Incident Summary:

On August 19, 2015, USDA Forest Service firefighters Richard Wheeler, Andrew Zajac, and Tom Zbyszewski perished while engaged in initial attack on the Twisp River Fire. A fourth member of the crew was critically injured with severe burns. In addition, a Heavy Equipment Boss, a Heavy Equipment Boss Trainee from the Washington Department of Natural Resources, and a contract Dozer Operator were entrapped but survived with minor injuries. Numerous other fire personnel were also entrapped but survived without injuries.
 

The Twisp River Fire was reported on August 19 at 1223 Pacific Daylight Time. The fire started when tree branches struck a nearby powerline. By 0600 hours on August 20, it was reported to be 7,231 acres and had reached the outskirts of Twisp, Washington. The fire’s final reported acreage on August 26 was 11,922 acres.

Key Points:

• The Unified Command Incident Commanders (ICs) on the Twisp River Fire had to build their team as they went, which resulted in multiple people being asked to temporarily serve in leadership roles during an extremely complex event. We do not always have the depth in qualifications to create the needed organization without using leadership from responding units. When leaders from crews are used to staff the incident management organization, there is a direct impact on the capacity of the crews.
• The captain of the entrapped engine was tasked with providing supervisory expertise elsewhere on the rapidly emerging fire. This resulted in a less experienced firefighter operating the engine during emergency egress operations.
• Perceptions of safety may be influenced by experiences where aggressive tactics have been successful. Each tactical success influences a field operator’s sense of accident probability.

Discussion:

• We often face competing needs, especially when staffing an emerging fire. Crews get asked to provide leadership staffing for the incident. Consider perspectives from an IC trying to build an organization AND the individual crews being asked to provide staffing. What specifics need to be addressed on both sides of this decision process?
• How do people with these different perspectives best compare and reconcile information to make sound decisions? How and when are these decisions best made?
• Does your crew have a “draw down” limit? Does capacity to “loan out” positions change based on fire conditions/complexity?
• When operational tempo is high, who is looking at the big picture? What traits can you build into your organization to continually process big picture information and act on it quickly?