Incident Summary:

On August 19, 2015, USDA Forest Service firefighters Richard Wheeler, Andrew Zajac, and Tom Zbyszewski perished while engaged in initial attack on the Twisp River Fire. A fourth member of the crew was critically injured with severe burns. In addition, a Heavy Equipment Boss, a Heavy Equipment Boss Trainee from the Washington Department of Natural Resources, and a contract Dozer Operator were entrapped but survived with minor injuries. Numerous other fire personnel were also entrapped but survived without injuries.
 

The Twisp River Fire was reported on August 19 at 1223 Pacific Daylight Time. The fire started when tree branches struck a nearby powerline. By 0600 hours on August 20, it was reported to be 7,231 acres and had reached the outskirts of Twisp, Washington. The fire’s final reported acreage on August 26 was 11,922 acres.

Key Points:

• The Unified Command Incident Commanders (ICs) on the Twisp River Fire found themselves in a position where they had to build their team as they went, which resulted in less experienced people being asked to take on leadership roles during an extremely complex event. Engines were turned over to Assistant Captains; squads were led by less experienced Squad Bosses. The current wildfire system does not always have the depth in qualifications to create a Type 3 team without stripping leadership from individual response units. If leadership is stripped from a unit, a decision has to be made about how to use the remaining less experienced team members. This adds complexity to the IC’s role.
• The person serving as captain of the burned-over engine had been called away to provide supervisory expertise elsewhere on the rapidly emerging fire. This left the next-most experienced firefighter as the engine driver during the emergency egress operations. The driver had taken the classroom courses needed for engine operation and was in the process of completing a region-specific supplemental driving requirement of four hours of supervised driving under “actual conditions” before taking the final driving test.
• Perceptions of safety are influenced by operational experiences where aggressive tactics were successful; each success reduces a field operator’s sense of accident probability or severity.
• Intuitive tactical actions common to past efforts may fail when the fire environment delivers rapid growth that is beyond the capacity of fire responders to predict and adapt. Explosive fire growth is becoming common, yet we are still relying upon strategies and tactics based on the fires of yesterday. We must create the ability to recognize when different approaches are needed and then safely and successfully apply those measures.
• Selecting the correct fire response must consider risk to firefighters, the public, and values at risk.
• Drought-stricken light flashy fuels are particularly responsive to changes in wind speed/direction and remain one of the most powerful drivers of suddenly explosive fire behavior.

Discussion:

• Who is looking at the big picture? Not only that, but who knows what to do about what they're seeing and when to do it?
• How do people who arrive with different perspectives best compare and reconcile information to make sound decisions? How do we get to a point where we know it’s important to retreat and do that definitively as opposed to continuing to engage? How do we help people learn how and when to disengage when they are otherwise rewarded over the course of a career for running in when others are running away?
• Can we assess fires in a way that allows us to identify high-risk/low probability of success situations before we decide how to commit resources?