrived on-scene. Line Boss Hugh Masterson briefed El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King. Masterson's instructions were to "leap-frog the Del Rosa crew and to cold trail the fire edge if possible." He also mentioned that "the main ridge could be used as an alternate if impossible to follow the burned edge."

See the southeast flank topo map with NAD 27 GPS locations for stands shown, above.

Hear excerpts from Dalton Superintendent Chuck Hartley's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

View looking toward the south point of the ridge from Contractors Point. Notice the break in the chamise brush field. This indicates the location of the fireline as it progressed south from Contractors Point during the late morning and early afternoon. The fireline was mostly built by dozers between the missile facility and Contractors Point. From Contractors Point south, handline was required.

Loop Canyon is the major drainage looking down and to the west from Contractors Point. This is the drainage where the fire made its initial downhill run.

Typical Angeles National Forest front country brush and terrain looking east from Contractors Point.

This is shown as Point A in the investigation report photo referred to as Figure 3. El Cariso Superintendent King led his crew to a small bench below this south point of the ridge and held them there until he could determine if it was possible to cold trail the fire edge all the way down. King could see the Los Angeles County dozers and crews working the lower edge of the fire and believed he could tie in with them. At about 1445 Line Boss Masterson requested Division Boss Westmoreland to go down the east flank and make sure the crews were lined out. Westmoreland had a radio and several of the crews did not have radios, including the El Cariso Hotshots. By the time Westmoreland reached the tail end of the El Cariso crew, King had led the first units of his crew well down into the steep rocky chimney staying directly on the fire edge. As a result, King never had a radio exchange or face-to-face meeting with Westmoreland, who was his Division Boss.

See the southeast flank orthophoto map with fire edge shown, above.

Hear excerpts from El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

Looking back from Stand 3 along the ridge toward Contractors Point. This was the 40 chains of open fire edge that was assigned to the Dalton and Del Rosa crews.

The direct attack route that the El Cariso crew followed down.

The alternate indirect route mentioned by Line Boss Masterson. This ended up being the location of the final control line on this flank.

Rocks arranged in an 'M' or a 'W' pattern about six feet across can be found about 100 yards below Stand 3. This is about where the El Cariso crew would have left the ridge and entered the chimney as they cold trailed along the fire edge. Division Boss Westmoreland probably caught up with the tail end of the crew in about this location.

Pacoima Reservoir as seen from the vicinity of Stand 3.

This is shown as Point E in the investigation report photo referred to as Figure 3. By about 15:30 the El Cariso Hotshots were fully committed, cold trailing their way down through the steep rocky chimney canyon with Superintendent King and the lead elements of the crew just starting to approach this point. Division Boss Westmoreland had followed them about halfway down and observed minimal fire activity, but he also stated that it was not a clean burn.

Hear excerpts from El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

At about this same time, line construction by the Los Angeles County dozer and crews, that were working west along the bottom of the slope, was halted by a deep gully. This gully was adjacent to and just below the chimney canyon that the El Cariso crew was working down. There was no radio communication capability between the two groups, but they did have visual contact. Independently, both were trying to figure out how best to tie in the line. At this point, there was no more than 500 feet separating them.

Several individuals, who were working at the bottom of the fire, stated that the fire behavior was in a static situation with hot spots near the bottom of the gully and that there were favorable southeast winds. In addition, a helicopter was making water drops on the hotspots. According to these same observers, sometime between 1535 and 1545, the fire started to cross the bottom of the gully. Within the next 5 to 10 minutes the fire crossed the gully, made a run upslope to the bottom of the chimney, and then flashed very quickly up the length of the chimney. The steep rocky terrain made it very difficult for firefighters to move toward the previously burned area. Terrain conditions combined with the rapid fire spread resulted in all members of the El Cariso Hotshot crew being burned over as they worked from this stand location and up several hundred yards in the chimney above.

See the Investigation Report Figure 3 map, above, showing the fatality site with fire edge.

Looking up from Stand 4 at the rock slide in the chimney canyon.

Rock cairn that marks Stand 4. This was put up in 2002.

Looking down from Stand 4 toward the gully that impeded the Los Angeles County crews line construction effort.

Reptile hazard encountered on the hike up in warm weather.

Rescue operations began immediately after the burnover. These efforts included having the helicopter hover over very rugged terrain while the fire was still active to pick up the survivors in the upper end of the chimney canyon.

Hear excerpts from El Cariso Superintendent Gordon King's interview:  audio file (mp3), transcript.

That evening the Del Rosa and Dalton Hotshot crews went on to complete the handline down to the bottom of Pacoima Canyon using the ridge and indirect line location that was identified as the alternate strategy by Line Boss Masterson. The fire was contained that night at approximately 2,000 acres.

A Washington Office investigation and safety review was ordered following this accident. Several recommendations from the investigation and safety review caused significant changes in wildland firefighting equipment and procedures.

Pacoima Dam Road offers a good perspective of the entire working area around the fatality site, making it a good location to conduct the integration phase of the Staff Ride by having participants share their observations at the end of the day.

Read Paul Gleason's 30 year commemoration remarks

Read the Report of the Fire Safety Review Team from 1967.

Looking at the chimney canyon and fatality site from Pacoima Dam Road. Highest point visible on the ridge is Stand 3.

Fire behavior and air tanker working just above Pacoima Canyon before the entrapment of the El Cariso Hotshot crew.

Loop Fire under the influence of the Santa Ana winds.

Investigation team on site.

Looking down the chimney canyon. Several of the investigation team members are barely visible on down the ridge. This photo was taken by Bud Moore, one of the team members, during the onsite investigation.

Looking across the deep gully from the location where the Los Angeles County dozer and crews were stopped. Note the individual standing in the bottom of the gully, a short distance farther up from that point in the gully is where the spot fire crossed and began its upslope run. This photo was taken during the winter following the fire.

On June 25, 1990, a lightning strike sparked a fire beneath the Mogollon Rim about 10 miles northeast of Payson. Conditions were such that the fire burned quickly and within a matter of hours the Dude Fire had become extremely active. The fire was reported at 1315. Initial attack resources arrived at 1400 to find a very active10-acre fire. An hour later over 360 firefighters including engines, dozers, handcrews, aviation resources, and a Type II Incident Management Team had been ordered. The Type II IMT was on site and assumed command of the fire by 1800.

Around 1930 the 20 person Perryville inmate crew arrived at the Payson Ranger District. The crew was instructed to eat and report to base camp. Following dinner, they were redirected to the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision. At 0100 the Perryville crew arrived at the Subdivision and they were quickly moved to the junction of Walk Moore Canyon and the Control Road, they arrived there at 0230. By this time a Type I IMT had been ordered and was to shadow the Type II team beginning at 0600 and then transfer command at 1300.

The Mogollon Rim rises 1,000 feet above the ponderosa pines north and east of Payson. It often created its own weather. From mid-July through September, large thunderheads gather almost daily along the Rim's edge. The vegetation in the fire area was drastically different from what we see today. The vegetation consisted primarily of dense Ponderosa Pine with decadent Manzanita underbrush covered in needle-drape. Due to heavy ponderosa over story, visibility was extremely limited for resources working in Walk Moore Canyon as opposed to the unrestricted visibility of today. It is important to note the change in vegetation composition as it relates to how we now implement LCES.

This location provides an overall view of the area including the Mogollon Rim, Walk Moore Canyon, and the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision.

Parking for Stand 1 is in this undeveloped gravel borrow pit. From the parking area walk up and over the Control Road to the east for Stand 1 location.

From Stand 1 participants can view the point of origin, Walk Moore Canyon, and Bonita Creek Estates.

At 0230 the Perryville crew met with Division Supervisor Dale Ashby at the Control Road and Walk Moore Canyon Junction. The crew's assignment was to anchor at the Control Road and construct line up the jeep trail. The crew completed the line on the jeep trail and continued up the power line right-of-way into the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision.

By 0300 the main fire was within one-quarter mile of the Subdivision structures. The brisk down canyon winds continued to push the fire to approximately 500 acres by 0500. By 0600 the fire was estimated to be 1900 acres.

The Perryville crew and Prescott IHC (Interagency Hotshot Crew) worked in the Subdivision until approximately 0930. By this time the jeep trail in Walk Moore Canyon had been bladed by a dozer, the crew was instructed to improve this line.

From the junction of the power line and Walk Moore Canyon, one can look up the power line through the brush and see the direction the crew began working. At the time of the fire, the hillside consisted of thick Pine trees with a brush and needle-cast understory. Saw work in the dense dog-hair-thicket was slow and finding a place swamp the cut material was tough because of the density of vegetation. The crew's original assignment was to proceed up the jeep trail in the bottom of the canyon, it changed to building line up the power line and around the south and east of the Subdivision.

This is the developed interpretive site/parking area. It is utilized to access Stands 2-4 and has a capacity for approximately 10 vehicles.

Looking up the handline that was constructed by the Perryville crew in the powerline right-of-way immediately after the fire.

The powerline looking in the direction the Perryville crew built line.

Saw team working in the area of Bonita Creek Estates during the Dude Fire – note the vegetation conditions.

As the intensive prep work near the corner house was completed a firing operation began. By 1300 Perryville had continued to improve line and made it approximately one-third of the way down Walk Moore Canyon where they ran out of drinking water. The crew boss and one crewmember walked to the Control Road and sent water back to the crew via ATV.

Around 1300 the firing operation was stopped due to holding difficulties. Around 1330 it was discovered travel south through the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision was blocked by fire. At this point, two dozers were instructed to build an impromptu safety zone within the recently attempted firing operation. At 1345 a spot fire was reported below the Control Road on the west side.

Shortly after 1400 Perryville had resupplied with water and returned to work as the Hotshot crews above them began to move into the impromptu safety zone. The fire began to crown and Perryville began to move down the canyon towards the Control Road.

The corner house became a landmark and reference point during the fire. This location served as a meeting point for the numerous resources on this portion of the fire. It was a tactical focal point being at the head of Walk Moore Canyon and the portion of Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision closest to the fire.

Looking north at the corner house.

Looking southwest at the corner house and down Walk Moore Canyon.

Fire approaching corner house on June 26, 1990.

Looking northwest up Walkmoore Canyon from a small mesa above the corner house. This photo was taken about 45 minutes before the blowup on June 26, 1990.

Deployment site with fatality markers and shelter deployment markers in place.

As the Perryville crew noticed the fire moving above them, they also saw that the Navajo Scouts crew was running past them and yelling to "get out". Everyone began to run towards the Control Road. The Perryville crew became separated into an upper and lower group, the lower group being closer to the Control Road. Several crewmembers had trouble with equipment such as chaps falling down and difficulty removing fusees. The upper portion of the crew was cut off when the fire crossed the dozer line below them. Those cut off were forced to move back up the canyon. The cut off crewmembers struggled to deploy their fire shelters.

At this location, 11 Perryville crewmembers were entrapped resulting in six fatalities. At the time of the fire, this canyon was full of closely spaced Ponderosa Pine trees limiting the view of the surrounding area. The existing jeep trail in the canyon bottom had just been bladed by a dozer for use as a control line.

Walk Moore Canyon immediately following the fire showing the height and density of the trees at the time of the fire.

Looking up Walk Moore Canyon at the deployment site immediately following the fire.

From his initial deployment site, James Ellis walked down the canyon, then back up the canyon where he met survivors. He was then escorted back down the canyon to this location where he stated "I'm dead," laid down with his head on a log, and expired.

This location provides a powerful and convenient site for field integration sessions.

Potential field integration site near Ellis' cross. The cross was positioned out of the canyon bottom and away from the actual fatality location to avoid erosion damage.

Actual location where Ellis declared: 'I'm dead'.

This memorial was organized and erected by the residents of the Bonita Creek Estates Subdivision in honor and recognition of the ultimate sacrifice made by the members of the Perryville crew.

The Perryville crew memorial erected by the residents of Bonita Creek Estates.

An expanded view of the memorial site and surrounding area. Parking opportunities are limited.